Nicomachean Ethics by Aristotle (little readers .TXT) 📕

opposite to each other as before; but the exchange will be expressed by joining A to D and B to C, i.e. by “cross conjunction” or by drawing diagonal lines (ἡ κατὰ διάμετρον σύζευξις) from A to D and B to C. ↩

I.e. (as will presently appear), it must first be determined how much builder’s work is equal to a given quantity of shoemaker’s work: i.e. the price of the two wares must first be settled; that done, they simply exchange shilling’s worth for shilling’s worth (ἀντιπεπονθός); e.g. if a four-roomed cottage be valued at £100, and a pair of boots at £1, the builder must supply such a cottage in return for 100 such pairs of boots (or their equivalent).

Fixing the price of the articles is called securing equality, because, evidently, it means fixing how much of one article shall be considered equal to a given quantity of the other. It is called securing proportionate equality, because; as we shall see, the question that has to be determined is, “in what ratio must work be exchanged in order to preserve the due ratio between the workers?” ↩

Benefit to consumer = cost to producer; e.g. if £100 be a fair price for a picture, it must fairly represent both the benefit to the purchaser and the effort expended on it by the artist. I follow Trendelenburg in inserting ὅ before ἐποίει, but not in omitting τὸ before πάσχον. Cf. note 107. ↩

The persons have to be appraised as well as their work; but, as we soon see, these are two sides of the same thing: the relative value at which persons are estimated by society is indicated by the relative value which society puts upon their services, and this is indicated by the price put upon a certain quantity of their work. ↩

See note 114. ↩

E.g. suppose the husbandman is twice as good a man as the shoemaker, then, if the transaction is to follow the universal rule of justice and leave their relative position unaltered, in exchange for a certain quantity of husbandman’s work the shoemaker must give twice as much of his own. The price, that is, of corn and shoes must be so adjusted that, if a quarter of corn sell for 50s. and three pair of shoes sell for the same sum, the three pair of shoes must represent twice as much labour as the quarter of corn. Aristotle speaks loosely of the ratio between the shoes and the corn, etc., but as their value is ex hypothesi the same, and as the relative size, weight, and number of articles is quite accidental (e.g. we might as well measure the corn by bushels or by pounds), the ratio intended can only be the ratio between the quantities of labour. He omits to tell us that these quantities must be measured by time, but the omission is easily supplied. He omits also to tell us how the relative worth of the persons is to be measured, but he has already said all that is necessary in Chapter 3 (“This is also plainly indicated by the common phrase ‘according to merit’⁠ ⁠…”). ↩

Literally “they must be reduced to proportion,” i.e., in strictness, the four terms (two persons and two things). ↩

I.e. have his superiority counted twice over. His (e.g. the husbandman’s) superiority over the other party (the shoemaker) has been already taken into account in fixing the price of a quarter of corn as equal to three pairs of shoes: this is one advantage which is fairly his; but it would be plainly unfair if, at the time of exchange, the husbandman were to demand 50s. worth of shoes for 25s. worth of corn, on the ground that he was twice as good a man: cf. Munro, Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology, vol. ii p. 58 f. In the text I have followed Trendelenburg’s stopping, throwing the words εἰ δὲ μὴ⁠ ⁠… ἄκρον into a parenthesis. ↩

I.e. each must be valued in money, so that so many quarters of corn shall exchange for so many hogsheads of wine. ↩

The mean which justice aims at (the just thing, the due share of goods) lies between two extremes, too much and too little; so far justice is analogous to the other virtues: but whereas in other fields these two extremes are chosen by different and opposite characters (e.g. the cowardly and the foolhardy), the character that chooses too much is here the same as that which chooses too little⁠—too much for himself or his friend, too little for his enemy. (The habitual choice of too little for oneself is neglected as impossible). Cf. II 6, especially the paragraph that begins “Virtue, then, is a habit or trained faculty of choice⁠ ⁠…”. ↩

It is in the state of mind of the doer that the difference lies, not in the particular things done: cf. Chapter 8. ↩

These first two paragraphs seem to have quite a natural connection with what goes before, though the discussion is not carried on here, but in Chapter 8. Again, the discussion which begins with the words τῶς μὲν οὖν Chapter 6 (The paragraph that begins “That which is just as between master and slave⁠ ⁠…”), though it has no connection with this passage, comes naturally enough after the end of Chapter 5, τὸ ἁπλῶς δίκαιον corresponding to τὸῦ δικαίον καὶ ἀδίκου καθόλου. We have, then, two discussions, both growing out of and attached to the discussion which closes with the