Freedomnomics: Why the Free Market Works and Other Half-Baked Theories Don't by John Jr. (books that read to you TXT) 📕

virtually universal agreement that absentee ballot fraud is the biggest problem.”41 Consider one outrageous example: in 1998, former Pennsylvania Democratic congressman Austin Murphy was convicted of electoral fraud after forging the names of nursing home residents on absentee ballots. Nursing home administrators were even paid a bounty for access to their patients.42

In addition to enabling forgery, absentee voting makes it easier to buy votes because absentee ballots, like ballots before the advent of secret voting, can be shown to others before being submitted. With 25 percent of voters using absentee ballots in the 2006 general election, these drawbacks are hard to ignore.43

Similarly, while allowing prospective voters to register by mail makes it easier to vote, it also increases fraud. In October 2006 in Missouri, the left-wing Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN) turned in at least 1,500 apparently fraudulent voter registration cards in St. Louis and another 3,000 more in Kansas City. Other problematic registrations appeared throughout the state, including forged signatures and the registration of ineligible teenagers and deceased individuals.44

As a result of these problems with voter fraud, bipartisan support has developed for stricter voter registration rules and for voter identification requirements.45 Nevertheless, these requirements are opposed by some Democratic politicians who are concerned that anti-fraud rules will discourage legitimate voters from casting a ballot. Senator John Kerry (D-Mass) even denounced photo identification requirements as “a new Jim Crow era poll tax.”46 Republicans, for their part, tend to support stricter anti-fraud rules, claiming they will increase voting rates by instilling confidence in the voting system. The clash between the two sides has resulted in vigorous court battles in such states as Arizona, Georgia, Indiana, and Missouri.47

How can we ascertain whether stricter anti-fraud regulations increase or decrease voting turnout? One place to start is to study the impact such rules have had in other countries. A good example is Mexico, which implemented some unusually stringent anti-fraud regulations in 1991. To vote there, a person must present a voter ID card that includes a photograph as well as a thumbprint. The cards themselves are virtually counterfeit-proof, using holographic images, imbedded security codes, and a magnetic strip containing still more security information. As an extra precaution, voters’ fingers are dipped in indelible ink to prevent people from voting multiple times.

Furthermore, Mexican voters cannot register by mail; they must go in person to a registration office to apply for a voter ID card, then return three months later to get it. Absentee ballots were banned due to their misuse during the 1988 presidential election. Although they were reintroduced for the 2006 election, their use is closely regulated, with voters required to request a ballot at least six months prior to the election.48

How have these measures affected voting rates? Voter turnout averaged 68 percent in the three presidential elections held since the reforms were adopted, compared to a 59 percent average rate in the three elections before the reforms.49 Clearly, more citizens were encouraged to vote by the prospect of clean elections.50

We cannot expect to find this large of a change when American voting regulations are strengthened because there is nowhere near the same level of corruption as in Mexico. Additionally, in the United States, photo IDs have only been required in a few state general elections beginning in 2006, making it too early to evaluate their effectiveness. However, we do have data on the effect of other regulations. These include anti-fraud measures such as non-photo ID requirements and registration deadlines, as well as rules meant to increase voter turnout such as allowing provisional ballots, “no excuse” absentee ballots, registration by mail, and pre-election day voting.51 Surprisingly, none of these regulations appear to have any effect on voter participation rates.52

Yet, these “non-results” may be misleading. Consider just the anti-fraud measures. On the one hand, these regulations may reduce the total number of votes cast either by usefully eliminating fraudulent votes or by detrimentally discouraging voters by complicating the voting process. On the other hand, anti-fraud regulations may increase voting rates by raising confidence in the voting system. A non-result may simply be the result of all these effects occurring at the same time.

How can we disentangle the different possibilities? One solution is to study the effect of the two kinds of regulations—those that make voting more “costly” by making regulations more strict, and “easy” regulations that make voting less costly by simplifying voting procedures—on voting rates in counties with low rates of fraud. We can then compare these results with the regulations’ effect on voting rates in high-fraud counties known as “hot spots.”

The American Center for Voting Rights provides the only comprehensive national list of voter fraud hot spots.53 Its 2005 report listed six major hot spots: Cuyahoga County, Ohio; St. Clair County, Illinois; St. Louis County, Missouri; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; King County, Washington; and Milwaukee County, Wisconsin. Analyzing the effect of voting regulations in these counties, we find that “costly” regulations increased voting rates, while “easy” regulations reduced them. The changes were small, never exceeding a few percentage points, but neither type of regulation had any discernable effect outside the fraud hot spots. This result strongly indicates that “costly” regulations encourage voting by instilling confidence in the voting system, while “easy” regulations lower turnout by increasing the perception of a high likelihood of fraud.54

There is only one regulation that impacts turnout outside of fraud hot spots: pre-election day voting. Allowing voting before election day results in a 1.5 to 5 percentage point drop in voter participation. This would surprise some analysts who would expect pre-election day voting to increase voting rates either by making voting easier or by allowing the casting of more fraudulent votes.55 Yet, the result is quite consistent with the general connection between voting turnout and fraud outlined above: by loosening voting regulations, pre-election day voting increases fraud and thereby discourages voters from participating in an election.

Voting Machines

1 million black votes didn’t count in the 2000 presidential election. It’s not too hard to