Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (the reader ebook .TXT) 📕

and Setermoen. Control of Narvik would be meaningless unless the railroad connection to Sweden was secured. Securing the northward advance to Bardufoss was also important, but the ability to accomplish it with the available resources was questionable. No immediate move was made towards the Swedish border and only a reinforced company from one of the two battalions available to Colonel Windisch saw any appreciable combat on the northern front before the last week in April. The weather played a role as the month of April witnessed some of the worst conditions in many years. The fear of Allied landings and stiffening Norwegian resistance were undoubtedly other factors that led to the somewhat hesitant German attitude.

General Fleischer’s Assessment

The return of General Fleischer and his chief of staff from eastern Finnmark was delayed because of snowstorms. They managed to get to Tromsø after a harrowing five-hour flight on April 10 and by April 12, Fleischer was at his headquarters at Moen in Målselv.

Since the northern part of the country was now isolated from southern and central Norway, General Fleischer assumed the mantle of Commander-in-Chief in North Norway. This gave him control of the civil administration and naval forces in the area. Both the mobilization and assumption of overall command were taken on his own initiative. The right to order mobilization was reserved for the government and although he was designated as wartime commander-in-chief, no orders were received to execute that contingency plan. It is to Fleischer’s credit that he took these important decisions without waiting for orders from a government that appeared incapable of taking immediate effective action in this chaotic situation.

Fleischer’s area of responsibility stretched about 600 miles as the crow flies, from north to south. An enemy bridgehead now cut that area in two. The southern portion was relatively safe for now since the Germans were located in the Trondheim area, over 100 miles from the southern border of his command. However, he had to keep an eye on the situation in the south since it would be logical for the Germans to try hard to establish land communications with their forces in Narvik. Furthermore, he could not neglect the border with the Soviet Union. Soviet actions in Poland while the Germans were invading that country from the west were still fresh in everyone’s mind. That danger was somewhat alleviated with the arrival of Allied forces in North Norway since it was unlikely that the Soviets would risk hostilities with the British and French. Even as he kept these threats in mind, Fleischer had to contend with an expanding German bridgehead in Narvik and assemble sufficient forces to commence offensive operations.

Fleischer’s first task was to bring the German advances to a halt, particularly their northern thrust towards Bardufoss Airfield. German capture of this airfield would significantly alter the situation in their favor and put any Allied assistance in jeopardy. The German northward thrust also posed a threat to Setermoen, the other major Norwegian mobilization depot and training area. The Norwegians knew that a German battalion was advancing northward with the mission of capturing these two objectives. The total strength of the Germans in Narvik was not known, but General Fleischer assumed that they numbered several thousand of Germany’s most elite troops.

Fleischer reasoned that it was not sufficient merely to isolate the Germans in Narvik. Such an approach would tie down his forces, give the Germans time to organize and build up their strength for continued attacks at points of their choosing while waiting for a link-up. He believed that a defensive strategy would not be successful since he had to assume that German forces from the south would drive aggressively towards Narvik and he had no forces to halt such an attack as long as Dietl’s 3rd Mountain Division tied him down.

The only clear alternative in Fleischer’s mind was to attack and destroy the German forces in Narvik or drive them over the border to Sweden. This would allow him to move substantial forces south to meet an eventual German drive from Trondheim. He viewed his soldiers as the hardiest in the world and felt certain that they would acquit themselves well when pitted against the German mountain troops.

In order to achieve local superiority for an attack, Fleischer found it necessary to risk reducing troop strength along the Soviet Border. He ordered the 1/12th Inf to the Narvik front as quickly as possible. He also decided to bring the Alta Bn south as soon as its mobilization was completed. These forces had to be transported by sea, which would take some time. Fleischer had only the 1/14th Inf battalion in Mosjøen in the southern part of his area. This force was inadequate to cope with a German advance from the Trondheim area and Fleischer decided that the best use of this unit was to move it south and attach it to Colonel Getz’ 5th Field Brigade in the Steinkjer area. Halfdan Sundlo, the brother of the regimental commander in Narvik, commanded this battalion.

Fleischer’s plan had as its goal the gradual reduction of the German ability to fight by first taking their base area at Bjerkvik and Elvegårdsmoen, prevent them from establishing a connection to Sweden, and finally of capturing Narvik. Fleischer concluded that the experienced German elite troops were professionally superior to his own units but he planned to compensate for this drawback by relying on what he saw as Norwegian superior mobility in the wild and snow-covered terrain around Narvik.

The partial destruction of the 1/13th Inf on April 9 was a serious setback for the Norwegians. It was doubtful that the remnants of the 1/13th could successfully resist a strong German advance to the border. It was hoped that the threat of Allied landings and Norwegian attacks from the north would prevent the Germans from undertaking offensive operations towards the border.

The loss of Elvegårdsmoen was most serious. It was the mobilization center for the 15th Infantry Regiment and a number of other units. Their valuable stores of equipment