Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (the reader ebook .TXT) 📕

in the country. Adams and Derry write that the soldiers brought along their weapons as they were transferred, but Auchinleck, in a letter to General Dill, wrote “They had no rifles, machine-guns or anything.”36 The escorts transported the troops back to Harstad. Here they were reorganized and reequipped.

The next disaster was not long in coming. It was decided to send the 2nd Bn, South Wales Borders to Bodø in the cruiser Effingham, commanded by Captain J. M. Howson. The cruiser was part of a five-ship task force that also consisted of two antiaircraft cruisers, and two destroyers. All troops were embarked on Effingham. The ships departed Harstad at 0400 hours on May 17. The warships proceeded west of the Lofoten Islands at top speed. Rather than following the normal approach to Bodø, it was decided to make a shorter back-door approach in order to minimize the submarine threat.

The first ship to hit the Flesene shoals about 12 miles from Bodø was the destroyer Matable, which struck only a glancing blow, losing its starboard propeller but remaining afloat. The antiaircraft cruiser Coventry also touched bottom but the damage was minor. Effingham, traveling at 23 knots, hit the shoal hard, tearing open its bottom. By great good fortune, there were no casualties. The troops were transferred rapidly and in an orderly way from the sinking cruiser to the destroyer Echo. All equipment, except that carried by the troops, was lost, including the Bren-gun carriers. Even some individual weapons were abandoned. Echo transferred the troops to Coventry and went back to rescue the Effingham’s crew. It was not possible to salvage the cruiser and it was sunk by torpedoes.

There was again an attempt to place blame where it did not belong. Adams writes:

Within hours of boarding the Coventry a strong rumour spread throughout the ship that a Norwegian was at the helm when the ship struck the reef. It was alleged that he was a follower of Quisling and that the sinking of the Effingham was a deliberate, traitorous act. One version of the story was emphatic that the Captain of the Effingham executed the “traitor” on the bridge by shooting him in the head. This rumour, like many others of its kind, seems completely without foundation.37

There was no Norwegian pilot on the cruiser. The British had a Norwegian navigational chart, and the report of the cruiser’s loss admits that the chosen channel was “more foul of navigational dangers than the normal approach.” It also notes that it carried a remark that vessels with local knowledge could make the passage, implying that it should not be attempted without such knowledge. The report states, however, that the qualification concerning local knowledge is commonplace on Norwegian navigational charts outside the main shipping lane and that “hitherto, experience had shown that no extreme regard need be paid to it, provided normal pilotage precautions were observed.”38

The Germans claimed they sank the British cruiser. A photograph in Signal, Hitler’s wartime picture magazine, shows the wreck of Effingham. The caption claims that the cruiser, damaged by German bombs, was beached, and finally capsized.

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“Ah, it is all very difficult. We are used to traveling on camels across the desert, and here you give us boats, and we have to cross the water. It is very difficult but it will be all right. I think so.”

REACTION BY AN OFFICER OF THE FRENCH FOREIGN LEGION WHEN TOLD THAT HIS UNIT WOULD MAKE THE FIRST AMPHIBIOUS LANDING OF WORLD WAR II.

Pressures on the Allied Commanders to Act

Churchill and his colleagues in London were understandably exasperated by the lack of initiative displayed by their military commanders at Narvik. The Norwegians were also baffled by the unwillingness of the Allies to use their enormous firepower and clear numerical advantage. London continued to exert pressure on the field commanders to get them to act but some of the messages reveal that the officials in London were out of touch with realities on the ground. On April 28, Churchill sent a message to Admiral Cork in which he maintained that the focus of effort must be on Narvik and the Gallivare ore fields.

Churchill was still thinking of advancing 250 kilometers through a winter wilderness at a time when a brigade of British professionals had great difficulties operating along a coastal road. The following comments by Professor Hubatsch, while directed primarily at the Germans, apply to the Allies to an even greater degree, “In the Norwegian Campaign more than in any other theatre of war, we see the fascinating problem of how different the impressions gained by the men at the front could be from those held by the High Command.”2

Churchill kept up the pressure on Admiral Cork.

Admiral Cork and General Mackesy had been engaged in a debate about strategy since they arrived in Norway. Some of the blame must be placed on those who issued instructions that were conflicting and not coordinated at the highest levels.

The possible window of opportunity for a landing in Narvik closed rather quickly and the Norwegians never suggested that the Allies should attempt a direct landing in Narvik. Lindbäck-Larsen concluded that a direct attack on Narvik was impractical within a few days after the destruction of the German destroyers on April 13.

Mackesy’s reluctance to launch an attack against Narvik in the first week or two after his arrival has considerable validity as long as the 24th Guards was the only force at his disposal. His arguments quickly lost their soundness after the Norwegians began their offensive in late April and with the arrival of significant reinforcements. He appears haunted by fears of a disaster long before committing his forces to battle. In one dispatch quoted by Derry, he talks about the “snows of Narvik being turned into another version of the mud of Passchendaele.” Moulton observes that this was, “… strange and hysterical language for a military commander,