Napoleon III and the French Second Empire by Roger Price (read e books online free txt) 📕

present himself as ‘all things to all men’, as a leader above existing party struggles. His victory in December was overwhelming (see Table 2.1).

In Paris Louis-Napoléon gained 58 per cent of the votes cast but, significantly, support for the author of the apparently socialistic pamphlet on the Extinction du paupérisme was highest in the popular quartiers in which both before and even during the June insurrection there had already been plenty of evidence of

Bonapartist sentiment. The democrat and former Interior Minister Ledru-Rollin and the socialist Raspail shared a mere 12.4 per cent of the vote, a pattern repeated in most large cities. However, in spite of this strong showing, it was the rural vote which would continue to provide the bedrock of Bonaparte’s popular support for the next two decades.

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Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte, Prince-President

Following his appointment, the new president named a government made up

mostly of former Orleanists headed by Odillon Barrot. This appeared to confirm to the supporters of the conservative alliance, the so-called ‘Party of Order’, that they could rely on his subservience. However, more perceptive observers like the Austrian diplomat Apponyi were already observing that ‘if they believe

themselves able to do anything with him and to dominate him, they are badly mistaken’ (Apponyi 1948: 78). The essential objective of these monarchist

ministers remained the restoration of order. In the short term, repression depended upon police action against left-wing political activists. Following the June insurrection, a series of laws and bureaucratic processes which restricted political activity were introduced. They provided the legal basis for both an increasingly authoritarian republic and the Imperial regime which would follow it. For the longer term, conservatives looked forward to the moral re-education of the

population. The objective of a new education law introduced in March 1850 (the loi Falloux) was defined by Michel, a member of the extra-parliamentary committee which prepared it, as being ‘to train a child to the yoke of obedience, to create in him a principle of energy which will enable him to resist his passions, accept of his own free will the law of labour and duty and contract habits of order and regularity . . .‘ (Price 1972: 254). Deferential behaviour was to be internalised by the young. The essential agents of this were to be the clergy. The notorious anti-clerical Adolphe Thiers, another member of the preparatory committee, insisted on this with breathtaking cynicism. Priests would be encouraged both to teach and to supervise a thoroughly purged secular teaching force, the members of which would also be expected to inculcate a conservative and intensely religious ideology. The clergy responded very positively to this opportunity to increase their influence, but at the cost of a considerable intensification of anti-clericalism on the left. More immediately, an effort was made to restore social order through the continuous tightening of repressive measures directed at a left united, from the Autumn of 1848, under the démocrate-socialiste banner. This led to the demobilisation of many of its intimidated supporters, to the fragmentation of its organisation as the more persistent activists were driven underground, and to the bankruptcy of most of its newspapers as a result of repeated fines and suspensions. The election of a substantial minority of démocrate-socialiste deputies in the May 1849 general elections, as well as in subsequent by-elections, nevertheless revealed that the 16

threat from the left was far from dead. In particular, its ability to attract support in some rural areas, especially in the south-east, reinforced old concerns about the principle of manhood suffrage. The apparent unreliabihty of peasant support for the conservative cause created the nightmare possibility of victory by the left in both the legislative and presidential elections due in 1852. It was intolerable, according to the state prosecutor at Rouen, that ‘the communists [be offered] the possibility of becoming kings one day by an electoral coup d’état. Society must not commit suicide’. The provincial newspaper L’Opinion of Auch echoed many others in asking whether ‘the fate of a great nation [can] be abandoned to this blind power .

. . ?’ It concluded that ‘Universal suffrage will bring the ruin of France’. Legislation was introduced on 31 May 1850 which imposed new preconditions for electoral registration, including three years’ prior residence in a constituency, the absence of a criminal record, and ‘eligibility’ to pay the personal tax. This disqualified 31.4

per cent of the electorate at a stroke and, as was intended, much higher proportions in the industrial and major urban centres. Significantly, if he did not oppose the new law, the President distanced himself publicly from this legislation, leaving all the running in its preparation to the monarchist majority in parliament. Although this legislation seemed likely to guarantee their electoral success in 1852, it did little to reduce conservative hysteria. Démoc-soc propaganda encouraged the disenfranchised to seize their rights, weapons in hand if necessary, on election day.

Although repression enjoyed considerable success and fear of persecution forced many republicans out of politics, démoc-soc organisation survived in fragmented form. This was particularly true in under-policed rural regions of the centre and south in which substantial mass support had previously been built up. There, domiciliary searches, arbitrary arrests and continued interference by the

administration in communal affairs bred resentment. Repression drove remaining démoc-soc militants underground, forcing them to use traditional forms of popular sociability such as cafés and private drinking clubs as cover. This radicalisation of the démoc-soc movement further heightened official anxiety about plots by secret societies to seize power by force.

The impact of repression was also weakened by the tension which continued to exist between the various monarchist factions, in spite of their shared fear of social revolution. Memories of past conflicts, ideological divisions, personal rivalries and suspicion of the Prince-President’s ambitions ensured that the Party of Order remained divided. Bonapartism, although enjoying considerable popular support, gained little sympathy among the political elites. Yet, as the prospect of a démoc-17

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