Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (the reader ebook .TXT) 📕

the British reached the fjord entrance, they spotted Rauenfels entering. They did not know the ship’s nationality, but this doubt was removed when she refused signals to stop. This had been a bad day for the captain of the supply ship. One German submarine had already attacked the ship and now he confronted three British destroyers.

Commander Wright ordered two high explosive shells fired into Rauenfels when she failed to obey the heave-to orders. The German ship began to burn and the crew abandoned ship. Wright continued to escort the crippled Hotspur out of the fjord and ordered Lieutenant Commander Courage in the Havock to take care of the German ship. A boarding party was sent aboard Rauenfels but they decided to leave because they feared an explosion. The British were also worried that German destroyers could reach them from the east at any moment. Bey, although he did not know it, missed another opportunity to punish the British. If the two German destroyers with some fuel left had continued their pursuit another few miles, they may have saved the Rauenfels, caught up with Havock, and perhaps destroyed her. Courage ordered two more rounds fired at the German ship as soon as the boarding party returned. Dickens describes the event:17

The result must have been one of the most shattering explosions of those good old days before nuclear weapons. Mr. Leslie Millns, Torpedo Gunner, saw a bright flash in the center of the ship which expanded until she shone from end to end, it seemed that it was not just the cargo which detonated but the whole ship … Wright in the Hostile, now well around Barøy and separated from the Rauenfels by the 500 foot contour or higher, saw what he swore was her funnel gyrating in the sky …

The British account of Rauenfels’ end has also found its way into some German sources. However, there are serious differences between that account and the events described in the Norwegian naval history. While Rauenfels was damaged severely, she did not explode. In fact, the German crew reboarded the ship after the British departed, managed to bring the fires under control, and beached their ship to keep it from sinking. The Norwegians captured the crew of 48 (one was killed in the encounter with the British). The Norwegians eventually salvaged most of the cargo but much was badly damaged by exposure to seawater.18

With the departure of Havock from the vicinity of Rauenfels, the First Naval Battle of Narvik was over. In terms of damage and losses, it was a tossup. Each side lost two destroyers and all that participated, except three German ships, were damaged. The British had 147 dead and the Germans 176. From both a tactical and strategic view, the battle was a British victory. The Germans were surprised, their refueling operation was interrupted, they sustained heavy losses, six German iron ore ships were sunk (along with one British), and a supply ship was badly damaged and its salvageable cargo fell into Norwegian hands. While the British also sustained heavy losses and their ships barely escaped destruction, they could sustain naval losses to a much greater degree than their opponents.

In retrospect, both sides made serious mistakes. The Germans, in view of their own successful surprise operation 24 hours earlier, should have been more alert to a similar operation by their opponents, particularly since they were fully aware that large British naval forces were in the general area. It would have been wise for Captain Bonte to keep one or two of the three refueled destroyers, Wilhelm Heidkamp, Georg Thiele and Bernd von Arnim, on continuous patrol near the Ofotfjord entrance. Only those destroyers actually refueling should have remained in Narvik while the rest were moved to nearby bays and fjords to present a multi-directional threat to an attacker. The German reliance on submarines was misplaced, as they accomplished nothing.

Two events during the battle could have changed the outcome in German favor. An earlier warning to the outlaying destroyers could have trapped the British between the three surviving destroyers in Narvik and the five that were located outside the harbor. An earlier warning may have resulted in the destruction of the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla. Second, when the outlying destroyers were finally alerted, Commander Bey’s failure to close aggressively with his opponents may have saved the remaining British destroyers.

The British took a great risk in launching the operation without waiting for reinforcements. They were fully aware that they were going against superior enemy forces and that the suspected shore batteries could be in German hands, as could the two Norwegian coastal defense ships. This risk-taking is attributable to Admiralty interference in tactical operations. However, Admirals Forbes and Whitworth are not without blame.

The British had large naval forces in the area and more on their way. They could easily have bottled up the German ships at their only exit routes from Narvik, Vestfjord and Vågsfjord, and disposed of them at their leisure. However, even if the sense of urgency is accepted, the British could have added a cruiser and another destroyer flotilla to the attacking force. This may well have removed the necessity for a second battle. Warburton-Lee and his men fought the battle in the best tradition of the Royal Navy, assisted by what began to look like an unbelievable run of luck. The stage was now set for a final naval showdown.

C

ONFUSION AND

D

ISSARAY

“Against Whom?.”

KING HÅKON VII’S REACTION WHEN AWAKENED BY HIS ADJUTANT AND TOLD NORWAY WAS AT WAR.

Myths of Treason and Sabotage

I have shown that Quisling and his party had little effect on German operational planning. The Germans used the organization as a source of information on political conditions in the country but Quisling was not informed about the forthcoming attack and his organization had no part in the operations. The Germans had come to realize that Quisling and his followers were not