The Ethics by Benedictus de Spinoza (free ebook novel .txt) 📕

knowledge of themselves and of God, and whereof the greatest or

chief part is eternal, and, therefore, that they should scarcely

fear death. But, in order that this may be understood more

clearly, we must here call to mind, that we live in a state of

perpetual variation, and, according as we are changed for the

better or the worse, we are called happy or unhappy.

For he, who, from being an infant or a child, becomes a

corpse, is called unhappy ; whereas it is set down to happiness,

if we have been able to live through the whole period of life

with a sound mind in a sound body. And, in reality, he, who, as

in the case of an infant or a child, has a body capable of very

few activities, and depending, for the most part, on external

causes, has a mind which, considered in itself alone, is scarcely

conscious of itself, or of God, or of things ; whereas, he, who

has a body capable of very many activities, has a mind which,

considered in itself alone, is highly conscious of itself, of

God, and of things. In this life, therefore, we primarily

endeavour to bring it about, that the body of a child, in so far

as its nature allows and conduces thereto, may be changed into

something else capable of very many activities, and referable to

a mind which is highly conscious of itself, of God, and of things

; and we desire so to change it, that what is referred to its

imagination and memory may become insignificant, in comparison

with its intellect, as I have already said in the note to the

last Proposition.

PROP. XL. In proportion as each thing possesses more of

perfection, so is it more active, and less passive ; and, vice

vers�, in proportion as it is more active, so is it more perfect.

Proof.-In proportion as each thing is more perfect, it

possesses more of reality (II. Def. vi.), and, consequently (III.

iii. and note), it is to that extent more active and less

passive. This demonstration may be reversed, and thus prove

that, in proportion as a thing is more active, so is it more

perfect. Q.E.D.

Corollary.-Hence it follows that the part of the mind which

endures, be it great or small, is more perfect than the rest.

For the eternal part of the mind (V. xxiii. xxix.) is the

understanding, through which alone we are said to act (III. iii.)

; the part which we have shown to perish is the imagination (V.

xxi.), through which only we are said to be passive (III. iii.

and general Def. of the Emotions) ; therefore, the former, be it

great or small, is more perfect than the latter. Q.E.D.

Note.-Such are the doctrines which I had purposed to set

forth concerning the mind, in so far as it is regarded without

relation to the body ; whence, as also from I. xxi. and other

places, it is plain that our mind, in so far as it understands,

is an eternal mode of thinking, which is determined by another

eternal mode of thinking, and this other by a third, and so on to

infinity ; so that all taken together at once constitute the

eternal and infinite intellect of God.

PROP. XLI. Even if we did not know that our mind is eternal, we

should still consider as of primary importance piety and

religion, and generally all things which, in Part IV., we showed

to be attributable to courage and highmindedness.

Proof.-The first and only foundation of virtue, or the rule

of right living is (IV. xxii. Coroll. and xxiv.) seeking one’s

own true interest. Now, while we determined what reason

prescribes as useful, we took no account of the mind’s eternity,

which has only become known to us in this Fifth Part. Although

we were ignorant at that time that the mind is eternal, we

nevertheless stated that the qualities attributable to courage

and highmindedness are of primary importance. Therefore, even

if we were still ignorant of this doctrine, we should yet put the

aforesaid precepts of reason in the first place. Q.E.D.

Note.-The general belief of the multitude seems to be

different. Most people seem to believe that they are free, in so

far as they may obey their lusts, and that they cede their

rights, in so far as they are bound to live according to the

commandments of the divine law. They therefore believe that

piety, religion, and, generally, all things attributable to

firmness of mind, are burdens, which, after death, they hope to

lay aside, and to receive the reward for their bondage, that is,

for their piety and religion ; it is not only by this hope, but

also, and chiefly, by the fear of being horribly punished after

death, that they are induced to live according to the divine

commandments, so far as their feeble and infirm spirit will carry

them.

If men had not this hope and this fear, but believed that the

mind perishes with the body, and that no hope of prolonged life

remains for the wretches who are broken down with the burden of

piety, they would return to their own inclinations, controlling

everything in accordance with their lusts, and desiring to obey

fortune rather than themselves. Such a course appears to me not

less absurd than if a man, because he does not believe that he

can by wholesome food sustain his body for ever, should wish to

cram himself with poisons and deadly fare ; or if, because he

sees that the mind is not eternal or immortal, he should prefer

to be out of his mind altogether, and to live without the use of

reason ; these ideas are so absurd as to be scarcely worth

refuting.

PROP. XLII. Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue

itself ; neither do we rejoice therein, because we control our

lusts, but, contrariwise, because we rejoice therein, we are able

to control our lusts.

Proof.-Blessedness consists in love towards God (V. xxxvi and

note), which love springs from the third kind of knowledge (V.

xxxii. Coroll.) ; therefore this love (III. iii. lix.) must be

referred to the mind, in so far as the latter is active ;

therefore (IV. Def. viii.) it is virtue itself. This was our

first point. Again, in proportion as the mind rejoices more in

this divine love or blessedness, so does it the more understand

(V. xxxii.) ; that is (V. iii. Coroll.), so much the more power

has it over the emotions, and (V. xxxviii.) so much the less is

it subject to those emotions which are evil ; therefore, in

proportion as the mind rejoices in this divine love or

blessedness, so has it the power of controlling lusts. And,

since human power in controlling the emotions consists solely in

the understanding, it follows that no one rejoices in

blessedness, because he has controlled his lusts, but,

contrariwise, his power of controlling his lusts arises from this

blessedness itself. Q.E.D.

Note.-I have thus completed all I wished to set forth

touching the mind’s power over the emotions and the mind’s

freedom. Whence it appears, how potent is the wise man, and how

much he surpasses the ignorant man, who is driven only by his

lusts. For the ignorant man is not only distracted in various

ways by external causes without ever gaining the true

acquiescence of his spirit, but moreover lives, as it were

unwitting of himself, and of God, and of things, and as soon as

he ceases to suffer, ceases also to be.

Whereas the wise man, in so far as he is regarded as such, is

scarcely at all disturbed in spirit, but, being conscious of

himself, and of God, and of things, by a certain eternal

necessity, never ceases to be, but always possesses true

acquiescence of his spirit.

If the way which I have pointed out as leading to this result

seems exceedingly hard, it may nevertheless be discovered. Needs

must it be hard, since it is so seldom found. How would it be

possible, if salvation were ready to our hand, and could without

great labour be found, that it should be by almost all men

neglected? But all things excellent are as difficult as they are

rare.

End of the Ethics by Benedict de Spinoza

1 “Affectiones”

2 “Forma”

3 “Animata”

4 A Baconian phrase. Nov. Org. Aph. 100. [Pollock, p. 126, n.]

5 Conscienti� morsus-thus rendered by Mr. Pollock.

6 By “men” in this and the following propositions, I mean men

whom we regard without any particular emotion.

7 So Van Vloten and Bruder. The Dutch version and Camerer read,

“an internal cause.” “Honor” = Gloria.

8 See previous endnote.

9 Ovid, “Amores,” II. xix. 4,5. Spinoza transposes the verses.

“Speremus pariter, pariter metuamus amantes ;

Ferreus est, si quis, quod sinit alter, amat.”

10 This is possible, though the human mind is part of the divine

intellect, as I have shown in II.xiii.note.

11 Gloria.

12 Ov. Met. vii.20, “Video meliora proboque, Deteriora sequor.”

13 Honestas

14 Land reads : “Quod ipsius agendi potentia juvatur”-which I

have translated above. He suggests as alternative readings to

`quod’, ‘quo’ (= whereby) and ‘quodque’ (= and that).

15 “Maltim praesens minus prae majori futuro.” (Van Vloten).

Bruder reads : “Malum praesens minus, quod causa est faturi

alicujus mali.” The last word of the latter is an obvious

misprint, and is corrected by the Dutch translator into “majoris

boni.” (Pollock, p. 268, note.)

16 Continuo. Rendered “constantly” by Mr. Pollock on the ground

that the classical meaning of the word does not suit the context.

I venture to think, however, that a tolerable sense may be

obtained without doing violence to Spinoza’s scholarship.

17 Affectiones. Camerer reads affectus - emotions.

End of The Project Gutenberg Etext of The Ethics, by Benedict de Spinoza