Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (the reader ebook .TXT) 📕

to him in the middle of the North Sea. Such a disposition only made sense if his primary concern was a German breakout into the Atlantic. Some writers maintain that the Admiralty, not Admiral Forbes, stipulated the dispositions of the naval forces in the North Sea in the evening of April 8.25 However, the official history of the Norwegian campaign makes no mention of any Admiralty orders with regard to the tactical disposition of forces in the North Sea until they issued the order for the cruiser squadrons to link up with the Home Fleet.

It may well be that, after turning south, Admiral Forbes began to give more credence to the possibility that the German forces observed in the Skagerrak were heading for ports in Norway, a possibility also alluded to in the Admiralty’s message at 1842 hours. This explains his orders to the 1st and 2nd Cruiser Squadrons. However, he must still have viewed this as a less likely possibility than a breakout since he continued the Home Fleet on a southerly course far out to sea, and had the 18th Cruiser Squadron sweep towards the Home Fleet, also far out at sea. Forbes ordered Admiral Cunningham’s 1st Cruiser Squadron, now reinforced by the French cruiser Emile Bertin and two French destroyers, and Admiral Edward-Collins’ 2nd Cruiser Squadron to proceed to a point off the Norwegian coast between Stavanger and Bergen. They were to start a northward sweep at 0500 hours on April 9. If carried out, the sweep would undoubtedly have led to an engagement with TF 3, destined for Bergen.

Task Force 3 Eludes the British Navy

The ships constituting TF 3 were located in three harbors in northern Germany on April 7. The light cruisers Köln, Königsberg, and the auxiliary Bremse were located in Wilhelmshaven and cleared that harbor before 2340 hours on April 7. The torpedo boats Wolf and Leopard, and the depot ship Karl Peters left Cuxhaven about the same time. The motor torpedo boats left from Helgoland. Plans called for the three elements of TF 3 to rendezvous near the southern coast of Norway, 56° 20´ North, 06° 20´ East, at 1015 hours on April 8. The three elements picked up an escort of He-111s at dawn on April 8.

Admiral Huber Schmundt’s assessment of the situation was not very optimistic. He realized that the German groups destined for Narvik, Trondheim, and Bergen were dangerously exposed to British interception and counterattacks. Narvik and Trondheim were located far from British naval bases, but Bergen was within eight or nine hours’ sailing distance from Scapa Flow and Schmundt believed that the British would launch their main naval effort against Bergen with secondary attacks against Narvik and Trondheim. Much of TF 3’s passage took place in daylight since its speed was limited to 18 knots because of the slow moving Bremse and Karl Peters. Schmundt assumed that the German ships destined for Narvik and Trondheim, which had departed a day earlier, would encounter British naval forces. This would make it very difficult for TF 3 to proceed along the Norwegian coast in clear weather.

The Germans were lucky because the weather deteriorated as they headed north and because the British made mistakes and were indecisive. The fog that hid the Germans ships from the British also prevented the German ships from making their scheduled rendezvous off the coast of southern Norway. Admiral Schmundt’s orders stipulated that he should let nothing interfere with his mission and therefore he proceeded towards Bergen at 18 knots, despite the fact that visibility was less than 500 meters.

It was not until around 1600 hours on April 8 that Karl Peters and the torpedo boats joined the main force. The Germans were in great peril during their voyage along the Norwegian west coast. Admiral Schmundt received a message from Naval Command West that numerous British warships were located between TF 3 and Bergen. This was an accurate report. As the fog lifted and the ships of TF 3 assembled, except for the motor torpedo boats, a British naval force of two modern light cruisers and 15 destroyers was located only 60 nautical miles to the northwest, between TF 3 and the southern approach to Bergen. This was the 2nd Cruiser Squadron, which had reached its start point for next morning’s sweep. The weather was clear and visibility good as TF 3 continued towards Bergen at a distance of 12 to 15 miles off the Norwegian coast.

The Admiralty now made another unfortunate intervention in tactical operations and the outcome was again harmful to the British and beneficial for the Germans. Worried that the cruiser squadrons off the Norwegian coast, which were about 135 nautical miles from the Home Fleet, could be caught between the German naval forces in the north and the ones reported in the Skagerrak, the Admiralty annulled Admiral Forbes’ plan for a cruiser sweep along the Norwegian coast. Instead it ordered the 1st and 2nd Cruiser Squadrons to join forces about 100 miles off the Norwegian coast and steer towards the Home Fleet. The 18th Cruiser Squadron had received a similar order earlier.

The British also failed to have reconnaissance aircraft aloft along the Norwegian coast after the fog lifted late in the afternoon on April 8. Reconnaissance aircraft might have spotted the German ships before the 2nd Cruiser Squadron started towards the Home Fleet and the attack on Bergen could have had a different outcome. As with Narvik and Trondheim, the British left the door to Bergen wide open at the last moment.

The Home Fleet continued on its southerly course during the night and when the Germans attacked Bergen, it was located only 90 miles off the Norwegian coast between Bergen and Stavanger. This enormous concentration of naval power was completed when the cruiser squadrons joined the Home Fleet early in the morning of April 9. Admiral Forbes had already learned from the Admiralty that German warships were engaged by fortresses covering the approach to Oslo and that German forces were attacking Trondheim,