Malaysian Maverick: Mahathir Mohamad in Turbulent Times by Barry Wain (fantasy novels to read .TXT) 📕

Singapore Story: 1965-2000 (Singapore: Times Media Pte. Ltd., 2000), p. 289.

Jairam Ramesh, "Mahathir's Mantra", India Today on the Net, 21 May 2001, http://www.india-today.com/itoday/20010521/jairam.shtml (accessed 1 June 2006).

Lee Hwok Aun, "The NEP, Vision 2020, and Dr. Mahathir: Continuing Dilemmas", p.273.

Halim Salleh, "Development and the Politics of Social Stability in Malaysia", Southeast Asian Affairs 1999, p. 189.

Ibid., p. 190.

Stephen Duthie, "The Asian Economist", Asian Wall Street Journal, 12 November 1992.

Jomo K.S., M Way, p. 180.

Ibid., p. 183.

Ibid., p. 182.

Ibid., p. 188.

Khoo Boo Teik, Beyond Mahathir, p. 47.

Jomo K.S., M Way, p. 187.

Khoo Boo Teik, Beyond Mahathir, p. 49.

Maggie Farley, "Malaysian Leader, Soros Trade Barbs", Los Angeles Times, 22 September 1997, http://articles.latimes.com/p/1997/sep/22/business/fi-34969 (accessed 24 March 2009). After he retired, Dr. Mahathir met with Soros in Kuala Lumpur and accepted that the financier was not responsible for the Asian financial crisis. "Malaysia's Former Leader Mahathir Buries the Hatchet with Financier George Soros", China Post, 15 December 2006, http://www.chinapost.com.tw/headlines/print/43088.htm (accessed 24 March 2009).

Jomo K.S., M Way, p. 186.

Ibid., p. 187.

Raphael Pura, "Confidence Crisis: Tough Talk by Mahathir Rattles Overseas Investors", Asian Wall Street Journal, 2 September 1997.

Khoo Boo Teik, Beyond Mahathir, p. 64.

In separate interviews, they gave conflicting accounts of Daim's departure. Dr. Mahathir said he tired of defending Daim against accusations of corruption, "And I decided that, I told him, look, it's better if he resigns" (20 March 2007). Daim said he resigned because he had told Dr. Mahathir at the outset he was taking the post for a limited time. His resignation, he said, left Dr. Mahathir without his closest political ally after the uproar over Anwar's dismissal and the setbacks in the 1999 election. "If I left...he would be alone. But he has to explain why I leave" (18 October 2007).

Lorraine Carlos Salazar, "'First Come, First Served': Privatization Under Mahathir", p.289.

Poverty figures are official, cited in Ragayah Mat Zin, "Malaysia: Poverty and Income Inequality – Prospects and Challenges Under the Ninth Malaysia Plan", paper delivered to conference on the Malaysian economy, organized by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 25-26 January 2007.

Beh Lih Yi, "Bumi Equity Hit NEP Target 10 Years Ago", 1 November 2006, http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/58885 (accessed 31 August 2008).

Koon Yew Yin, "What is Wrong with the NEP", Aliran Monthly, 2006: 9, pp. 34, 40.

Ragayah Mat Zin, "Malaysia: Poverty and Income Inequality – Prospects and Challenges Under the Ninth Malaysia Plan".

Lee Hwok Aun, "The NEP, Vision 2020, and Dr. Mahathir: Continuing Dilemmas", p.276.

G. Lin, "Debating an Equitable Malaysia: Towards an Alternative Economic Agenda", Aliran Monthly, 2005: 8, pp. 7-10.

Figures from the Ninth Malaysia Plan cited by Lim Guan Eng, secretary general of the Democratic Action Party, in a speech to the DAP Economic Forum, "NEP vs. Vision 2020: Where Has All the Money Gone?", 26 September 2006.

Bridget Welsh, "Mahathir's Legacy: A New Society?", in Reflections, p. 361.

Lee Hock Guan, "Affirmative Action in Malaysia", Southeast Asian Affairs 2005, p.221.

Ibid., p. 221.

Although the ethnic admission quota system for local public universities was dropped in favour of a merit-based system in 2001, non-bumiputras remained skeptical of the new policy since Chinese and Indian student intakes fell sharply.

Abdul Rahman Embong, State-led Modernization and the New Middle Class in Malaysia (New York: Palgrave, 2002), p. 41.

Lee Hock Guan, "Affirmative Action in Malaysia", p. 214.

Abdul Rahman Embong, State-led Modernization and the New Middle Class in Malaysia, p. 56.

Edmund Terence Gomez, "The Perils of Pro-Malay Policies", Far Eastern Economic Review, September 2005, p. 39.

Justin Doebele, "Malaysia's 40 Richest", Forbes Asia, 5 June 2006, pp. 35-38.

Christopher Adam and William Cavendish, "Background", in Jomo K.S., ed., Privatizing Malaysia: Rents, Rhetoric, Realities (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1995), p. 15.

Bridget Welsh, "Mahathir's Legacy: A New Society?", p. 363.

Ibid., p. 363.

Ibid., p. 364.

Halim Salleh, "Development and the Politics of Social Stability in Malaysia", Southeast Asian Affairs 1999, p. 188.

Lee Hock Guan, "Affirmative Action in Malaysia", p. 216.

(5)

A Volatile Mix of Business and Politics

Before Dr. Mahathir became president of UMNO, the party dabbled in business to keep the media in friendly hands and generate income to cover operating expenses. Dr. Mahathir plunged UMNO deep into the corporate world, in partnership with Daim Zainuddin, his wealthy and most trusted business operative, whom he made UMNO treasurer. They turned the party into a vast conglomerate, with investments that spanned almost the entire economy, inducing a profound change in the nature and role of UMNO.

The key to UMNO's transformation was Malaysia's affirmative action programme to eliminate poverty and assist bumiputras. While devised to reduce inequality, it was often applied by the Mahathir administration in a way that enriched a political elite, whose common attribute was an intimate relationship with UMNO. The mandatory 30 per cent of share allocation for bumiputras during a company's public listing, or restructuring, was usually channeled to UMNO-owned or -linked corporate entities and other party allies. With privatization, too, UMNO was used as a vehicle to transfer government holdings to private or semi-private ownership, mostly for the benefit of the same clique.

With UMNO an active corporate player, the party at times was in competition or collaboration with state-owned agencies and private companies. Some valuable state assets passed into UMNO hands. The fusion — and often confusion — of party, state and private roles went far beyond the government-corporate cooperation implied in the Malaysia Inc. concept. Business and politics, ideally kept separate in the name of good governance, were inextricably mixed in what Lim Kit Siang, the opposition leader, called an "incestuous relationship".[1]

With UMNO membership an avenue to riches, ever larger amounts of money were poured into party and general elections to secure positions with access to tenders, licences and subsidies, while party leaders in turn channeled benefits back to their supporters to maintain their posts. Across the country, thousands of companies were set up by UMNO divisions, branches and members to collect shares and other forms of patronage allocated to bumiputra enterprises. Malays joined UMNO not so much to do community service anymore, but to make the contacts and get the contracts that would bring easy