Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (the reader ebook .TXT) 📕

of Norway and that no serious opposition would be offered by either Norwegians or Swedes to such an event. Raeder went on to admonish, “Therefore it is necessary to be prepared and ready.”32

Studie Nord was completed on December 28, but on Hitler’s instruction it was not distributed for evaluation and comment to the three service headquarters until January 10, 1940. It appears that only OKM considered Studie Nord in a serious manner, but even this headquarters recommended that no action be taken unless it became clear that the British intended to move into Scandinavia. On this, there was complete agreement between Raeder and his staff, but there were differences when it came to what emphasis should be placed on the danger of a British occupation of Norway.

Raeder was convinced that Britain would occupy points on the Norwegian coast in the near future, to stop the iron ore traffic from Sweden and hinder German naval operations in the Atlantic and North Sea. He also believed that the Norwegian government would cooperate with the British, or at least fail to offer effective resistance. The accuracy of Raeder’s assessment of British intentions is remarkable.

The operational branch of the SKL, under Admiral C. Fricke, did not believe that a British occupation of Norway was imminent. The SKL took a conservative military view of the forces the British would require for the operation and concluded that Britain did not have the forces necessary to carry out an occupation of Norway and thereafter secure that position against German threats. Fricke and his planners believed that a British occupation of Norway would cause a strong reaction from the Soviet Union.

The SKL viewed a preemptive German strike against Norway as disadvantageous. German imports of iron ore currently proceeded safely through Norwegian territorial waters and this situation would continue as long as Great Britain respected Norwegian neutrality. A German occupation would result in the necessity of providing naval escorts for the ore traffic, and this would put a great strain on the navy. A German strike against Norway would demand almost every ship in the navy for it to have even the slightest chance of success against British superiority at sea. The occupation was a grave decision to make in view of the fact that a successful occupation of Norway would not be a decisive factor in the war against France and Britain. An action against Norway in the absence of a British move in that direction would also be difficult to justify. Hubatsch writes that it was only at the last moment that the SKL agreed that nothing short of force could solve the Norwegian problem.33

Caution was also the view of Captain Theodor Krancke, who represented the SKL at OKW on matters dealing with Norway, and was the chief of staff of the group tasked to further develop Studie Nord. However, despite doubts, the operational branch of the SKL agreed that it would be prudent to undertake preparations for an operation against Norway in case British actions made it necessary.

The caution that prevailed in the operational branch of the SKL was also prevalent in the German Foreign Office. This organization underlined the fact that Germany had lost much goodwill in the Scandinavian countries because of its association with the Soviet Union and the Soviet-Finnish war. However, the diplomats expressed fear that the Allies could find a justification in the occupation of points on the Norwegian coast under the guise of helping the Finns. The German Foreign Office concluded that the Norwegian government would oppose an Allied invasion with all means at its disposal, but it was less certain about the reaction of the Norwegian people. The Foreign Office based its conclusions primarily on reports received from Dr. Curt Bräuer, the German Ambassador in Oslo.

Commander Schreiber and Hans Wilhelm Scheidt, Rosenberg’s personal representative in Norway, did not share Bräuer’s views. They concluded that Norway was not enforcing its neutrality and would not oppose a British invasion. They made their views known in numerous messages and in person when they visited Berlin in January 1940. Subsequent events illustrated that the two representatives had good reasons for these claims. The Altmark affair, and frequent British violations of Norwegian neutrality in the aftermath of that incident, did not lead to any meaningful measures on the part of the Norwegians to enforce their neutrality.

The operational branch of the SKL had worked out an expansion of Studie Nord. This is contained in an SKL operational branch document titled Überlegungen Studie Nord, dated January 19, 1940 and summarized by Ziemke in the cited work. The SKL envisioned requirements for naval support for landings from Oslo to Tromsø, and considered surprise the key element in the operation. The whole fleet had to participate to carry out the navy’s part of the operation. They foresaw no difficulties on the outward journey if surprise could be achieved. The Norwegian warships were not considered a threat to even a single light naval unit, and the coastal fortifications were not viewed as serious obstacles. However, it was important to capture these fortifications intact as quickly as possible in order to use them against expected British counterattacks.

The SKL calculated that the assault force should consist of an airborne or mountain division. Transportation would be provided through the combined resources of the Luftwaffe and the navy. The problem of weather was recognized. Air force participation would be limited by the typical winter weather both in the target areas and along the routes to those areas. On the other hand, the expected weather conditions would favor the navy. The darkness, fog, and stormy weather would shield the fleet from British observation and help achieve surprise.

The SKL considered sending the troops that were not air transported by merchant ships, disguised as ore transports. This idea was rejected because a large number of ships would be required, the navy could not afford them protection, and there was a risk of discovery by Norwegian authorities. A second possibility considered was to transport the assault troops aboard