Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (the reader ebook .TXT) 📕

von Arnim. Badly damaged by five hits. Un-seaworthy because of hull damage and one boiler out of action. Refueled. Fifty-two killed.

Wolfgang Zenker. Undamaged but not refueled.

Erich Giese. Undamaged but not refueled. Erich Koellner. Undamaged but not refueled.

The German Naval Staff realized its worst fears. The quick return of the destroyers was thwarted by the failure of one tanker to reach Narvik. It is surprising that the Germans had not made allowances for one or two additional tankers to be at Narvik. This would have increased the probability that more than one tanker would be in position when required. Furthermore, it would have permitted quicker refueling and allowed the destroyers to head back home while the enemy was still in a state of confusion. Now, almost half of Germany’s destroyer force appeared trapped. The Luftwaffe facilitated the return of warships from ports in western and southern Norway by keeping British surface units at a distance, but there was little help from the Luftwaffe in the Narvik area.

Jan Wellem had miraculously escaped the carnage in Narvik harbor on April 10. Refueling could therefore continue but at the same slow rate as on April 9. Shortage of ammunition was also a serious concern for Commander Bey. The destroyers had used over half of their ammunition supply. German hopes for resupply by sea were dealt a final blow on April 11 when the British destroyer Icarus captured the supply ship Alster in Vestfjord.

Commander Bey reported to Naval Command West in the afternoon of April 10 that none of his damaged destroyers would be ready to attempt a breakout in time to link up with the two battleships that evening. Only two of the surviving destroyers would be refueled by dark, Wolfgang Zenker and Erich Giese.

Commander Bey did not appear anxious to attempt a breakout with the two refueled destroyers. Naval Command West believed that he failed to appreciate the deadly trap in which he found himself. They finally resorted to an unusual procedure for a command that normally left tactical decisions to the senior commander at sea. They sent Bey a curt message at 1712 hours on April 10 to leave with Wolfgang Zenker and Erich Giese as soon as it was dark. If he needed further persuasion, Naval Command West transmitted, two hours later the very precise intelligence that in addition to the Renown and Repulse, three more British battleships were headed for the Lofoten area. The second message may not have served its intended purpose. Instead, it may have convinced Bey that a breakout was futile.

The two German destroyers ordered to break out departed Narvik at 2040 hours. They proceeded westward at high speed at about the same time as U25, whose commander did not know that a breakout was in progress, confronted two British destroyers on patrol near Barøy. The British destroyers withdrew when they began to suspect that they were near a minefield. This left an unintended opening for the two German destroyers, which passed through the area about one hour later and turned south through Vestfjord. Within a few minutes of entering the fjord, the Germans sighted the silhouettes of three warships, one identified as a cruiser. The visibility was excellent despite the onset of darkness and Commander Bey decided that a breakout was not achievable. The German destroyers turned around within 7,000 meters of the British ships and headed back to Narvik while laying smoke. The British ships, which were probably the cruiser Penelope and the destroyers Bedouin and Eskimo, did not see the German destroyers.

German Torpedo Problems

U25, when she confronted Bedouin and Eskimo prior to Bey’s unsuccessful breakout attempt, fired four torpedoes at the British warships at a range of no more than 1,200 meters. Lieutenant Commander Schütze, the U25 commander, heard explosions and assumed his torpedoes had found their targets at that very close range. They had not. Two exploded in the vicinity of the British ships and one detonated against the shore. The two destroyer captains became sufficiently concerned that they withdrew from the area. The British apparently did not considered that there could be a submarine in the area and Bedouin’s skipper, Lieutenant Commander McCoy, sent a message suggesting that the explosions were mines or torpedoes fired from shore batteries on Barøy. This message had—as we have seen in the case of Captain Yates on the Penelope—considerable impact on British plans.

The German destroyer crews were extremely dissatisfied with the service provided by their submarines, and the submariners were especially upset with their research and development services. No provisions were made for direct communications between the destroyers in Narvik and the German submarines operating in the area. This problem was finally overcome when Commander Bey contacted Naval Command West and arranged for a personal meeting with Lieutenant Herbert Sohler, captain of the submarine U46, on April 11.

Arrangements were made for direct communications between the destroyers and the submarines to include radio warnings transmitted in the clear of an enemy approach. Sohler assured Bey that the submarines would provide better support to the destroyers in the future. The fact that this was not to be cannot be blamed on the submarine commanders’ lack of effort.

Another submarine, U51, attacked a British destroyer near Tranøy about 0200 hours on April 11. The torpedoes either missed or failed to function. U51 had another opportunity within half an hour, but the result was the same. The U47, commanded by Lieutenant Günther Prien, fired two salvos of four torpedoes each against a large transport and cruiser at anchor near Bygden in Vågsfjord between 2200 and 2400 hours on April 15, but scored no hits. She then developed engine troubles and had to return to Germany. Southwest of Vestfjord, she encountered the battleship Warspite and two escorting destroyers. Prien fired two torpedoes at a distance of only 900 meters, again without results.

These are only a few examples of the 31 submarine attacks carried out against British warships during these critical days. The German Navy concluded that 20