Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (the reader ebook .TXT) 📕

only that the notification by radio and telegram applicable to full mobilization should be used in the current situation. Whatever additional chaos may have resulted was certainly preferable to giving the Germans three days to consolidate their bridgeheads.

The German Ultimatum and Negotiations

Minister Bräuer’s instructions called for the presentation of the German note to the Norwegian Foreign Minister between 0400 and 0500 hours on April 9. The Germans believed that if the ultimatum was delivered to the Norwegian Government before the start of hostilities, there was a good chance that the Norwegians would accept the German demands. They assumed that German attack groups would not meet any resistance before 0400 hours at the earliest. This assumption was unrealistic since hostilities had started as early as 2300 hours on April 8. By 0400 hours, the Norwegians were aware that there were German attacks taking place against Oslo, Bergen, and Trondheim. At 0414 hours, the naval headquarters in Oslo also learned that an attack was in progress against Narvik and at 0500 hours that Kristiansand was under attack.

Curt Bräuer met with Mr. Koht in the Foreign Ministry library at 0430, while the second air raid alarm of the night took place. Bräuer presented the German note immediately. It announced that Germany had found it necessary to occupy parts of Norway as a preemptive operation to forestall British plans against Norway. Norwegian unwillingness or inability to defend its neutrality against British violations also necessitated the German operation. The note stated that the German occupation would only be for the duration of the war, and that the integrity and sovereignty of Norway would be respected. If the Norwegians resisted, the resistance would be broken with all means at Germany’s disposal. To prevent unnecessary bloodshed, the Norwegian Government should take the necessary political and military steps to cooperate with the German authorities. The note had an enclosure detailing the steps that were necessary. These included a demand for the Norwegian Government to announce to the Norwegian people that all resistance should cease. All military installations were to be turned over to the Germans. The Germans were to take control of all communication facilities, the press, radio, and postal system. Norwegian military units should be ordered to contact and cooperate with the German armed forces.

Koht listened silently as Bräuer read the German ultimatum. When the German had finished, Koht stated that he needed to consult the cabinet. Bräuer insisted on an immediate answer. Koht replied that the cabinet was in the next room and a quick answer should therefore not be a problem. It took the government only a couple of minutes to decide unanimously to reject the German ultimatum. Koht returned to the library and informed Bräuer that Norway would not submit to the German demands. Bräuer stated that this meant war and that nothing could save Norway. Koht replied that the war had already started. Bräuer reported the Norwegian reply in a telegram to General von Falkenhorst at 0618 hours.

The Norwegian Government and the royal family left Oslo for Hamar by a special train at 0723 hours. Koht had an interview with the Norwegian Broadcasting System at the railway station in Oslo and reported what had transpired and that general mobilization had been ordered. While this was not exactly what had been decided, it is how news about mobilization first reached thousands of Norwegians and they began showing up at mobilization centers all over the country.

The Norwegian Parliament was able to convene in the afternoon of April 9 at Hamar, a town located 76 miles north of Oslo. Despite the confusion that reigned that day, only five of the 150 members were absent. The members of the government, with the exception of Defense Minister Ljungberg, were all from the Labor Party. Prime Minister Nygaardsvold offered the government’s resignation in order that a new government, with all parties represented, could be formed. However, at the urging of Hambro, the leader of the conservatives, it was agreed unanimously that the government should remain in power and that three members from the opposition parties be added as ministers without portfolio.

The government also received a request from Ambassador Bräuer for negotiations and a meeting with the Norwegian Government and King. While most of those present felt that to negotiate with the Germans was meaningless, Foreign Minister Koht, who was skeptical about the extent and timeliness of Allied assistance, convinced them that they should at least listen to their proposal. A message sent to the Germans stated that the proposal would be submitted to the Parliament provided the Germans did not make any offensive military moves. The parliamentary session adjourned at 1930 hours when it was learned that a German force was approaching Hamar. For the second time in a day, the government was forced to move. Their new destination was the town of Elverum, about 20 miles from Hamar and 50 miles from the Swedish border.

The government meeting in Hamar, as the ones on the previous day, is hard to understand. It was time for action, not for discussions, and particularly not for discussions involving the Parliament. Odd-Bjørn Fure writes, “In a situation that demanded observations, analysis, and action, the government became tied up in an endless and purposeless debate in the Parliament.”6 The fact that the military chiefs were not represented at the most important meetings on April 9 was a major blunder. The cabinet ministers had little understanding of the military issues involved as the country went from peace to war. They did not understand how the war would be fought and therefore they made decisions without appreciating their military consequences.

Captain Spiller’s “Private War” Ends Negotiations

The event that caused the Norwegian Government and the royal family to flee to Elverum was a daring raid organized by the German air attaché to Norway, Captain Eberhard Spiller. Spiller and Captain Erich Walther, the commander of the two airborne companies that landed at Fornebu earlier in the day, had quickly organized an expedition using one company of German