Handbook of Ethical Theory by George Stuart Fullerton (e reader TXT) ๐
A presumption against this arbitrary assumption that we have the one andonly desirable code is suggested the unthinking acceptance of thetraditional by those who are lacking in enlightenment and in the capacityreflection. Is it not significant that a contact with new ways ofthinking has a tendency, at least, to make men broaden their horizon andto revise some of their views?
In other fields, we hope to attain to a capacity for self-criticism. Weexpect to learn from other men. Why should we, in the sphere of morals,lay claim to the possession of the truth, the whole truth, and nothingbut the truth? Why should we refuse to learn from anyone? Such a positionseems unreasoning. It puts moral judgments beyond the pale of argumentand intelligent discussion. It is an assumption of infallibility littlein harmony with the spirit of science. The fact that a given standard ofconduct is in harmo
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Title: A Handbook of Ethical Theory
Author: George Stuart Fullerton
Release Date: September, 2004 [EBook #6463] [Yes, we are more than one year ahead of schedule] [This file was first posted on December 17, 2002]
Edition: 10
Language: English
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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A HANDBOOK OF ETHICAL THEORY ***
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A HANDBOOK OF ETHICAL THEORY
BY GEORGE STUART FULLERTON
To
MY WIFE
PREFACEWe are all amply provided, with moral maxims, which we hold with more or less confidence, but an insight into their significance is not attained without reflection and some serious effort. Yet, surely, in a field in which there are so many differences of opinion, clearness of insight and breadth of view are eminently desirable.
It is with a view to helping students of ethics in our universities and outside of them to a clearer comprehension of the significance of morals and the end of ethical endeavor, that this book has been written.
I have, in the Notes appended to it, taken the liberty of making a few suggestions to teachers, some of whom have fewer years of teaching behind them than I have. I make no apology for writing in a clear and untechnical style, nor for reducing to a minimum references to literatures in other tongues than our own. These things are in accord with the aim of the volume.
I take this opportunity of thanking Professor Margaret F. Washburn, of Vassar College, and Professor F. J. E. Woodbridge, of Columbia University, for kind assistance, which I have found helpful.
G. S. F. New York, 1921.
CONTENTS
THE ACCEPTED CONTENT OF MORALSCHAPTER I. IS THERE AN ACCEPTED CONTENT? 1. The Point in Dispute. 2. What Constitutes Substantial Agreement? 3. Dogmatic Assumption.
CHAPTER II. THE CODES OF COMMUNITIES 4. The Codes of Communities: Justice. 5. The Codes of Communities: Veracity. 6. The Codes of Communities: the Common Good.
CHAPTER III. THE CODES OF THE MORALISTS 7. The Moralists. 8. Epicurean and Stoic. 9. Plato; Aristotle; the Church. 10. Later Lists of the Virtues. 11. The Stretching of Moral Concepts. 12. The Reflective Mind and the Moral Codes.
ETHICS AS SCIENCECHAPTER IV. THE AWAKENING TO REFLECTION 13. The Dogmatism of the Natural Man. 14. The Awakening.
CHAPTER V. ETHICAL METHOD 15. Inductive and Deductive Method. 16 The Authority of the โGiven.โ
CHAPTER VI. THE MATERIALS OF ETHICS 17. How the Moralist should Proceed. 18. The Philosopher as Moralist.
CHAPTER VII. THE AIM OF ETHICS AS SCIENCE 19. The Appeal to Reason. 20. The Appeal to Reason Justified.
MAN AND HIS ENVIRONMENTCHAPTER VIII. MANโS NATURE 21. The Background of Actions. 22. Manโs Nature. 23. How Discover Manโs Nature?
CHAPTER IX. MANโS MATERIAL ENVIRONMENT 24. The Struggle with Nature. 25. The Conquests of the Mind. 26. The Conquest of Nature and the Well-being of Man.
CHAPTER X. MANโS SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT 27. Man is Assigned his Place. 28. Varieties of the Social Order. 29. Social Organization. 30. Social Order and Human Will.
THE REALM OF ENDSCHAPTER XI. IMPULSE, DESIRE, AND WILL 31. Impulse. 32. Desire. 33. Desire of the Unattainable. 34. Will. 35. Desire and Will not Identical. 36. The Will and Deferred Action.
CHAPTER XII. THE PERMANENT WILL 37. Consciously Chosen Ends. 38. Ends not Consciously Chosen. 39. The Choice of Ideals.
CHAPTER XIII. THE OBJECT IN DESIRE AND WILL 40. The Object as End to be Realized. 41. Human Nature and the Objects Chosen. 42. The Instincts and Impulses of Man. 43. The Study of Manโs Instincts Important. 44. The Bewildering Multiplicity of the Objects of Desire, and the Effort to Find an Underlying Unity.
CHAPTER XIV. INTENTION AND MOTIVE 45. Complex Ends. 46. Intention. 47. Motive. 48. Ethical Significance of Intention and Motive.
CHAPTER XV. FEELING AS MOTIVE 49. Feeling. 50. Feeling and Action. 51. Feeling as Object. 52. Freedom as Object.
CHAPTER XVI. RATIONALITY AND WILL 53. The Irrational Will. 54. One View of Reason. 55. Dominant and Subordinate Desires. 56. The Harmonization of Desires. 57. Varieties of Dominant Ends. 58. An Objection Answered. 59. This View of Reason Misconceived. 60. Another View of Reason.
THE SOCIAL WILLCHAPTER XVII. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SOCIAL WILL 61. What is the Social Will? 62. Social Will and Social Habits. 63. Social Will and Social Organization. 64. The Social Will and Ideal Ends. 65. The Permanent Social Will.
CHAPTER XVIII. EXPRESSIONS OF THE SOCIAL WILL 66. Custom. 67. The Ground for the Authority of Custom. 68. The Origin and the Persistence of Customs. 69. Law. 70. Public Opinion.
CHAPTER XIX. THE SHARERS IN THE SOCIAL WILL 71. The Community. 72. The Community and the Dead. 73. The Community and the Supernatural. 74. Religion and the Community. 75. The Spread of the Community.
THE REAL SOCIAL WILLCHAPTER XX. THE IMPERFECT SOCIAL WILL 76. The Apparent and the Real Social Will. 77. The Will of the Majority. 78. Ignorance and Error and the Social Will. 79. Heedlessness and the Social Will. 80. Rational Elements in the Irrational Will. 81. The Social Will and the Selfishness of the Individual.
CHAPTER XXI. THE RATIONAL SOCIAL WILL 82. Reasonable Ends. 83. An Objection Answered. 84. Reasonable Social Ends. 85. The Ethics of Reason. 86. The Development of Civilization.
CHAPTER XXII. THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE SOCIAL WILL 87. Manโs Multiple Allegiance. 88. The Appeal to Reason. 89. The Ethics of Reason and the Varying Moral Codes.
THE SCHOOLS OF THE MORALISTSCHAPTER XXIII. INTUITIONISM 90. What is it? 91. Varieties of Intuitionism. 92. Arguments for Intuitionism. 93. Arguments against Intuitionism. 94. The Value of Moral Intuitions.
CHAPTER XXIV. EGOISM 95. What is Egoism? 96. Crass Egoisms. 97. Equivocal Egoism? 98. What is Meant by the Self? 99. Egoism and the Broader Self. 100. Egoism not Unavoidable. 101. Varieties of Egoism. 102. The Arguments for Egoism. 103. The Argument against Egoism. 104. The Moralistโs Interest in Egoism.
CHAPTER XXV. UTILITARIANISM 105. What is Utilitarianism? 106. Benthamโs Doctrine. 107. The Doctrine of J. S. Mill. 108. The Argument for Utilitarianism. 109. The Distribution of Happiness. 110. The Calculus of Pleasures. 111. The Difficulties of Other Schools. 112. Summary of Arguments for Utilitarianism. 113. Arguments against Utilitarianism. 114. Transfigured Utilitarianism.
CHAPTER XXVI. NATURE, PERFECTION, SELF-REALIZATION I. Nature 115. Human Nature as Accepted Standard. 116. Human Nature and the Law of Nature. 117. Vagueness of the Law of Nature. 118. The Appeal to Nature and Intuitionism.
II. Perfection 119. Perfection and Type. 120. More and Less Perfect Types. 121. Perfectionism and Intuitionism.
III. Self-realization 122. The Self-realization Doctrine. 123. The Doctrine Akin to that of Following Nature. 124. Is the Doctrine More Egoistic? 125. Why Aim to Realize Capacities? 126. The Problem of Self-sacrifice. 127. Self-satisfaction and Self-sacrifice. 128. Can Moral Self-sacrifice be a Duty? 129. Self-sacrifice and the Identity of Selves. 130. Questions which Seem to be Left Open.
CHAPTER XXVII. THE ETHICS OF EVOLUTION 131. The Significance of the Title. 132. Evolution and the Schools of the Moralists. 133. The Ethics of Individual Evolutionists.
CHAPTER XXVIII. PESSIMISM 134. The Philosophy of the Pessimist. 135. Comment on the Ethics of Pessimism.
CHAPTER XXIX. KANT, HEGEL AND NIETZSCHE 136. Kant. 137. Hegel. 138. Nietzsche.
THE ETHICS OF THE SOCIAL WILLCHAPTER XXX. ASPECTS OF THE ETHICS OF REASON 139. The Doctrine Supported by the Other Schools. 140. Its Method of Approach to Problems. 141. Its Solution of Certain Difficulties. 142. The Cultivation of Our Capacities.
CHAPTER XXXI. THE MORAL LAW AND MORAL IDEALS 143. Duties and Virtues. 144. The Negative Aspect of the Moral Law. 145. How Can One Know the Moral Law?
CHAPTER XXXII. THE MORAL CONCEPTS 146. Good and Bad; Right and Wrong. 147. Duty and Obligation. 148. Reward and Punishment. 149. Virtues and Vices. 150. Conscience.
CHAPTER XXXIII. THE ETHICS OF THE INDIVIDUAL. 151. What is Meant by the Term? 152. The Virtues of the Individual. 153. Conventional Morality.
CHAPTER XXXIV. THE ETHICS OF THE STATE 154. The Aim of the State. 155. Its Origin and Authority. 156. Forms of Organization. 157. The Laws of the State. 158. The Rights and Duties of the State.
CHAPTER XXXV. INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 159. What is Meant by the Term. 160. Our Method of Approach to the Subject. 161. Some Problems of International Ethics. 162. The Other Side of the Shield. 163. The Solution. 164. The Necessity for Caution.
CHAPTER XXXVI. ETHICS AND OTHER DISCIPLINES 165. Sciences that Concern the Moralist. 166. Ethics and Philosophy. 167. Ethics and Religion. 168. Ethics and Belief. 169. The Last Word.
NOTES
INDEX
1. THE POINT IN DISPUTE.โIs there an accepted content of morals? Can we use the expression without going on to ask: Accepted where, when, and by whom?
To be sure, certain eminent moralists have inclined to maintain that men are in substantial agreement in regard to their moral judgments. Joseph Butler, writing in the first half of the eighteenth century, came to the conclusion that, however men may dispute about particulars, there is an universally acknowledged standard of virtue, professed in public in all ages and all countries, made a show of by all men, enforced by the primary and fundamental laws of all civil constitutions: namely, justice, veracity, and regard to common good. [Footnote: Dissertation on the Nature of Virtue.] Sir Leslie Stephen, writing in the latter half of the nineteenth, tells us that โin one sense moralists are almost unanimous; in another they are hopelessly discordant. They are unanimous in pronouncing certain classes of conduct to be right and the opposite wrong. No moralist denies that cruelty, falsity and intemperance are vicious, or that mercy, truth and temperance are virtuous.โ [Footnote: The Science of Ethics, chapter i, Sec. 1.]
In other words, these writers would teach us that men are, on the whole, agreed in approving, explicitly or implicitly, some
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