Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (the reader ebook .TXT) 📕

It seemed clear that the Allies had already sustained a crushing defeat, and some of the discussions centered on how to deflect the storm of criticism that was sure to follow. Since this setback came on top of the Allied failure to give aid to the Finns, it was necessary politically to launch a concerted effort to shift the blame. Churchill blamed Norway’s “strict observance of neutrality” in a speech delivered to the House of Commons the following day.15

It is not the slightest use blaming the Allies for not being able to give substantial help and protection to neutral countries if we are held at arm’s length until these neutrals are actually attacked on a scientifically prepared plan by Germany. The strict observance of neutrality by Norway has been a contributory cause to the sufferings to which she is now exposed and to the limits of the aid which we can give her.

Even now, on April 11, Churchill sounded full of optimism and predicted a catastrophe for the Germans as he spoke to the House of Commons:

In the upshot, it is the considered view of the Admiralty that we have greatly gained by what has occurred in Scandinavia and in northern waters in a strategic and military sense. For myself, I consider that Hitler’s action in invading Scandinavia is as great a strategic and political error as that which was committed by Napoleon in 1807, when he invaded Spain.16

Disorganized Forces, an Untidy Command Structure, and Bewildering Orders

As a result of their hurried debarkation in R4, the eight battalions available for disposition were in a state of confusion. Derry states that the list of forces available was “not numerically unimpressive.” This is a strange statement. The British had only 11 battalions available for operations in Norway and it would take up to two weeks for all of these to be ready to deploy. In the first week, the German forces in Norway had grown to over 45 battalions.

The 24th Guards Brigade was to figure prominently in the early efforts by the Allies to offer a riposte to the German capture of Narvik. This brigade of regulars had existed since the end of 1939, but the headquarters staff assembled hurriedly in the first days of April. It had never trained together as a unit. The 1st Battalion Irish Guards and the 1st Battalion Scots Guards were moved north from the London area on April 6. The Scots Guards were loaded on the Batory, a Polish transport, in the Clyde. The two remaining battalions were not yet at their embarkation points. The Irish Guards embarked in the liner Monarch of Bermuda in the morning of April 11. The third battalion of the brigade, the 2nd Battalion South Wales Borderers, had recently returned from India, not exactly a good training ground for arctic operations. This battalion embarked on the Reino de Pacifica.

Unfortunately, little thought was given to how equipment was loaded. Those items most essential for landing on a hostile shore were loaded deep in the holds while there was so many unnecessary “comfort” items for headquarters operations that it ended up cluttering the piers. Tactical loading was ignored.

The 146th Infantry Brigade, consisting of three territorial battalions, was added to these forces. One battalion of the 146th Infantry Brigade had Trondheim as its destination under R4 and it was ready in the Clyde. The other two battalions of this brigade, previously destined for Bergen, had gone through the hurried debarkation five days earlier and much of their equipment remained on the ships in the mass confusion associated with that embarkation.

Two territorial battalions from the 148th Infantry Brigade also required several days to replace equipment left behind on the ships. The six battalions of French alpine troops that had been part of the forces for R4 were scheduled to deploy a week after the first British forces.

The 49th Infantry Division was designated headquarters for the force at Narvik with Major General Pierce C. Mackesy as its commander. No plan had yet been formulated, not even in conceptual terms. The possibility of copying the German method of landing troops directly in the target area was not realistic since the troops were embarked in large merchant vessels with little thought given to their tactical employment without first disembarking, and then being organized and equipped.

The most frantic efforts were made to get the forces underway as quickly as possible. The 24th Guards Brigade lacked artillery, vehicles, and engineers and was therefore not in a position to advance overland against organized opposition, particularly in the wintry wilderness around Narvik. The 146th was hurried on its way on April 12, without taking time to re-equip. As pointed out by Moulton, it appeared that in their haste to take some action, the command authorities mistook another hasty embarkation as signs of drive and energy.

The selection of commanders was equally confusing and the failure to designate a clear-cut chain of command violated sound operational principles. Admiral Sir Edward Evans had been designated to lead British forces against Narvik before the German attack. However, he was dispatched as a member of the Allied delegation to Sweden and Admiral of the Fleet Lord Cork and Orrery was appointed commander of the naval forces for the Narvik operation. Since Admiral Cork was senior to Admiral Forbes, his nominal superior as Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleet, the Admiralty put the control of naval operations within 100 miles of Vågsfjord in the hands of Admiral Cork. General Mackesy was sent to Scapa Flow in a hurry to accompany the Scots Guards. Mackesy, the 24th Guards Brigade commander, and two companies of the Scots Guards sailed on the same warship.

The British had only the vaguest ideas as to those two most important elements in coming up with a workable operational plan: the enemy and the terrain. A few lines from General Ironside’s written notes accompanying General Mackesy instructions are illustrative:17

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