Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (the reader ebook .TXT) 📕

a halt and the major combat elements of the Alta Bn were either withdrawn back to their starting positions or remained passive on the northern slopes of their objectives. The French had not undertaken any offensive operations. Nothing came of the coordinated attack on the high plateau supposedly worked out between Generals Fleischer and Béthouart on May 14. There is no evidence of attempts to carry out “maneuver warfare.”

The troops in the 6th Brigade had reached almost the limits of their endurance, as noted in an extract from Major Munthe-Kaas’ report to the brigade in the evening of May 21:

The enemy’s unusual obstinate defense yesterday and last night against our repeated attacks has tired our units heavily after days of continual combat under the most unfavorable conditions for care, rest, and personal hygiene. All forces are committed and must remain so until we are secured against counterattacks and the loss of the territory captured. Tactically, we need relief from the pressure through attacks by forces on our right flank. Materially, we need help to get our supplies, particularly ammunition up to the front … The capture of the heavily occupied and bravely defended Hill 648 presents many possibilities for continual advances but first we must consolidate, rest, and be re-supplied …26

The Norwegian units operating on the high plateau captured prisoners from several German units. From these and some captured documents they concluded that they faced six enemy companies that had orders to defend their positions against all odds. The severity of the fighting attested to the fact that these orders were followed.

Group Windisch’s losses in the three-day period 17-19 May amounted to 32 killed, 57 wounded, and 45 missing. Such losses could not be sustained much longer, and Windisch and Dietl agreed that the group needed to retire to a shorter defensive line.

In addition to the threat from the northeast, the Germans were also concerned about the French battalion that landed at Liljedal on May 19. If it advanced northeast over Aasen (Hill 332) in conjunction with an attack by the Legionnaires against Hill 488 from Hill 621, Group Windisch’s southern flank would be threatened. One officer and 15 men from Co 3, 138th, who had landed by seaplane on May 20, were reinforced by 36 naval personnel and rushed across the Rombakfjord in small boats to the area south of the French landing site to secure Group Windisch’s flank. Hergot, south of Liljedal, was occupied by the French in the morning of May 21 but was retaken by the Germans the following evening.

A German withdrawal from the high plateau had been under discussion for several days. Positions were reconnoitered and bridges over the swollen rivers prepared for demolition. Group Windisch was near collapse, pressure was mounting along the whole front, its line of retreat was threatened, the supply situation was in chaos, and the flow of reinforcements noted below was not sufficient to replace losses or turn the tide of battle:

May 14—66 troops from the Co 1, 1st Parachute Regiment parachuted into the Bjørnefjell area.

May 15—22 paratroopers arrived.

May 16—76 additional airborne troops parachuted into the Bjørnefjell area. May 18—Two seaplanes brought in 16 mountain troops from Co 2, 138th Regiment.

May 20—Two seaplanes brought in 19 mountain troops with one anti-tank gun from Co 2, 138th. Forty specialists also arrived by train through Sweden.

May 22—Six seaplanes brought in 63 troops and an antitank gun from Co 2, 138th.

The decisive moment for Dietl and Windisch came on May 21 when Munthe-Kaas’ men stormed Hill 648. The Germans lost 50 troops killed or captured. Both officers commanding the troops on that hill died in the fighting. A breakthrough in the center, leading to heavy losses, was now a distinct possibility. Dietl decided to carry out the planned withdrawal, which would shorten and strengthen the front. The timing and conduct of the withdrawal was left to Colonel Windisch. Light infantry and engineer units covered the withdrawal, which began at 2100 hours on May 21. The withdrawal was carried out according to plans and without interference from Norwegians and French forces.

The Norwegians attacked Lillebalak during the night of the withdrawal and occupied that key terrain as well as Hill 482 in the morning of May 22. The 6th Brigade had continued its pressure around Kobberfjell, trying to isolate that dominating terrain. The German withdrawal allowed it to occupy Kobberfjell by the middle of the day on May 22. Munthe-Kaas notes with regret that the Germans managed to withdraw without being pursued:27

The withdrawal took place without interference; it caused despair but there was nothing that could be done at that time. The 6th Brigade lacked the fresh and rested troops required for an effective pursuit that could have ended in trapping or destroying the withdrawing enemy or, more likely, in their flight into Sweden. It [the brigade] could not squeeze more from its combat units that had, day and night, for four weeks fought their way forward, without relief or hope of relief, in unusually difficult, completely roadless, and snowed-under mountain terrain against the battle-experienced troops of a great power. Exhausted units–despite a glowing desire for the fatherland’s freedom, good discipline, and eagerness to fight–can not be used in such demanding operations as the pursuit of an enemy retiring in good order.

By the evening of May 22, most of the German units were in their new defensive positions behind the watercourse formed by Storeelven, Jernvannene, and Holmeelven. The paratroopers on Group Schleebrügge’s far right failed to get the withdrawal order because Norwegian units prevented the messenger from reaching them in time. They managed to disengage eventually and withdrew to Hills 620 and 698. The covering forces along the front succeeded in retiring behind the new front after carrying out the planned destructions.

T

HE

L

OSS OF

N

ORDLAND

P

ROVINCE

“In this Norwegian encounter, our finest troops, the Scots and Irish Guards, were baffled by the vigour, enterprise, and training of Hitler’s young men.”

CHURCHILL’S COMMENTS IN THE