Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (the reader ebook .TXT) 📕
Read free book «Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (the reader ebook .TXT) 📕» - read online or download for free at americanlibrarybooks.com
- Author: Henrik Lunde
Read book online «Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (the reader ebook .TXT) 📕». Author - Henrik Lunde
The loss of Elvegårdsmoen was a blow to the Germans. Some magazines, although considerably reduced from April 9, fell into French hands. The Germans left behind three doctors and 45 seriously wounded at their field hospital, all of whom were captured. Group Windisch was now entirely dependent on supplies from the base at Bjørnefjell and the spring thaw made the route to that location very difficult.
Group Windisch Escapes
The Norwegian part of the operations against the Germans involved an attack by the 7th Brigade on the right to seize the Vassdalsfjell area north of Hartvigvann. This attack was expected to result in a link up with the Legionnaires who were moving northeast from Elvegårdsmoen, thereby trapping the 1/139th in its defensive positions astride Route 50. The 6th Brigade on the left was to seize a foothold on the Kuberg Plateau before the Germans could settle into new defensive positions.
Group Windisch was in danger of having its line of retreat severed. Windisch also had to establish a new front, one that faced north as well as west against the forces landed in Herjangsfjord. He had to delay the French advance northeast of Elvegårdsmoen and prevent a link-up with an anticipated advance by the 7th Brigade while shoring up the front facing the 6th Brigade. Failing to do so would prevent the withdrawing forces from occupying and preparing new defensive positions.
Windisch issued orders at 0500 hours on May 13 for his dangerously exposed forces on the German left to withdraw eastward to the area south of Hartvigvann and for the establishment of new defensive line from Storebalak to Fiskeløsvann. Units had orders to destroy heavy weapons and equipment that could not be brought along. Several factors came into play to allow Group Windisch to extricate itself successfully.
The advance of the 1/13th Half-Brigade halted on a line running from Skoglund to Skogfjell while the 1/139th was able to halt the southward drive of the 14/27th CA before it reached the planned link-up point at Tverelven. The two French units were therefore unable to join on May 13 as planned. The advance of the 2/13 Half-Brigade from Elvegårdsmoen was slowed by some very effective, but costly, German rear-guard actions. Lieutenant Bauer, the commander of Co 2 1/139, led a 30-man platoon from his company and tried to halt the French advance. The platoon was driven back after some vicious close-quarter fighting and Bauer was killed. Many of his men were also killed, wounded, or captured.
Elements from Co 13 were ordered to counterattack and try to throw the French back to the coast. The attack failed and the unit took up positions in the hills facing west. This allowed them to keep the Hartvigvann road as well as Route 50 under observation and fire. This fire contributed to halting the northward drive of the 1/13 Half-Brigade.
The fighting now switched to Hill 220 northeast of Elvegårdsmoen. This knoll was held by a weak detachment from Co 11 under the command of Lieutenant Tollschein. His mission was to cover the German withdrawal. The French eastward drive was stopped and the Legionnaires suffered a considerable number of casualties. Tollschein and his men repelled repeated attacks supported by naval gunfire and attacks by Norwegian aircraft. The two tanks supporting the second French attempt to take Hill 220 were stopped by mines that blew off their treads. Tollschein and his men managed to hold the Legionnaires of the 2nd Bn for 24 hours, allowing their comrades to make an orderly, but very difficult, retreat to the east. The position fell on May 14 after a French multi-directional attack. Only five of Tollschein’s men escaped by climbing down the hill’s 180-foot cliff-like backside. Buchner writes that it is difficult to understand why the French did not try to bypass the detachment by advancing south of Hartvigvann where there were no German defenders.
The German divisional reserve consisted of Lieutenant Ploder’s Co 3, 138th Regiment: two officers and 65 men who were landed in Rombakfjord between May 8 and 10. Early in the morning of May 13, this unit was ordered to move forward, occupy Mebyfjell from Hill 482 to Hill 548, and cover the withdrawal of Group Windisch. Hill 482 was secured by only two squads until 0600 hours when the company, ignorant of the actual situation, tried to return to its previous location. It ran into Colonel Windisch who turned it around. French detachments, probing eastward from the landing areas, found no Germans in their path but instead of continuing their advance, they settled in on the plateau and were subsequently driven back by Co 3/138th.
It was of the greatest importance for the Germans to secure and hold open the bridge over the Vassdal River near Gamberg for the withdrawing units, in case the enemy was able to brush aside the delaying forces or descended into the valley from Vassdalsfjell. The river was in flood because of the spring thaw and there was no other crossing point. The regimental engineer platoon was ordered to hold the bridge. Strong Norwegian forces in Gressdal also posed an acute danger to the regiment’s right flank and the weak remnants of naval company Erdmenger had the mission of blocking this threat.
The 1/139th, on the German far left, faced the most difficult withdrawal. The battalion had to disengage while under pressure from French and Norwegians forces from two directions. By leapfrogging from position to position and under the cover of well-selected machinegun emplacements, the remnants of the four
Comments (0)