Nicomachean Ethics by Aristotle (little readers .TXT) 📕

who have experience, would seem to be quite useless to those who know nothing of medicine.

So also, I think we may say, collections of laws and constitutions may be very serviceable to those who are able to examine them with a discriminating eye, and to judge whether an ordinance is good or bad, and what ordinances agree with one another, but if people who have not the trained faculty go through such compendia, they cannot judge properly (unless indeed a correct judgment comes of itself), though they may perhaps sharpen their intelligence in these matters.

Since then our predecessors have left this matter of legislation uninvestigated, it will perhaps be better ourselves to inquire into it, and indeed into the whole question of the management of a state, in order that our philosophy of human life may be completed to the best of our power.

Let us try, then, first of all, to consider any valuable utterances that our predecessors have made upon this or that branch of the subject; and then, looking at our collection of constitutions, let us inquire what things tend to preserve or to destroy states, and what things tend to preserve or destroy the several kinds of constitution, and what are the causes of the good government of some states and the misgovernment of others: for when we have got an insight into these matters we shall, I think, be better able to see what is the best kind of constitution, and what is the best arrangement of each of the several kinds; that is to say, what system of laws and customs is best suited to each.

Let us begin then.261

Endnotes

In the few passages where this text is not followed, the reading adopted is indicated in a note. ↩

Reading τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ. ↩

To Aristotle, Politics is a much wider term than to us; it covers the whole field of human life, since man is essentially social (see the remainder of this and the following paragraph); it has to determine (1) what is the good?⁠—the question of this treatise (see the final paragraph of this section)⁠—and (2) what can law do to promote this good?⁠—the question of the sequel, which is specially called “The Politics;” cf. X 9. ↩

I.e. covers a part of the ground only: see preceding note. ↩

The expression τὰ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ covers both (1) what is generally though not universally true, and (2) what is probable though not certain. ↩

“Works and Days,” 291⁠–⁠295. ↩

Cf. the opening paragraphs of VI 7 and 12, and X 7 and 8. ↩

Plato’s nephew and successor. ↩

For there is no meaning in a form which is a form of nothing, in a universal which has no particulars under it. ↩

That is, the opening of chapter 2, see J. A. Stewart Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle. ↩

πρακτική τις τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος. Aristotle frequently uses the terms πρᾶξις, πρακτός, πρακτικός in this wide sense, covering all that man does, i.e. all that part of man’s life that is within the control of his will, or that is consciously directed to an end, including therefore speculation as well as action. ↩

For it might mean either the mere possession of the vital faculties, or their exercise. ↩

This paragraph seems to be a repetition (I would rather say a rewriting) of the previous paragraph. See note 175 on VII 3. ↩

This “best and most complete excellence or virtue” is the trained faculty for philosophic speculation, and the contemplative life is man’s highest happiness. Cf. the opening paragraph of X 7. ↩

See chapter 9 (“For, as we said, happiness requires not only perfect excellence or virtue⁠ ⁠…”). ↩

Cf. above, chapter 7 (“Undemonstrated facts⁠ ⁠…”). ↩

The “highest exercise of our faculties” is, of course, philosophic contemplation, as above, I 7 (“But the function of anything⁠ ⁠…”); cf. X 7 (“But if happiness be the exercise of virtue⁠ ⁠…”) ↩

We may forget scientific truths that we have known more easily than we lose the habit of scientific thinking or of virtuous action; cf. X 7 (“This conclusion would seem to agree⁠ ⁠…”); VI 5 (“And the rational parts of the soul or the intellectual faculties⁠ ⁠…”). ↩

ἔθος, custom; ἦθος, character; ἠθικὴ ὰρετή, moral excellence: we have no similar sequence, but the Latin mos, mores, from which “morality” comes, covers both ἔθος and ἦθος. ↩

It is with the moral virtues that this and the three following books are exclusively concerned, the discussion of the intellectual virtues being postponed to Book VI. ἀρεταί is often used in these books, without any epithet, for “moral virtues,” and perhaps is so used here. ↩

In Book VI. ↩

These two, the “boor” (ἀγροῖκος) and he who lacks sensibility (ἀναίσθητος), are afterwards distinguished: cf. II 7 (“Moderation in respect of certain pleasures⁠ ⁠…” and “With regard to pleasantness in amusement⁠ ⁠…”). ↩

Reading ἔτι. See J. A. Stewart Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle. ↩

Actions and the accompanying feelings of pleasure and pain have so grown together, that it is impossible to separate the former and judge them apart: cf. X