American library books » Other » Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (the reader ebook .TXT) 📕

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Mackesy, who was also very concerned about developments in the south, decided to send the 1st Bn, Scots Guards to Mo. He also sent along a half-battery of 25-pounders, four antiaircraft guns, and engineers. This force, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Trappes-Lomax, landed in Mo early on May 12. Mackesy viewed the defense of Mo as important since it was the terminal of the last road connection to Sweden and the airfield located just north of that town had to be kept out of German hands. Mackesy also prepared to reinforce the Scots Guards in Mo with the 1st Bn of the Irish Guards.

German Supply Problems

The Germans were having difficulties in supplying their forward units. Von Falkenhorst’s order on May 4 had specified that the 2nd Mountain Division would pass through General Woytasch’s 181st Division in the Grong area. The 181st Division would expand its area of responsibility northward behind the rearmost elements of Feurstein’s forces and assume responsibility for the movement of supplies in those areas. The north-south road was in terrible shape after the thaw set in and it was unsuitable for transport of supplies on a large scale before May 20. Until then, most supplies were brought in by air but the weather conditions made even this effort unpredictable. The capture of the British supplies in Mosjøen on May 11 alleviated the precarious supply situation for five to six days.29

The Germans attempted unsuccessfully to bring supplies to the 2nd Division by sea. Their failure was attributable to Norwegian patrol boats operating from bases on the islands along the coast. This forced the Germans to undertake operations to secure the sea route by occupying a number of larger islands along the coast in order to prevent Norwegian patrol vessels from operating in the fjords and forcing them out to sea.

This mission was given to the 181st Division and carried out systematically during the rest of May and early June, assisted by a task force from the 2nd Mountain Division. Only small groups of Norwegian volunteers opposed them. Nevertheless, the last island was not captured until May 31. The route along the coast on the inland side of the islands was now open and the Germans began using this on a regular basis; but it was still necessary to plan a large-scale German naval operation for early June.

The Fight at Finneid

Captain Dahl met Lieutenant Colonel Trappes-Lomax soon after the 1st Bn, Scots Guards landed early on May 12. He tried to persuade the British commander to attempt to recapture Hemnes while the Germans were suffering from a lack of supplies. Trappes-Lomax replied that he would await the arrival of reinforcements and that night the British battalion went into positions at Dalselv, approximately midway between Mo and Finneid, a position he considered very strong. This left the defense of Finneid, which was the most defensible position south of Mo, to the 1st Independent Co, without artillery support, and Captain Ellinger’s weak company.30

Roscher-Nielsen and Nummedal arrived in Mo on May 13. Roscher-Nielsen took command of the Norwegian forces in the area while Nummedal retained his responsibilities for mobilization and training. Roscher-Nielsen’s initial thoughts were for the 1/14th Inf to hold or delay the German northward advance from Elsfjord and Korgen. However, Trappes-Lomax informed him in the evening of May 13 that he had given orders for the 1st Independent Co to withdraw, since the road leading north from Finneid was under German mortar fire from Hemnesøy. Roscher-Nielsen prevailed on his counterpart to delay the withdrawal long enough to assist Captain Ellinger in his effort to cover the withdrawal of the 1/14th through Finneid.

Ellinger’s men occupied positions along the road from Sund to Finneid and remained there while the soldiers in the 1/14th withdrew through Finneid to Mo. A company from the reserve battalion of the 14th Inf was the last unit to withdraw from Korgen in the morning of May 14. Ellinger’s men withdrew from Hemnesøy and British engineers destroyed the road behind them.

The 6th Division was still somewhat in the dark about the situation in Nordland. Roscher-Nielsen sent a message to the division at midnight on May 13, reporting the steps taken, including the withdrawal from Korgen. He also reported that another British battalion was expected on May 14 and that naval gunfire support was required. A message from the division on May 14 requested detailed information about force deployment, to include the exact location of each company in preparation for a meeting with the new British commander, General Auchinleck. Fleischer also wanted to know if the withdrawal from Korgen was due to enemy pressure.

In a message at 2300 hours on May 14, Roscher-Nielsen tried to explain the difficult and serious situation in the Mo area to General Fleischer:

The expected British battalion was yesterday ordered to Bodø instead of Mo. Simultaneously, the British battalion in this area was ordered to concentrate on the defense of Mo. Despite repeated protests, the defense of Finneid will be abandoned tomorrow at 2200 hours. Consequently, the reduced combat effective Sundlo battalion could not be left in Korgen. The Germans have not pressed their attack and it is my belief that Hemnesøy could be recaptured if there was help from the sea but this appears hopeless … Both battalions have lost most of their transport and have no horse-drawn trains. They can only be used for stationary missions.31

Both Major May and Captain Ellinger expected to be attacked by the Germans on Hemnesøy as well as by the Germans approaching from the south. It was obvious that they did not have sufficient forces to meet attacks from two directions. The German attack across the isthmus from Hemnesøy began at 1700 hours on May 14. The attack was well supported by mortar and artillery fire and the Germans quickly drove back the British outposts and established themselves on the isthmus. Two British warships appeared in the fjord and bombarded the village of Hemnesberg but the bombardment did nothing to help the units fighting

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