Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (the reader ebook .TXT) 📕

of these attacks would certainly have hit their targets, which included one battleship, seven cruisers, seven destroyers, and five transports, but for the malfunctioning of the torpedoes.

It was discovered later that the new magnetic pistols that allowed the torpedo to be detonated by the magnetic field of a ship’s hull when it passed underneath, without requiring a direct impact, were ineffective at these northern latitudes. It was also discovered that the depth-regulator mechanism did not function as intended. This also applied to the destroyer torpedoes as shown by their failure against British destroyers on April 10. The failure of the submarine torpedoes to function properly had a serious effect on operations around Narvik, and certainly on the psychological confidence of the submarine crews. On his return to Germany, Prien summed up succinctly the confidence crisis in the torpedoes among submarine commanders: “One cannot again expect him [submarine commander] to fight with an air gun.”4

German Destroyers Trapped

By noon on April 11, Wolfgang Zenker, Erich Koellner, Hermann Künne, and Hans Lüdemann were ready to sail from Narvik. Erich Giese was also ready but developed a minor engine problem. However, Commander Bey continued to maintain that conditions for a breakout were unfavorable. Some writers have suggested that the lives of his sailors were uppermost in his mind and that he felt they had a better chance to survive if the ships remained in Narvik. However, he also knew that he was expected to uphold the honor of the German Navy by fighting to the end.

Naval Command West was becoming impatient at what they must have viewed as Commander Bey’s procrastinations. They issued Bey an order in the afternoon of April 12 to make use of the first opportunity of reduced visibility and bad weather to break out. However, Bey maintained that any attempt to break out was futile in view of the overwhelming British naval presence at the entrance to Ofotfjord. This may have been his view all along.

All discussions of a breakout at this time appear to have focused on a southwest passage through Vestfjord, an area heavily guarded by the Royal Navy. There was another possible route that the destroyers could have used to reach the open sea without the danger of running the British gauntlet in Vestfjord. The narrow strait of Ramsund, between Tjeldøy and the mainland, leads to the broader Tjeldsund, and that strait exits into the Vågsfjord just southeast of Harstad. The entrance to Ramsund is inside Ofotfjord and at least ten miles from the British patrol line. The distance from where Tjeldsund intersects with Vågsfjord to the open sea is not more than five miles. The British Navy did not reach Vågsfjord in force until April 14, and the route to the open sea would therefore be relatively clear for the German destroyers. The U49 in Vågsfjord could provide intelligence on British naval activities.

After the German destroyers had reached open sea on a southwesterly course, it would have been very difficult for the British to intercept them. The destroyers, in moderate weather, were capable of speed of 36 knots and the British did not have heavy units capable of that speed. It seems strange therefore, that Bey and Naval Command West appear not to have considered this escape route. Navigation through Ramsund or Tjeldsund at night would be very tricky, but possible.5

A series of events after April 11 made it considerably more difficult for the Germans to make a successful breakout. Two destroyers—Erich Koellner and Wolfgang Zenker—ran aground in Ofotfjord while on patrol during the night between April 11 and 12. Erich Koellner was so badly damaged when it hit an underwater reef that it was no longer seaworthy. Wolfgang Zenker’s propellers were damaged, limiting its speed.

Commander Bey reported to Naval Command West in the afternoon of April 12 that two destroyers—Hans Lüdemann and Hermann Künne–were operational, that three destroyers—Erich Giese, Bernd von Arnim, and Georg Thiele—could operate at a maximum speed of 28 knots, and that Wolfgang Zenker could travel at a maximum speed of only 20 knots. The remaining two destroyers—Erich Koellner and Diether von Roeder—were so heavily damaged that they were not seaworthy. Bey planned to use Erich Koellner as a floating battery on the north side of Ofotfjord, just east of Ramnes. He planned to use Diether von Roeder in a similar capacity in Narvik harbor.

The German Situation Ashore

The Germans quickly brought ashore all recoverable weapons, equipment, and supplies from those destroyers damaged beyond repair in the destroyer battle on April 10. Survivors from Wilhelm Heidkamp and Anton Schmitt were organized into a naval infantry battalion, armed mostly with weapons from the Norwegian depot at Elvegårdsmoen. Lieutenant Commander Erdmenger, the skipper of the sinking Wilhelm Heidkamp, was placed in command of this force. The Germans also continued to bring ashore and set up the heavy guns from the armed British merchant ships in the harbor.

General Dietl’s situation looked precarious to General von Falkenhorst and the OKW. He was isolated in an area over 400 miles from the nearest friendly forces. He had lost many of his supplies and equipment and was faced by a Norwegian army in the process of mobilizing superior forces and with the distinct prospect that the Allies would land troops either directly in Narvik or nearby. Dietl was directed to find a suitable place for a temporary airfield pending the capture of Bardufoss. This was a tall order in the mountainous area around Narvik and resulted in a request from Dietl that long-range seaplanes and bombers be used for resupply. He was promised that seaplanes carrying supplies would arrive on April 11, but only one appeared, and it did not land. A German unit discovered that the ice on Lake Hartvigvann was more than three feet thick and Dietl directed that it be examined to determine if it could be used as an airfield.

Dietl still had to accomplish two critically important parts of his mission, securing the railway from Narvik to the border and capturing Bardufoss Airfield