Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (the reader ebook .TXT) 📕

sure that Walther established contact with Haussels’ forces. Second, he wanted to move the forces along the railroad out of the reach of British warships and French/Norwegian artillery batteries at Øyjord. Finally, Walther was worried about an enemy landing in his rear, and a withdrawal to the narrows at Straumnes would alleviate this problem. The retreating Germans offered strong resistance and were able to destroy the railroad.

May 30 and 31 were days full of crises for the Germans and they did not know that the situation with respect to the French and Polish forces would stabilize at the end of that period. Captain Walther’s forces along the railroad were under steady and increasing pressure from the French. The most serious situation developed in Major Haussels’ area when it became apparent that the Poles were driving towards Sildvik. If they succeeded, Walther’s forces would be cut off. There were no reserves available and it was estimated that the Polish drive was in battalion strength. Haussels had only weak forces in their path and the 3rd Division expected the enemy to reach Sildvik shortly.

Dietl had a telephone conversation with Group XXI in Oslo and stressed the need for immediate assistance. He then traveled to Hundal to familiarize himself with the situation at the front. At 1200 hours, he decided to send a parachute company to block the expected arrival of the Poles in the valley above Sildvik. He also ordered Walther’s forces to fall back to positions at the narrow strait east of Straumnes. Naval detachment Kothe was withdrawn from Rundfjell on the northern front and moved towards Hundal while one company of mountain infantry was removed from Walther’s command and transferred to Haussels to shore up his left flank at Hill 884. The division reserve, the engineer platoon, was moved to the mountains south of Sildvik. At 2245 hours it was reported that the enemy was about to break through the German positions at Straumnes Strait and the parachute company that was earlier moved to the valley above Sildvik was brought back to Sildvik in case of a breakthrough to the west.

There was still no contact between Captain Walther’s left flank and Major Haussels’ right flank and it was not until the evening of May 31 that it was discovered that Walther’s left flank was two kilometers behind Haussels’ right flank. The division ordered Walther to establish contact with Haussels’ forces immediately and insure that there were no gaps between them.

The French forces reached the peninsula east of Straumnes on May 31 but did not press their attack. The Polish attack against Major Haussels’ forces was hampered by heavy fog and snow. Consequently, their advance was delayed and Company 2 was not able to capture Hill 884 before May 31, at the same time as Company 3 captured Hill 970. Company 1, which was supposed to make a more or less isolated move towards Sildvik encountered unexpected resistance. After being caught in a crossfire, it withdrew to the Beisfjord village area.

The bad weather that hampered the Polish attack on May 30 and 31 also affected the Germans. The troops were beginning to show signs of exhaustion. The weather had prevented aerial resupply for three days and ammunition was running short. An attempt to airdrop ammunition in the evening of May 31 was not successful. The parachutes were improperly fastened to the loads and tore loose. Most of the mortar ammunition detonated as it hit the ground. The situation was to become worse as continued bad weather prevented air operations.

The Last Fights

The first phase of the resumed Norwegian offensive called for a move to the Nygård watershed. Alta Bn was given the mission of clearing the Germans from the north side of this watershed, capturing Hill 346 on the south side of the watershed, and thereby securing the road from Trældal to Cirkelvann, the proposed new supply line that it was hoped would be opened by a French drive from the southwest.

The Germans had positions on the north side of the watershed, on Hill 361 and between Cirkelvann and Nedre Jernvann. They were driven back across the river in a series of company-size operations by the Alta Battalion between May 24 and May 31. The 6th Division ordered the Alta Bn to seize Hill 346 by 2400 hours on May 30. The Germans had strong forces on Hill 346 and the Norwegians were unable to cross the river because there was no bridging equipment available.

Lieutenant Colonel Dahl planned to cross Jernvannene using improvised rafts made from sleeping bags stuffed with hay or straw. It was envisioned that two sleeping bags tied together would suffice to carry five soldiers with equipment. It was now light around the clock and the battalion planned a quick crossing under air cover and concealed by an artillery smoke screen. Although the battalion was suffering from scurvy, Dahl felt that it was better to attack than continue the positional warfare and relative inactivity of the past week. Safely across, the battalion planned to bypass all enemy positions and secure the highest terrain in the area. The plan was not carried out since division’s operational order on June 1 directed that most of Alta Bn move east to operate in conjunction with the 6th Brigade.

New units were also arriving in the area. The 1/15th Inf assembled in Gratangen where it was reorganized since all its trains and transport were lost in the evacuation from Bodø. The battalion was eventually moved to the Lillebalak area with one company relieving part of Alta Bn and another company involved in supply operations. The reserve battalion of the 14th Inf also moved into the area from Nordland Province. This battalion, badly demoralized by its experience in that province, was given security missions in the rear, against enemy airborne operations. This mission was made more important by the frequent German parachute operations into the Bjørnefjell area.

The 6th Division’s directive for the operations against Bjørnefjell was issued on May 29. The 6th Brigade was