The Ethics by Benedictus de Spinoza (free ebook novel .txt) 📕

reason are we able to perform any action, which we know for

certain to be good (IV. xxvii.) ; thus, in a man who lives under

the guidance of reason, pity in itself is useless and bad.

Q.E.D.

Note.-He who rightly realizes, that all things follow from

the necessity of the divine nature, and come to pass in

accordance with the eternal laws and rules of nature, will not

find anything worthy of hatred, derision, or contempt, nor will

he bestow pity on anything, but to the utmost extent of human

virtue he will endeavour to do well, as the saying is, and to

rejoice. We may add, that he, who is easily touched with

compassion, and is moved by another’s sorrow or tears, often does

something which he afterwards regrets ; partly because we can

never be sure that an action caused by emotion is good, partly

because we are easily deceived by false tears. I am in this

place expressly speaking of a man living under the guidance of

reason. He who is moved to help others neither by reason nor by

compassion, is rightly styled inhuman, for (III. xxvii.) he seems

unlike a man.

PROP. LI. Approval is not repugnant to reason, but can agree

therewith and arise therefrom.

Proof.-Approval is love towards one who has done good to

another (Def. of the Emotions, xix.) ; therefore it may be

referred to the mind, in so far as the latter is active (III.

lix.), that is (III. iii.), in so far as it understands ;

therefore, it is in agreement with reason, &c. Q.E.D.

Another Proof.-He, who lives under the guidance of reason,

desires for others the good which he seeks for himself (IV.

xxxvii.) ; wherefore from seeing someone doing good to his fellow

his own endeavour to do good is aided ; in other words, he will

feel pleasure (III. xi. note) accompanied by the idea of the

benefactor. Therefore he approves of him. Q.E.D.

Note.-Indignation as we defined it (Def. of the Emotions,

xx.) is necessarily evil (IV. xlv.) ; we may, however, remark

that, when the sovereign power for the sake of preserving peace

punishes a citizen who has injured another, it should not be said

to be indignant with the criminal, for it is not incited by

hatred to ruin him, it is led by a sense of duty to punish him.

PROP. LII. Self-approval may arise from reason, and that which

arises from reason is the highest possible.

Proof.-Self-approval is pleasure arising from a man’s

contemplation of himself and his own power of action (Def. of the

Emotions, xxv.). But a man’s true power of action or virtue is

reason herself (III. iii.), as the said man clearly and

distinctly contemplates her (II. xl. xliii.) ; therefore

self-approval arises from reason. Again, when a man is

contemplating himself, he only perceived clearly and distinctly

or adequately, such things as follow from his power of action

(III. Def. ii.), that is (III. iii.), from his power of

understanding ; therefore in such contemplation alone does the

highest possible self-approval arise. Q.E.D.

Note.-Self-approval is in reality the highest object for

which we can hope. For (as we showed in IV. xxv.) no one

endeavours to preserve his being for the sake of any ulterior

object, and, as this approval is more and more fostered and

strengthened by praise (III. liii. Coroll.), and on the contrary

(III. lv. Coroll.) is more and more disturbed by blame, fame

becomes the most powerful of incitements to action, and life

under disgrace is almost unendurable.

PROP. LIII. Humility is not a virtue, or does not arise from

reason.

Proof.-Humility is pain arising from a man’s contemplation of

his own infirmities (Def. of the Emotions, xxvi.). But, in so

far as a man knows himself by true reason, he is assumed to

understand his essence, that is, his power (III. vii.).

Wherefore, if a man in self-contemplation perceives any infirmity

in himself, it is not by virtue of his understanding himself, but

(III. lv.) by virtue of his power of activity being checked.

But, if we assume that a man perceives his own infirmity by

virtue of understanding something stronger than himself, by the

knowledge of which he determines his own power of activity, this

is the same as saying that we conceive that a man understands

himself distinctly (IV. xxvi.), because14 his power of activity

is aided. Wherefore humility, or the pain which arises from a

man’s contemplation of his own infirmity, does not arise from the

contemplation or reason, and is not a virtue but a passion.

Q.E.D.

PROP. LIV. Repentance is not a virtue, or does not arise from

reason ; but he who repents of an action is doubly wretched or

infirm.

Proof.-The first part of this proposition is proved like the

foregoing one. The second part is proved from the mere

definition of the emotion in question (Def. of the Emotions,

xxvii.). For the man allows himself to be overcome, first, by

evil desires ; secondly, by pain.

Note.-As men seldom live under the guidance of reason, these

two emotions, namely, Humility and Repentance, as also Hope and

Fear, bring more good than harm ; hence, as we must sin, we had

better sin in that direction. For, if all men who are a prey to

emotion were all equally proud, they would shrink from nothing,

and would fear nothing ; how then could they be joined and linked

together in bonds of union? The crowd plays the tyrant, when it

is not in fear ; hence we need not wonder that the prophets, who

consulted the good, not of a few, but of all, so strenuously

commended Humility, Repentance, and Reverence. Indeed those who

are a prey to these emotions may be led much more easily than

others to live under the guidance of reason, that is, to become

free and to enjoy the life of the blessed.

PROP. LV. Extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme ignorance

of self.

Proof.-This is evident from Def. of the Emotions, xxviii. and

xxix.

PROP. LVI. Extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme

infirmity of spirit.

Proof.-The first foundation of virtue is self-preservation

(IV. xxii. Coroll.) under the guidance of reason (IV. xxiv.).

He, therefore, who is ignorant of himself, is ignorant of the

foundation of all virtues, and consequently of all virtues.

Again, to act virtuously is merely to act under the guidance of

reason (IV. xxiv.) : now he, that acts under the guidance of

reason, must necessarily know that he so acts (II. xliii.).

Therefore he who is in extreme ignorance of himself, and

consequently of all virtues, acts least in obedience to virtue ;

in other words (IV. Def. viii.), is most infirm of spirit. Thus

extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme infirmity of spirit.

Q.E.D.

Corollary.-Hence it most clearly follows, that the proud and

the dejected specially fall a prey to the emotions.

Note.-Yet dejection can be more easily corrected than pride ;

for the latter being a pleasurable emotion, and the former a

painful emotion, the pleasurable is stronger than the painful

(IV. xviii.).

PROP. LVII. The proud man delights in the company of flatterers

and parasites, but hates the company of the highminded.

Proof.-Pride is pleasure arising from a man’s over estimation

of himself (Def. of the Emotions, xxviii. and vi.) ; this

estimation the proud man will endeavour to foster by all the

means in his power (III. xiii. note) ; he will therefore delight

in the company of flatterers and parasites (whose character is

too well known to need definition here), and will avoid the

company of highminded men, who value him according to his

deserts. Q.E.D.

Note.-It would be too long a task to enumerate here all the

evil results of pride, inasmuch as the proud are a prey to all

the emotions, though to none of them less than to love and pity.

I cannot, however, pass over in silence the fact, that a man may

be called proud from his underestimation of other people ; and,

therefore, pride in this sense may be defined as pleasure arising

from the false opinion, whereby a man may consider himself

superior to his fellows. The dejection, which is the opposite

quality to this sort of pride, may be defined as pain arising

from the false opinion, whereby a man may think himself inferior

to his fellows. Such being the ease, we can easily see that a

proud man is necessarily envious (III. xli. note), and only takes

pleasure in the company, who fool his weak mind to the top of his

bent, and make him insane instead of merely foolish.

Though dejection is the emotion contrary to pride, yet is the

dejected man very near akin to the proud man. For, inasmuch as

his pain arises from a comparison between his own infirmity and

other men’s power or virtue, it will be removed, or, in other

words, he will feel pleasure, if his imagination be occupied in

contemplating other men’s faults ; whence arises the proverb,

“The unhappy are comforted by finding fellow-sufferers.”

Contrariwise, he will be the more pained in proportion as he

thinks himself inferior to others ; hence none are so prone to

envy as the dejected, they are specially keen in observing men’s

actions, with a view to fault-finding rather than correction, in

order to reserve their praises for dejection, and to glory

therein, though all the time with a dejected air. These effects

follow as necessarily from the said emotion, as it follows from

the nature of a triangle, that the three angles are equal to two

right angles. I have already said that I call these and similar

emotions bad, solely in respect to what is useful to man. The

laws of nature have regard to nature’s general order, whereof man

is but a part. I mention this, in passing, lest any should think

that I have wished to set forth the faults and irrational deeds

of men rather than the nature and properties of things. For, as

I said in the preface to the third Part, I regard human emotions

and their properties as on the same footing with other natural

phenomena. Assuredly human emotions indicate the power and

ingenuity, of nature, if not of human nature, quite as fully as

other things which we admire, and which we delight to

contemplate. But I pass on to note those qualities in the

emotions, which bring advantage to man, or inflict injury upon

him.

PROP. LVIII. Honour (gloria) is not repugnant to reason, but may

arise therefrom.

Proof.-This is evident from Def. of the Emotions, xxx., and

also from the definition of an honourable man (IV. xxxvii. note.

i.).

Note-Empty honour, as it is styled, is self-approval,

fostered only by the good opinion of the populace ; when this

good opinion ceases there ceases also the self-approval, in other

words, the highest object of each man’s love (IV. lii. note) ;

consequently, he whose honour is rooted in popular approval must,

day by day, anxiously strive, act, and scheme in order to retain

his reputation. For the populace is variable and inconstant, so

that, if a reputation be not kept up, it quickly withers away.

Everyone wishes to catch popular applause for himself, and

readily represses the fame of others. The object of the strife

being estimated as the greatest of all goods, each combatant is

seized with a fierce desire to put down his rivals in every

possible way, till he who at last comes out victorious is more

proud of having done harm to others than of having done good to

himself. This sort of honour, then, is really empty, being

nothing.

The points to note concerning shame may easily be inferred

from what was said on the subject of mercy and repentance. I

will only add that shame,