The Ethics by Benedictus de Spinoza (free ebook novel .txt) 📕

Proof.-This proposition is evident from Prop. iii. of this

Part. We there drew the conclusion, that God can form the idea

of his essence, and of all things which follow necessarily

therefrom, solely because he is a thinking thing, and not because

he is the object of his own idea. Wherefore the actual being of

ideas owns for cause God, in so far as he is a thinking thing.

It may be differently proved as follows : the actual being of

ideas is (obviously) a mode of thought, that is (Part i., Prop.

xxv., Coroll.) a mode which expresses in a certain manner the

nature of God, in so far as he is a thinking thing, and therefore

(Part i., Prop. x.) involves the conception of no other attribute

of God, and consequently (by Part i., Ax. iv.) is not the effect

of any attribute save thought. Therefore the actual being of

ideas owns God as its cause, in so far as he is considered as a

thinking thing, &c. Q.E.D.

PROP. VI. The modes of any given attribute are caused by God, in

so far as he is considered through the attribute of which they

are modes, and not in so far as he is considered through any

other attribute.

Proof.-Each attribute is conceived through itself, without

any other (Part i., Prop. x.) ; wherefore the modes of each

attribute involve the conception of that attribute, but not of

any other. Thus (Part i., Ax. iv.) they are caused by God, only

in so far as he is considered through the attribute whose modes

they are, and not in so far as he is considered through any

other. Q.E.D.

Corollary.-Hence the actual being of things, which are not

modes of thought, does not follow from the divine nature, because

that nature has prior knowledge of the things. Things

represented in ideas follow, and are derived from their

particular attribute, in the same manner, and with the same

necessity as ideas follow (according to what we have shown) from

the attribute of thought.

PROP. VII. The order and connection of ideas is the same as the

order and connection of things.

Proof.-This proposition is evident from Part i., Ax. iv. For

the idea of everything that is caused depends on a knowledge of

the cause, whereof it is an effect.

Corollary.-Hence God’s power of thinking is equal to his

realized power of action-that is, whatsoever follows from the

infinite nature of God in the world of extension (formaliter),

follows without exception in the same order and connection from

the idea of God in the world of thought (objective).

Note.-Before going any further, I wish to recall to mind what

has been pointed out above-namely, that whatsoever can be

perceived by the infinite intellect as constituting the essence

of substance, belongs altogether only to one substance :

consequently, substance thinking and substance extended are one

and the same substance, comprehended now through one attribute,

now through the other. So, also, a mode of extension and the

idea of that mode are one and the same thing, though expressed in

two ways. This truth seems to have been dimly recognized by

those Jews who maintained that God, God’s intellect, and the

things understood by God are identical. For instance, a circle

existing in nature, and the idea of a circle existing, which is

also in God, are one and the same thing displayed through

different attributes. Thus, whether we conceive nature under the

attribute of extension, or under the attribute of thought, or

under any other attribute, we shall find the same order, or one

and the same chain of causes-that is, the same things following

in either case.

I said that God is the cause of an idea-for instance, of the

idea of a circle,-in so far as he is a thinking thing ; and of a

circle, in so far as he is an extended thing, simply because the

actual being of the idea of a circle can only be perceived as a

proximate cause through another mode of thinking, and that again

through another, and so on to infinity ; so that, so long as we

consider things as modes of thinking, we must explain the order

of the whole of nature, or the whole chain of causes, through the

attribute of thought only. And, in so far as we consider things

as modes of extension, we must explain the order of the whole of

nature through the attributes of extension only ; and so on, in

the case of the other attributes. Wherefore of things as they

are in themselves God is really the cause, inasmuch as he

consists of infinite attributes. I cannot for the present

explain my meaning more clearly.

PROP. VIII. The ideas of particular things, or of modes, that do

not exist, must be comprehended in the infinite idea of God, in

the same way as the formal essences of particular things or modes

are contained in the attributes of God.

Proof.-This proposition is evident from the last ; it is

understood more clearly from the preceding note.

Corollary.-Hence, so long as particular things do not exist,

except in so far as they are comprehended in the attributes of

God, their representations in thought or ideas do not exist,

except in so far as the infinite idea of God exists ; and when

particular things are said to exist, not only in so far as they

are involved in the attributes of God, but also in so far as they

are said to continue, their ideas will also involve existence,

through which they are said to continue.

Note.-If anyone desires an example to throw more light on

this question, I shall, I fear, not be able to give him any,

which adequately explains the thing of which I here speak,

inasmuch as it is unique ; however, I will endeavour to

illustrate it as far as possible. The nature of a circle is such

that if any number of straight lines intersect within it, the

rectangles formed by their segments will be equal to one another

; thus, infinite equal rectangles are contained in a circle. Yet

none of these rectangles can be said to exist, except in so far

as the circle exists ; nor can the idea of any of these

rectangles be said to exist, except in so far as they are

comprehended in the idea of the circle. Let us grant that, from

this infinite number of rectangles, two only exist. The ideas of

these two not only exist, in so far as they are contained in the

idea of the circle, but also as they involve the existence of

those rectangles ; wherefore they are distinguished from the

remaining ideas of the remaining rectangles.

PROP. IX. The idea of an individual thing actually existing is

caused by God, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as

he is considered as affected by another idea of a thing actually

existing, of which he is the cause, in so far as he is affected

by a third idea, and so on to infinity.

Proof.-The idea of an individual thing actually existing is

an individual mode of thinking, and is distinct from other modes

(by the Corollary and note to Prop. viii. of this part) ; thus

(by Prop. vi. of this part) it is caused by God, in so far only

as he is a thinking thing. But not (by Prop. xxviii. of Part i.)

in so far as he is a thing thinking absolutely, only in so far as

he is considered as affected by another mode of thinking ; and he

is the cause of this latter, as being affected by a third, and so

on to infinity. Now, the order and connection of ideas is (by

Prop. vii. of this book) the same as the order and connection of

causes. Therefore of a given individual idea another individual

idea, or God, in so far as he is considered as modified by that

idea, is the cause ; and of this second idea God is the cause, in

so far as he is affected by another idea, and so on to infinity.

Q.E.D.

Corollary.-Whatsoever takes place in the individual object of

any idea, the knowledge thereof is in God, in so far only as he

has the idea of the object.

Proof.-Whatsoever takes place in the object of any idea, its

idea is in God (by Prop. iii. of this part), not in so far as he

is infinite, but in so far as he is considered as affected by

another idea of an individual thing (by the last Prop.) ; but (by

Prop. vii. of this part) the order and connection of ideas is the

same as the order and connection of things. The knowledge,

therefore, of that which takes place in any individual object

will be in God, in so far only as he has the idea of that object.

Q.E.D.

PROP. X. The being of substance does not appertain to the

essence of man-in other words, substance does not constitute the

actual being2 of man.

Proof.-The being of substance involves necessary existence

(Part i., Prop. vii.). If, therefore, the being of substance

appertains to the essence of man, substance being granted, man

would necessarily be granted also (II.Def.ii.), and,

consequently, man would necessarily exist, which is absurd

(II.Ax.i.). Therefore, &c. Q.E.D.

Note.-This proposition may also be proved from I.v., in which

it is shown that there cannot be two substances of the same

nature ; for as there may be many men, the being of substance is

not that which constitutes the actual being of man. Again, the

proposition is evident from the other properties of

substance-namely, that substance is in its nature infinite,

immutable, indivisible, &c., as anyone may see for himself.

Corollary.-Hence it follows, that the essence of man is

constituted by certain modifications of the attributes of God.

For (by the last Prop.) the being of substance does not belong to

the essence of man. That essence therefore (by i. 15) is

something which is in God, and which without God can neither be

nor be conceived, whether it be a modification (i. 25. Coroll.),

or a mode which expresses God’s nature in a certain conditioned

manner.

Note.-Everyone must surely admit, that nothing can be or be

conceived without God. All men agree that God is the one and

only cause of all things, both of their essence and of their

existence ; that is, God is not only the cause of things in

respect to their being made (secundum fieri), but also in respect

to their being (secundum esse).

At the same time many assert, that that, without which a

thing cannot be nor be conceived, belongs to the essence of that

thing ; wherefore they believe that either the nature of God

appertains to the essence of created things, or else that created

things can be or be conceived without God ; or else, as is more

probably the case, they hold inconsistent doctrines. I think the

cause for such confusion is mainly, that they do not keep to the

proper order of philosophic thinking. The nature of God, which

should be reflected on first, inasmuch as it is prior both in the

order of knowledge and the order of nature, they have taken to be

last in the order of knowledge, and have put into the first place

what they call the objects of sensation ; hence, while they are

considering natural phenomena, they give no attention at all to

the divine nature, and, when afterwards they apply their mind to

the study of the divine nature, they are quite unable to bear in

mind the first hypotheses, with which they have overlaid the

knowledge of natural phenomena, inasmuch as such hypotheses are

no help towards understanding the