Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (the reader ebook .TXT) 📕

A hastily convened meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (CSC)10 assembled at 0600 hours. Information about the unfolding events in Norway was fragmentary and there was great uncertainty about how much credence should be accorded the various reports. Nevertheless, it was clear that German naval operations and landings north of Stavanger, hitherto considered extremely unlikely, had become a reality. It appeared to those assembled that attacks were in progress against Oslo, Bergen, and Trondheim and that some of these cities had been occupied. The chiefs did not believe that the Germans had reached Narvik, despite the Admiralty’s warning to the Norwegians on the previous day that German forces could reach that city as early as 2200 hours on April 8, and they decided to dispatch a battalion to that city immediately. The military leaders in Great Britain did not yet appreciate the size and scope of the German operations. They also agreed that the recapture of Trondheim should be a primary objective.11

The inadequacy of the military plans developed to support the mining operations now came back to haunt the Allies as they began to grapple with the question of what to do about the German invasion. In a meeting of the British War Cabinet at 0830 hours, General Ironside presented the results of the deliberations by the CSC. He stated that it was the view of the committee that the priority task was the seizure of Bergen and Trondheim so that the Allies could use those excellent harbors. The chiefs considered the occupation of Narvik a secondary goal. Churchill pressed for immediate action against Narvik and maintained that this was within their capabilities since only small forces would be required at Bergen and Trondheim in the initial stages. Cyril Newall, the Chief of the Air Staff, argued for operations against Stavanger. He was the only one who had a true appreciation for the advantages that would accrue to the Germans from the capture of Sola Airfield.

It was decided that the main effort should be directed at the recapture of Bergen and Trondheim. However, this decision rested on the very tenuous assumption that Narvik was still in Norwegian hands and that large forces would therefore not be required in that area. There was still no definite information on what kind of resistance the Germans were encountering from Norwegian forces. However, it was agreed that the early recapture of these cities would encourage the Norwegians to continue their struggle.

The War Cabinet directed the Chiefs of Staff to prepare expeditions to wrest Bergen and Trondheim from the Germans at the same time as a force was dispatched to occupy Narvik. First, however, the naval situation needed to be brought under control. These discussions serve to explain both the earlier mentioned instructions to Admiral Forbes, and the background for Admiralty direct involvement in the tactical operations at Narvik. According to Moulton, neither Ismay nor Ironside came away from the meeting with a clear understanding of what had to be done and for what purpose.

The War Cabinet reconvened at noon—after a second CSC meeting—and it now appeared that their earlier assumption about Narvik being in Norwegian hands had fallen by the wayside. Unconfirmed news reports from Norway indicated that the Germans had occupied Narvik. Allied plans now became totally reactive and continued to illustrate a lack of understanding and logic. It was decided to send a few destroyers in the direction of Narvik to determine what was going on and to make a battalion available to support the destroyer operation. The chiefs informed the cabinet that a further seven battalions would be ready to sail by April 12. However, there was no decision made on how and where to use these additional battalions when they were ready!

The mood was still very optimistic since most of those in attendance expected that the use of overwhelming naval power would turn the German enterprise into a great Allied victory. This optimism—like the plans—was devoid of realism and logic. Churchill, who had access to the latest information from the Admiralty, optimistically told his colleagues that operations against Bergen and Trondheim were underway and he predicted that the application of British sea power would lead to the end of the landings in a week or two.

The telegram from Lord Halifax to his ambassador in Norway, Cecil Dormer, should be viewed in the light of this optimism. The message stated that the British Government was taking immediate action against the Germans in Bergen and Trondheim. This information was passed to the Norwegians and created false expectations. In fact, the members of the War Cabinet were already shifting their attention away from south and central Norway to Narvik.

Admiral Pound briefed Churchill after the War Cabinet meeting. Pound considered the operation against Bergen too risky after discovering that there were two German cruisers in that city. Churchill agreed and this led to the cancellation of the attack. By the time the telegram from Halifax to Dormer was on its way, telling the Norwegians that the British were moving immediately against the Germans in Bergen, Churchill and the Admiralty were canceling that operation. In retrospect, Churchill concluded that the Admiralty had interfered too much in operational matters and that the decision on whether or not to attack Bergen should have been left to Admiral Forbes.

A meeting of the Supreme War Council was convened at 10 Downing Street around 1730 hours on April 9, with the French represented by Reynaud, Daladier, and Admiral Darlan. The discussion focused on what could be done to thwart the Germans in Norway. The British pointed out that the two divisions held back in England for use in Scandinavia had been sent to France after the conclusion of peace between the Soviet Union and Finland. Consequently, there were only eleven battalions in Great Britain available for operations in Norway. The council was told that two of these battalions were embarked and sailing that night. Another five battalions would be available in three days, earmarked for Bergen and Trondheim according