An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith (ebook reader macos .TXT) π
The causes of this improvement in the productive powers of labour, and the order according to which its produce is naturally distributed among the different ranks and conditions of men in the society, make the subject of the first book of this Inquiry.
Whatever be the actual state of the skill, dexterity, and judgment, with which labour is applied in any nation, the abundance or scantiness of its annual supply must depend, during the continuance of that state, upon the proportion between the number of those who are annually employed in useful labour, and that of those who are not so employed. The number of us
Read free book Β«An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith (ebook reader macos .TXT) πΒ» - read online or download for free at americanlibrarybooks.com
- Author: Adam Smith
- Performer: 0226763749
Read book online Β«An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith (ebook reader macos .TXT) πΒ». Author - Adam Smith
Both these regulations, though they have been confirmed by a public law of the kingdom, are
evidently dictated by the same corporation-spirit which enacted the bye-law of Sheffield. The
silk-weavers in London had scarce been incorporated a year, when they enacted a bye-law,
restraining any master from having more than two apprentices at a time. It required a
particular act of parliament to rescind this bye-law.
Seven years seem anciently to have been, all over Europe, the usual term established for the
duration of apprenticeships in the greater part of incorporated trades. All such incorporations
were anciently called universities, which, indeed, is the proper Latin name for any
incorporation whatever. The university of smiths, the university of tailors, etc. are expressions
which we commonly meet with in the old charters of ancient towns. When those particular
incorporations, which are now peculiarly called universities, were first established, the term of
years which it was necessary to study, in order to obtain the degree of master of arts, appears
evidently to have been copied from the term of apprenticeship in common trades, of which the
incorporations were much more ancient. As to have wrought seven years under a master
properly qualified, was necessary, in order to entitle my person to become a master, and to
have himself apprentices in a common trade ; so to have studied seven years under a master
properly qualified. was necessary to entitle him to become a master, teacher, or doctor (words
anciently synonymous), in the liberal arts, and to have scholars or apprentices (words likewise
originally synonymous) to study under him.
By the 5th of Elizabeth, commonly called the Statute of Apprenticeship, it was enacted, that
no person should, for the future, exercise any trade, craft, or mystery, at that time exercised in
England, unless he had previously served to it an apprenticeship of seven years at least ; and
what before had been the bye-law of many particular corporations, became in England the
general and public law of all trades carried on in market towns. For though the words of the
statute are very general, and seem plainly to include the whole kingdom, by interpretation its
operation has been limited to market towns; it having been held that, in country villages, a
person may exercise several different trades, though he has not served a seven years
apprenticeship to each, they being necessary for the conveniency of the inhabitants, and the
number of people frequently not being sufficient to supply each with a particular set of hands.
By a strict interpretation of the words, too, the operation of this statute has been limited to
those trades which were established in England before the 5th of Elizabeth, and has never
been extended to such as have been introduced since that time. This limitation has given
occasion to several distinctions, which, considered as rules of police, appear as foolish as can
well be imagined. It has been adjudged, for example, that a coachmaker can neither himself
make nor employ journeymen to make his coach-wheels, but must buy them of a master
wheelwright; this latter trade having been exercised in England before the 5th of Elizabeth.
But a wheelwright, though he has never served an apprenticeship to a coachmaker, may
either himself make or employ journeymen to make coaches; the trade of a coachmaker not
being within the statute, because not exercised in England at the time when it was made. The
manufactures of Manchester, Birmingham, and Wolverhampton, are many of them, upon this
account, not within the statute, not having been exercised in England before the 5th of
Elizabeth.
In France, the duration of apprenticeships is different in different towns and in different
trades. In Paris, five years is the term required in a great number; but, before any person can
be qualified to exercise the trade as a master, he must, in many of them, serve five years more
as a journeyman. During this latter term, he is called the companion of his master, and the
term itself is called his companionship.
In Scotland, there is no general law which regulates universally the duration of
apprenticeships. The term is different in different corporations. Where it is long, a part of it
may generally be redeemed by paying a small fine. In most towns, too, a very small fine is
sufficient to purchase the freedom of any corporation. The weavers of linen and hempen cloth,
the principal manufactures of the country, as well as all other artificers subservient to them,
wheel-makers, reel-makers, etc. may exercise their trades in any town-corporate without
paying any fine. In all towns-corporate, all persons are free to sell butchersβ meat upon any
lawful day of the week. Three years is, in Scotland, a common term of apprenticeship, even in
some very nice trades; and, in general, I know of no country in Europe, in which corporation
laws are so little oppressive.
The property which every man has in his own labour, as it is the original foundation of all
other property, so it is the most sacred and inviolable. The patrimony of a poor man lies in the
strength and dexterity of his hands ; and to hinder him from employing this strength and
dexterity in what manner he thinks proper, without injury to his neighbour. is a plain violation
of this most sacred property. It is a manifest encroachment upon the just liberty, both of the
workman, and of those who might be disposed to employ him. As it hinders the one from
working at what he thinks proper, so it hinders the others from employing whom they think
proper. To judge whether he is fit to be employed, may surely be trusted to the discretion of
the employers, whose interest it so much concerns. The affected anxiety of the lawgiver, lest
they should employ an improper person, is evidently as impertinent as it is oppressive.
The institution of long apprenticeships can give no security that insufficient workmanship
shall not frequently be exposed to public sale. When this is done, it is generally the effect of
fraud, and not of inability ; and the longest apprenticeship can give no security against fraud.
Quite different regulations are necessary to prevent this abuse. The sterling mark upon plate,
and the stamps upon linen and woollen cloth, give the purchaser much greater security than
any statute of apprenticeship. He generally looks at these, but never thinks it worth while to
enquire whether the workman had served a seven years apprenticeship.
The institution of long apprenticeships has no tendency to form young people to industry. A
journeyman who works by the piece is likely to be industrious, because he derives a benefit
from every exertion of his industry. An apprentice is likely to be idle, and almost always is so,
because he has no immediate interest to be otherwise. In the inferior employments, the sweets
of labour consist altogether in the recompence of labour. They who are soonest in a condition
to enjoy the sweets of it, are likely soonest to conceive a relish for it, and to acquire the early
habit of industry. A young man naturally conceives an aversion to labour, when for a long
time he receives no benefit from it. The boys who are put out apprentices from public charities
are generally bound for more than the usual number of years, and they generally turn out very
idle and worthless.
Apprenticeships were altogether unknown to the ancients. The reciprocal duties of master and
apprentice make a considerable article in every modern code. The Roman law is perfectly
silent with regard to them. I know no Greek or Latin word (I might venture, I believe, to assert
that there is none) which expresses the idea we now annex to the word apprentice, a servant
bound to work at a particular trade for the benefit of a master, during a term of years, upon
condition that the master shall teach him that trade.
Long apprenticeships are altogether unnecessary. The arts, which are much superior to
common trades, such as those of making clocks and watches, contain no such mystery as to
require a long course of instruction. The first invention of such beautiful machines, indeed,
and even that of some of the instruments employed in making them, must no doubt have been
the work of deep thought and long time, and may justly be considered as among the happiest
efforts of human ingenuity. But when both have been fairly invented, and are well understood,
to explain to any young man, in the completest manner, how to apply the instruments, and
how to construct the machines, cannot well require more than the lessons of a few weeks;
perhaps those of a few days might be sufficient. In the common mechanic trades, those of a
few days might certainly be sufficient. The dexterity of hand, indeed, even in common trades,
cannot be acquired without much practice and experience. But a young man would practice
with much more diligence and attention, if from the beginning he wrought as a journeyman,
being paid in proportion to the little work which he could execute, and paying in his turn for
the materials which he might sometimes spoil through awkwardness and inexperience. His
education would generally in this way be more effectual, and always less tedious and
expensive. The master, indeed, would be a loser. He would lose all the wages of the
apprentice, which he now saves, for seven years together. In the end, perhaps, the apprentice
himself would he a loser. In a trade so easily learnt he would have more competitors, and his
wages, when he came to be a complete workman, would be much less than at present. The
same increase of competition would reduce the profits of the masters, as well as the wages of
workmen. The trades, the crafts, the mysteries, would all be losers. But the public would be a
gainer, the work of all artificers coming in this way much cheaper to market.
It is to prevent his reduction of price, and consequently of wages and profit, by restraining that
free competition which would most certainly occasion it, that all corporations, and the greater
part of corporation laws have been established. In order to erect a corporation, no other
authority in ancient times was requisite, in many parts of Europe, but that of the
town-corporate in which it was established. In England, indeed, a charter from the king was
likewise necessary. But this prerogative of the crown seems to have been reserved rather for
extorting money from the subject, than for the defence of the common liberty against such
oppressive monopolies. Upon paying a fine to the king, the charter seems generally to have
been readily granted ; and when any particular class of artificers or traders thought proper to
act as a corporation, without a charter, such adulterine guilds, as they were called, were not
always disfranchised upon that account, but obliged to fine annually to the king, for
permission to exercise their usurped privileges {See Madox Firma Burgi p. 26 etc.}. The
immediate inspection of all corporations, and of the bye-laws which they might think proper
to enact for their own government, belonged to the town-corporate in which they were
established; and whatever discipline was exercised over them, proceeded commonly, not from
the king, but from that greater incorporation of which those subordinate ones were only parts
or members.
The government of towns-corporate was altogether in the hands of traders and artificers, and it
was the manifest interest of every particular class of them, to prevent the market from being
overstocked, as they commonly express it, with their own particular species of industry; which
is in reality to keep it always understocked. Each class was eager to establish regulations
proper for this purpose, and, provided it was allowed to do so, was willing to
Comments (0)