Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (the reader ebook .TXT) 📕
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- Author: Henrik Lunde
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The operational staff of the SKL considered the attitudes of Denmark, Sweden, and the Soviet Union, and offered recommendations for each. The staff suggested that Germany should seize bases at the northern end of the Jutland Peninsula in Denmark as a means to dominate the Skagerrak and the southern portion of the North Sea. The Soviet Union should be assured that the occupation of bases in North Norway was only for the duration of the war. Sweden would be informed pointedly that the only way to preserve its independence was to adopt a pro-German neutrality policy.
Hitler Moves Planning to OKW
Hitler was still preoccupied with plans for the campaign in the West, but when bad weather forced a postponement of the that offensive, he turned his attention to the Scandinavian situation. On January 23, he ordered Studie Nord recalled and directed that all future work on this project take place at OKW under his personal guidance. Up to then, the review and planning for Studie Nord was carried out by the services and the OKW. Security may have been one of the major considerations in Hitler taking this unusual step. Some of the plans for the Western offensive had fallen into enemy hands when a German officer’s airplane had made a forced landing in Belgium earlier in January.
Keitel informed the service chiefs on January 27 that he would take over supervision of a working staff consisting of one officer from each of the three services experienced in operational planning and with some background in organization and supply. The group’s chief of staff, and senior member of this inter-service team, was Captain Theodor Krancke, commander of the heavy cruiser Admiral Scheer. The code-name Studie Nord was now replaced by the more secretive code-name Weserübung. (The Weser was a German river; “übung” means exercise or drill.) The group held its first meeting on February 5.
The close working relationship between OKW and SKL has led some writers to suggest that there existed an axis between the two organizations, or between Raeder and Jodl, on the subject of Norway.34 There is no doubt that OKW was tuned to Raeder’s ideas and supportive of his views. As opposed to General Halder, Jodl took a positive view of the feasibility of securing bases in Norway as early as October 1939, and “thought it could be easily accomplished.” The OKW had made its own study on the possibility of acquiring bases in Norway and concluded that, although it would require considerable forces, it was feasible and should be considered if other possibilities (e.g. the base on the Russian coast) proved inadequate. A copy of this report was given to Raeder.35 The views of the OKW appear to be more in tune with the views expressed by Raeder in the fall of 1939 and the early winter of 1940 than with the more cautious attitude in the SKL.
The OKW and Hitler had definitely taken a lead in the invasion plans by March 1940, and during February and March of that year, Raeder had become a cautious follower.
Centralizing the planning for the Norwegian operation in OKW made sense since it involved elements of all three services, and because there was no precedent in German military history for the type of combined arms operation envisioned. However, the action was the first of several that eroded the influence and prestige of service commanders. Oberkommando des Heeres (Army High Command, or OKH) still constituted the famed German General Staff and it was not to be expected that it would relish seeing its planning and operational functions taken over by what amounted to Hitler’s personal military staff. The army and air force harbored similar feelings, and it was therefore not surprising that these two organizations reacted vehemently a few weeks after Hitler had taken this action. Walter Goerlitz writes the following about Hitler charging OKW with planning the Norwegian operation and the creation of a theater command directly answerable to him and his staff:
This practice, which was soon to be extended to other military undertakings, really amounted to the creation of a second General Staff. It was Hitler’s answer to the General Staff’s opposition. Its result was that Jodl, as head of the Wehrmachtführungsstab, was now recognized at the Führer Headquarters as the leading military personality of the day.36
Hitler’s unprecedented disregard for the General Staff has been explained in various ways, but there is no doubt that Goerlitz is on the mark. Halder’s diary entry on February 21 notes, “Headquarters XXI Corps is to be placed under OKW in order to avoid difficulties with the Luftwaffe.” Later events indicated that this was just an attempt by Keitel and Jodl to soothe bruised feelings at OKH. Another reason advanced for Hitler and his staff taking direct control of the planning and execution of Weserübung was that it would relieve OKH of some work, since that headquarters was deeply involved in preparations for the attack in the West. However, the workload of OKH was not reduced by the new procedures. The various branches of OKH were still involved in force readiness, movement, transport, and supply, and it could be argued that the new command arrangements created more work and greater stress since the various staff sections of OKH and its subordinate organizations now had to answer to two masters. The fact that these command arrangements became a prototype for similar arrangements later in the war tells us that OKH’s workload was not a prime consideration.
The Krancke Staff
The OKW work group that became known as the Krancke Staff produced the first real plan for the Norwegian operation. It used the work of the SKL as a point of departure,
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