Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (the reader ebook .TXT) 📕

not until May 19 that the flank was covered, by relatively weak forces. If Berg had been allowed to move significant forces into the area between Nævertind and the Swedish border, he may have found no German defenses to speak of between that area and Bjørnefjell.

A two-battalion attack in the area from Kuberget to the Swedish border, conducted at the same time as the rest of the Norwegian and French forces tied down the remainder of Group Windisch, could have led to a quick termination of the campaign. It would have posed a direct threat to what was a rather defenseless base area in the middle of May. Only a quick withdrawal of Group Windisch would have produced sufficient forces to blunt such a drive. Failure to do so in a timely manner would have isolated Group Windisch and caused the loss of the Bjørnefjell base. Its loss would spell the end to any possibility of Dietl’s forces surviving for more than a few days. If successful, a thrust along the Swedish border would give the Norwegians ample time to eliminate the last pocket of German resistance before the situation in Narvik was overtaken by events.

A breakthrough drive by the 6th Brigade in the east would have involved minimal risks to its right flank, if the other Norwegian and French forces had maintained pressure on Group Windisch as it withdrew. The risk would have been more than offset by the turmoil such an advance would cause for the 3rd Division and the avoidance of a three-week slugging match that resulted from the set-piece broad front approach. German reinforcements were beginning to trickle into the Narvik area and it was important to conclude the operation successfully before this became a significant flow. It was also important for General Fleischer to move forces to the south to confront General Feurstein.

There are differences of opinion with regard to who was at fault for not exploiting an excellent opportunity to conclude the campaign. General Hovland maintains that Fleischer intended to conduct “maneuver warfare” and blames Berg for either misunderstanding or ignoring Fleischer’s instructions.18 Hovland refers to the 6th Division’s operational directive on May 15 as proof of Fleischer’s intentions. This directive calls for the advance to Bjørnefjell to start after Narvik was recaptured and the troops had had an opportunity to rest in positions suitable as starting points for future operations.

The 6th Brigade did not stop for a rest and it was due to its initiative on the high plateau that the Norwegians were able to capture this area before the Germans built up their defenses and brought in reinforcements. There was no pressure from the division to hurry the attack. With respect to future operations, the brigades were encouraged to send reconnaissance detachments into the Cirklevann and Kuberg areas and to maintain strong combat patrols there.19

The Norwegians had good intelligence about German dispositions that indicated that the bulk of their forces were in the west and center of their sector.20 Berg had the lack of German troops between Nævertind and the Swedish border in mind when he suggested shifting the weight of his attack eastward on May 12. He pointed to the difficulties involved in an attack from Læigastind and Gressvann and the obvious defensive preparations the Germans had made on the plateau south of these locations. He saw maneuver possibilities in the area from Nævertind to Isvann and the Swedish border. A concentration of forces in the east would still allow for an offensive against Jernvannene. Berg anticipated that supplying an easterly offensive would be more difficult but concluded that it was possible.

It may well be that Fleischer intended to avoid the German strongpoint on the plateau as much as possible, and it may have been his intention to push through the center and cut off the German retreat near Jernvannene. However, there is no convincing evidence of “maneuver warfare” in the Norwegian operations after May 1. There is no evidence of a main effort or of attempts to outflank the Germans. The operations can be characterized as an effort to drive the Germans back on a broad front. Fleischer was familiar with the positioning of the various units along his front. He also had copies of the brigade orders for their operations and objectives. These should have told him that the Norwegians were engaged on an systematic assault on and capture of key terrain all along the front, with little thought given to bypassing the enemy. There were no units positioned to widen a breakthrough and push into the enemy rear. Dietl had ordered the Kuberg-Kobberfjell area held “unconditionally” and it was against these strong defenses that the 6th Brigade was ordered to launch its operations.

The next division directive was issued on May 19, as the fighting for the key objectives on the high plateau was already in progress. Again, there is no expressed sense of urgency.21 Ø.K. [Fleischer] finds no grounds to force [hasten] the advance. Ø.K. would prefer that the units first expand their supply lines. However, if the Allied troops advance, it is the responsibility of the advance security force [6th Brigade] to insure that Norwegian troops reach the line Spionkop-international border first. And, the 6th Brigade may initiate this advance on its own initiative along a line of advance it finds most suitable.

However, we must give credit to Fleischer who appears to have been the only general officer who considered Bjørnefjell the main objective. The Allies—from Churchill down—continued their fixation with the town of Narvik, a town that had lost whatever importance it may have had as a military objective. It had only a symbolic importance. The objective of an offensive is the destruction of enemy forces or placing these forces in an untenable situation. The capture of Bjørnefjell would do that since Dietl would be forced to defend his last link to the outside world and would withdraw—as he indicated—from Narvik to defend his base area if that became necessary.

If all available forces were committed on