The Ethics by Benedictus de Spinoza (free ebook novel .txt) 📕

the greater good and the lesser evil. Q.E.D.

Corollary.-We may, under the guidance of reason, pursue the

lesser evil as though it were the greater good, and we may shun

the lesser good, which would be the cause of the greater evil.

For the evil, which is here called the lesser, is really good,

and the lesser good is really evil, wherefore we may seek the

former and shun the latter. Q.E.D.

PROP. LXVI. We may, under the guidance of reason, seek a greater

good in the future in preference to a lesser good in the present,

and we may seek a lesser evil in the present in preference to a

greater evil in the future.15

Proof.-If the mind could have an adequate knowledge of things

future, it would be affected towards what is future in the same

way as towards what is present (IV. lxii.) ; wherefore, looking

merely to reason, as in this proposition we are assumed to do,

there is no difference, whether the greater good or evil be

assumed as present, or assumed as future ; hence (IV. lxv.) we

may seek a greater good in the future in preference to a lesser

good in the present, &c. Q.E.D.

Corollary.-We may, under the guidance of reason, seek a

lesser evil in the present, because it is the cause of a greater

good in the future, and we may shun a lesser good in the present,

because it is the cause of a greater evil in the future. This

Corollary is related to the foregoing Proposition as the

Corollary to IV. lxv. is related to the said IV. lxv.

Note.-If these statements be compared with what we have

pointed out concerning the strength of the emotions in this Part

up to Prop. xviii., we shall readily see the difference between a

man, who is led solely by emotion or opinion, and a man, who is

led by reason. The former, whether will or no, performs actions

whereof he is utterly ignorant ; the latter is his own master and

only performs such actions, as he knows are of primary importance

in life, and therefore chiefly desires ; wherefore I call the

former a slave, and the latter a free man, concerning whose

disposition and manner of life it will be well to make a few

observations.

PROP. LXVII. A free man thinks of death least of all things ;

and his wisdom is a meditation not of death but of life.

Proof.-A free man is one who lives under the guidance of

reason, who is not led by fear (IV. lxiii.), but who directly

desires that which is good (IV. lxiii. Coroll.), in other words

(IV. xxiv.), who strives to act, to live, and to preserve his

being on the basis of seeking his own true advantage ; wherefore

such an one thinks of nothing less than of death, but his wisdom

is a meditation of life. Q.E.D.

PROP. LXVIII. If men were born free, they would, so long as they

remained free, form no conception of good and evil.

Proof.-I call free him who is led solely by reason ; he,

therefore, who is born free, and who remains free, has only

adequate ideas ; therefore (IV. lxiv. Coroll.) he has no

conception of evil, or consequently (good and evil being

correlative) of good. Q.E.D.

Note.-It is evident, from IV. iv., that the hypothesis of

this Proposition is false and inconceivable, except in so far as

we look solely to the nature of man, or rather to God ; not in so

far as the latter is infinite, but only in so far as he is the

cause of man’s existence.

This, and other matters which we have already proved, seem to

have been signifieded by Moses in the history of the first man.

For in that narrative no other power of God is conceived, save

that whereby he created man, that is the power wherewith he

provided solely for man’s advantage ; it is stated that God

forbade man, being free, to eat of the tree of the knowledge of

good and evil, and that, as soon as man should have eaten of it,

he would straightway fear death rather than desire to live.

Further, it is written that when man had found a wife, who was in

entire harmony with his nature, he knew that there could be

nothing in nature which could be more useful to him ; but that

after he believed the beasts to be like himself, he straightway

began to imitate their emotions (III. xxvii.), and to lose his

freedom ; this freedom was afterwards recovered by the

patriarchs, led by the spirit of Christ ; that is, by the idea of

God, whereon alone it depends, that man may be free, and desire

for others the good which he desires for himself, as we have

shown above (IV. xxxvii.).

PROP. LXIX. The virtue of a free man is seen to be as great,

when it declines dangers, as when it overcomes them.

Proof.-Emotion can only be checked or removed by an emotion

contrary to itself, and possessing more power in restraining

emotion (IV. vii.). But blind daring and fear are emotions,

which can be conceived as equally great (IV. v. and iii.) :

hence, no less virtue or firmness is required in checking daring

than in checking fear (III. lix. note) ; in other words (Def. of

the Emotions, xl. and xli.), the free man shows as much virtue,

when he declines dangers, as when he strives to overcome them.

Q.E.D.

Corollary.-The free man is as courageous in timely retreat as

in combat ; or, a free man shows equal courage or presence of

mind, whether he elect to give battle or to retreat.

Note.-What courage (animositas) is, and what I mean thereby,

I explained in III. lix. note. By danger I mean everything,

which can give rise to any evil, such as pain, hatred, discord,

&c.

PROP. LXX. The free man, who lives among the ignorant, strives,

as far as he can, to avoid receiving favours from them.

Proof.-Everyone judges what is good according to his

disposition (III. xxxix. note) ; wherefore an ignorant man, who

has conferred a benefit on another, puts his own estimate upon

it, and, if it appears to be estimated less highly by the

receiver, will feel pain (III. xlii.). But the free man only

desires to join other men to him in friendship (IV. xxxvii.), not

repaying their benefits with others reckoned as of like value,

but guiding himself and others by the free decision of reason,

and doing only such things as he knows to be of primary

importance. Therefore the free man, lest be should become

hateful to the ignorant, or follow their desires rather than

reason, will endeavour, as far as he can, to avoid receiving

their favours.

Note.-I say, as far as he can. For though men be ignorant,

yet are they men, and in cases of necessity could afford us human

aid, the most excellent of all things : therefore it is often

necessary to accept favours from them, and consequently to repay

such favours in kind ; we must, therefore, exercise caution in

declining favours, lest we should have the appearance of

despising those who bestow them, or of being, from avaricious

motives, unwilling to requite them, and so give ground for

offence by the very fact of striving to avoid it. Thus, in

declining favours, we must look to the requirements of utility

and courtesy.

PROP. LXXI. Only free men are thoroughly grateful one to

another.

Proof.-Only free men are thoroughly useful one to another,

and associated among themselves by the closest necessity of

friendship (IV. xxxv., and Coroll. i.), only such men endeavour,

with mutual zeal of love, to confer benefits on each other (IV.

xxxvii.), and, therefore, only they are thoroughly grateful one

to another. Q.E.D.

Note.-The goodwill, which men who are led by blind desire

have for one another, is generally a bargaining or enticement,

rather than pure goodwill. Moreover, ingratitude is not an

emotion. Yet it is base, inasmuch as it generally shows, that a

man is affected by excessive hatred, anger, pride, avarice, &c.

He who, by reason of his folly, knows not how to return benefits,

is not ungrateful, much less he who is not gained over by the

gifts of a courtesan to serve her lust, or by a thief to conceal

his thefts, or by any similar persons. Contrariwise, such an one

shows a constant mind, inasmuch as he cannot by any gifts be

corrupted, to his own or the general hurt.

PROP. LXXII. The free man never acts fraudulently, but always in

good faith.

Proof.-If it be asked : What should a man’s conduct be in a

case where he could by breaking faith free himself from the

danger of present death? Would not his plan of self-preservation

completely persuade him to deceive? This may be answered by

pointing out that, if reason persuaded him to act thus, it would

persuade all men to act in a similar manner, in which case reason

would persuade men not to agree in good faith to unite their

forces, or to have laws in common, that is, not to have any

general laws, which is absurd.

PROP. LXXIII. The man, who is guided by reason, is more free in

a State, where he lives under a general system of law, than in

solitude, where he is independent.

Proof.-The man, who is guided by reason, does not obey

through fear (IV. lxiii.) : but, in so far as he endeavours to

preserve his being according to the dictates of reason, that is

(IV. lxvi. note), in so far as he endeavours to live in freedom,

he desires to order his life according to the general good (IV.

xxxvii.), and, consequently (as we showed in IV. xxxvii. note.

ii.), to live according to the laws of his country. Therefore

the free man, in order to enjoy greater freedom, desires to

possess the general rights of citizenship. Q.E.D.

Note.-These and similar observations, which we have made on

man’s true freedom, may be referred to strength, that is, to

courage and nobility of character (III. lix. note). I do not

think it worth while to prove separately all the properties of

strength ; much less need I show, that he that is strong hates no

man, is angry with no man, envies no man, is indignant with no

man, despises no man, and least of all things is proud. These

propositions, and all that relate to the true way of life and

religion, are easily proved from IV. xxxvii. and IV. xlvi. ;

namely, that hatred should be overcome with love, and that every

man should desire for others the good which he seeks for himself.

We may also repeat what we drew attention to in the note to IV.

l., and in other places ; namely, that the strong man has ever

first in his thoughts, that all things follow from the necessity

of the divine nature ; so that whatsoever he deems to be hurtful

and evil, and whatsoever, accordingly, seems to him impious,

horrible, unjust, and base, assumes that appearance owing to his

own disordered, fragmentary, and confused view of the universe.

Wherefore he strives before all things to conceive things as they

really are, and to remove the hindrances to true knowledge, such

as are hatred, anger, envy, derision, pride, and similar

emotions, which I have mentioned above. Thus he endeavours, as

we said before, as far as in him lies, to do good, and to go on

his way rejoicing. How far human virtue is capable of attaining

to such a condition, and what its powers may be, I will prove in

the following Part.

APPENDIX.