Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (the reader ebook .TXT) 📕

Colonel Otto Ruge, Inspector General of Infantry, had argued for resistance and he was now promoted to Major General and given the daunting task of trying to organize a defense to stop the Germans. Ruge accepted the appointment and his first priority was to orient himself on the exceedingly confused situation. He discovered that General Hvinden-Haug had ordered the mobilized parts of the 2nd Division to withdraw from its main defensive line along the Nittedal River north of Oslo. Ruge made it clear that he did not believe it possible to save eastern Norway.

The Germans were not pressing the 2nd Division and there was no apparent reason for it to give up the advantageous forward defensive positions. Spiller’s deep penetration in the division area had given rise to wild and unfounded rumors of other German units operating behind the Norwegian lines, which had precipitated this unfortunate withdrawal. In the process, two mobilization depots were left defenseless and one cavalry and one infantry regiment lost more than 50% of their personnel and equipment.

Before General Ruge could make any plans on how to cope with the Germans, he needed to get an overview of the military situation in South Norway. First, he needed to know what forces he had at his disposal. He also moved the army headquarters from its location in Rena, Østerdal to the more central location at Øyer in Gudbrandsdal.

Norwegian Mobilization Efforts

Many individuals designated for mobilization who lived in the country’s population centers awoke on April 9 to find that the Germans had taken control of their area and had captured the nearby mobilization centers. This threw mobilization into a state of chaos. Many of those who were liable for military service in the cities and towns captured by the Germans managed to slip away but ended up reporting for duty at mobilization centers other than those designated in the mobilization plans.

The Norwegian Government had a very liberal policy in granting exemptions from military service in the 1920s and 1930s. Untrained and sometimes medically unfit individuals now showed up at mobilization centers to offer their services, but they had no unit assignments and were not included on any mobilization rolls. While this feeling of duty to country was a laudable and positive development at the outset, problems developed. Since these men reported of their own volition, they felt no obligation to remain if they chose otherwise. Many came from social groups and families with strong anti-military views and a strong skepticism of military authorities.

A large number did not understand the reason for the chaos that accompanied an emergency mobilization under conditions where many population and mobilization centers were already under enemy control and others under threat of capture. They saw the confusion and disorder as proof of treason and sabotage and these rumors spread like wildfire. Lindbäck-Larsen writes that, in some units, the rumor-mongering tendencies began to disappear as units became organized but in others they lingered below the surface as “poisonous wells” that reappeared in times of hardships and reverses and contributed to the breakdown of esprit de corps, discipline, and the will to resist.

In North Norway, either most units were mobilized at the time of the attack with several months of active duty and some training behind them or they were able to complete mobilization almost according to plans. The units in the western part of the country and in Nord-Trøndelag were also able to mobilize in a somewhat orderly manner, but the greater cohesion and training found in North Norway were lacking. In other areas of the country, the fight was initiated after a very disorderly and improvised mobilization that resulted in under strength units with little cohesion.

Those mobilization depots not captured at the outset were located by the Germans and bombed heavily. While this was further disruptive to Norwegian mobilization, it did not halt the effort. The extent of disruption due to the surprise capture of population centers and mobilization depots is illustrated by the fact that only about 55,000 saw service during the campaign, despite the fact that many who had no training or mobilization assignments showed up for service. This number constituted half of the planned mobilization strength and the effective fighting force at any one time probably did not exceed 30,000.

The greatest need was for infantry units and many who showed up for mobilization from other arms were used as infantry. Those with no military training were in some cases assigned to units sent to the front but for the most part, they were assigned to training units that supported and served as a replacement pool for the fighting units. There was a serious shortage of artillery and a total lack of tanks or antitank weapons. Most of the aircraft that could have been effective against the Germans were lost the first day. German air superiority was a decisive factor in most parts of the country.

Other factors also contributed to the confusion and uncertainties in the days following the German attack. Quisling took to the airwaves in the evening of April 9, announcing that he had taken over as prime minister. He ordered that resistance cease and he followed up this order by threats against those who did not obey. The legal government responded in a communiqué the following day but the answer lacked firmness and persuasion and was not a ringing appeal to arms. There was no confirmation that mobilization should continue. The government simply expressed confidence that the people would do everything to resurrect the freedom and sovereignty that a foreign power wanted to destroy by force.

General von Falkenhorst, on the other hand, communicated to the people in straightforward and unmistakable terms on April 13 what a refusal to follow Quisling’s demands would mean. Those who followed the bidding of the “former government” and obeyed its order to mobilize would face military tribunals that would most likely lead to executions. This communiqué was sent out over the state radio, published in