The Ethics by Benedictus de Spinoza (free ebook novel .txt) 📕

one single mind and one single body, and that all should, with

one consent, as far as they are able, endeavour to preserve their

being, and all with one consent seek what is useful to them all.

Hence, men who are governed by reason-that is, who seek what is

useful to them in accordance with reason, desire for themselves

nothing, which they do not also desire for the rest of mankind,

and, consequently, are just, faithful, and honourable in their

conduct.

Such are the dictates of reason, which I purposed thus

briefly to indicate, before beginning to prove them in greater

detail. I have taken this course, in order, if possible, to gain

the attention of those who believe, that the principle that every

man is bound to seek what is useful for himself is the foundation

of impiety, rather than of piety and virtue.

Therefore, after briefly showing that the contrary is the

case, I go on to prove it by the same method, as that whereby I

have hitherto proceeded.

PROP. XIX. Every man, by the laws of his nature, necessarily

desires or shrinks from that which he deems to be good or bad.

Proof.-The knowledge of good and evil is (IV. viii.) the

emotion of pleasure or pain, in so far as we are conscious

thereof ; therefore, every man necessarily desires what he thinks

good, and shrinks from what he thinks bad. Now this appetite is

nothing else but man’s nature or essence (Cf. the Definition of

Appetite, III. ix. note, and Def. of the Emotions, i.).

Therefore, every man, solely by the laws of his nature, desires

the one, and shrinks from the other, &c. Q.E.D.

PROP. XX. The more every man endeavours, and is able to seek

what is useful to him-in other words, to preserve his own

being-the more is he endowed with virtue ; on the contrary, in

proportion as a man neglects to seek what is useful to him, that

is, to preserve his own being, he is wanting in power.

Proof.-Virtue is human power, which is defined solely by

man’s essence (IV. Def. viii.), that is, which is defined solely

by the endeavour made by man to persist in his own being.

Wherefore, the more a man endeavours, and is able to preserve his

own being, the more is he endowed with virtue, and, consequently

(III.iv. and vi.), in so far as a man neglects to preserve his

own being, he is wanting in power. Q.E.D.

Note.-No one, therefore, neglects seeking his own good, or

preserving his own being, unless he be overcome by causes

external and foreign to his nature. No one, I say, from the

necessity of his own nature, or otherwise than under compulsion

from external causes, shrinks from food, or kills himself : which

latter may be done in a variety of ways. A man, for instance,

kills himself under the compulsion of another man, who twists

round his right hand, wherewith he happened to have taken up a

sword, and forces him to turn the blade against his own heart ;

or, again, he may be compelled, like Seneca, by a tyrant’s

command, to open his own veins-that is, to escape a greater evil

by incurring, a lesser ; or, lastly, latent external causes may

so disorder his imagination, and so affect his body, that it may

assume a nature contrary to its former one, and whereof the idea

cannot exist in the mind (III. x.) But that a man, from the

necessity of his own nature, should endeavour to become

non-existent, is as impossible as that something should be made

out of nothing, as everyone will see for himself, after a little

reflection.

PROP. XXI. No one can desire to be blessed, to act rightly, and

to live rightly, without at the same time wishing to be, act, and

to live-in other words, to actually exist.

Proof.-The proof of this proposition, or rather the

proposition itself, is self-evident, and is also plain from the

definition of desire. For the desire of living, acting, &c.,

blessedly or rightly, is (Def. of the Emotions, i.) the essence

of man-that is (III. vii.), the endeavour made by everyone to

preserve his own being. Therefore, no one can desire, &c.

Q.E.D.

PROP. XXII. No virtue can be conceived as prior to this

endeavour to preserve one’s own being.

Proof.-The effort for self-preservation is the essence of a

thing (III. vii.) ; therefore, if any virtue could be conceived

as prior thereto, the essence of a thing would have to be

conceived as prior to itself, which is obviously absurd.

Therefore no virtue, &c. Q.E.D.

Corollary.-The effort for self-preservation is the first and

only foundation of virtue. For prior to this principle nothing

can be conceived, and without it no virtue can be conceived.

PROP. XXIII. Man, in so far as he is determined to a particular

action because he has inadequate ideas, cannot be absolutely said

to act in obedience to virtue ; he can only be so described, in

so far as he is determined for the action because he understands.

Proof.-In so far as a man is determined to an action through

having inadequate ideas, he is passive (III. i.), that is (III.

Deff. i., and iii.), he does something, which cannot be perceived

solely through his essence, that is (by IV. Def. viii.), which

does not follow from his virtue. But, in so far as he is

determined for an action because he understands, he is active ;

that is, he does something, which is perceived through his

essence alone, or which adequately follows from his virtue.

Q.E.D.

PROP. XXIV. To act absolutely in obedience to virtue is in us

the same thing as to act, to live, or to preserve one’s being

(these three terms are identical in meaning) in accordance with

the dictates of reason on the basis of seeking what is useful to

one’s self.

Proof.-To act absolutely in obedience to virtue is nothing

else but to act according to the laws of one’s own nature. But

we only act, in so far as we understand (III. iii.) : therefore

to act in obedience to virtue is in us nothing else but to act,

to live, or to preserve one’s being in obedience to reason, and

that on the basis of seeking what is useful for us (IV. xxii.

Coroll.). Q.E.D.

PROP. XXV. No one wishes to preserve his being for the sake of

anything else.

Proof.-The endeavour, wherewith everything endeavours to

persist in its being, is defined solely by the essence of the

thing itself (III. vii.) ; from this alone, and not from the

essence of anything else, it necessarily follows (III. vi.) that

everyone endeavours to preserve his being. Moreover, this

proposition is plain from IV. xxii. Coroll., for if a man should

endeavour to preserve his being for the sake of anything else,

the last-named thing would obviously be the basis of virtue,

which, by the foregoing corollary, is absurd. Therefore no one,

&c. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXVI. Whatsoever we endeavour in obedience to reason is

nothing further than to understand ; neither does the mind, in so

far as it makes use of reason, judge anything to be useful to it,

save such things as are conducive to understanding.

Proof.-The effort for self-preservation is nothing else but

the essence of the thing in question (III. vii.), which, in so

far as it exists such as it is, is conceived to have force for

continuing in existence (III. vi.) and doing such things as

necessarily follow from its given nature (see the Def. of

Appetite, III. ix. note). But the essence of reason is nought

else but our mind, in so far as it clearly and distinctly

understands (see the definition in II. xl. note. ii.) ; therefore

(II. xl.) whatsoever we endeavour in obedience to reason is

nothing else but to understand. Again, since this effort of the

mind wherewith the mind endeavours, in so far as it reasons, to

preserve its own being is nothing else but understanding ; this

effort at understanding is (IV. xxii. Coroll.) the first and

single basis of virtue, nor shall we endeavour to understand

things for the sake of any ulterior object (IV. xxv.) ; on the

other hand, the mind, in so far as it reasons, will not be able

to conceive any good for itself, save such things as are

conducive to understanding.

PROP. XXVII. We know nothing to be certainly good or evil, save

such things as really conduce to understanding, or such as are

able to hinder us from understanding.

Proof.-The mind, in so far as it reasons, desires nothing

beyond understanding, and judges nothing to be useful to itself,

save such things as conduce to understanding (by the foregoing

Prop.). But the mind (II. xli., xliii. and note) cannot possess

certainty concerning anything, except in so far as it has

adequate ideas, or (what by II. xl. note, is the same thing) in

so far as it reasons. Therefore we know nothing to be good or

evil save such things as really conduce, &c. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXVIII. The mind’s highest good is the knowledge of God,

and the mind’s highest virtue is to know God.

Proof.-The mind is not capable of understanding anything

higher than God, that is (I. Def. vi.), than a Being absolutely

infinite, and without which (I. xv.) nothing can either be or be

conceived ; therefore (IV. xxvi. and xxvii.), the mind’s highest

utility or (IV. Def. i.) good is the knowledge of God. Again,

the mind is active, only in so far as it understands, and only to

the same extent can it be said absolutely to act virtuously. The

mind’s absolute virtue is therefore to understand. Now, as we

have already shown, the highest that the mind can understand is

God ; therefore the highest virtue of the mind is to understand

or to know God. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXIX. No individual thing, which is entirely different

from our own nature, can help or check our power of activity, and

absolutely nothing can do us good or harm, unless it has

something in common with our nature.

Proof.-The power of every individual thing, and consequently

the power of man, whereby he exists and operates, can only be

determined by an individual thing (I. xxviii.), whose nature (II.

vi.) must be understood through the same nature as that, through

which human nature is conceived. Therefore our power of

activity, however it be conceived, can be determined and

consequently helped or hindered by the power of any other

individual thing, which has something in common with us, but not

by the power of anything, of which the nature is entirely

different from our own ; and since we call good or evil that

which is the cause of pleasure or pain (IV. viii.), that is (III.

xi. note), which increases or diminishes, helps or hinders, our

power of activity ; therefore, that which is entirely different

from our nature can neither be to us good nor bad. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXX. A thing cannot be bad for us through the quality

which it has in common with our nature, but it is bad for us in

so far as it is contrary to our nature.

Proof.-We call a thing bad when it is the cause of pain (IV.

viii.), that is (by the Def., which see in III. xi. note), when

it diminishes or checks our power of action. Therefore, if

anything were bad for us through that quality which it has in

common with our nature, it would be able itself to diminish or

check that which it has in common with our nature, which (III.

iv.) is absurd. Wherefore nothing can be bad for us through that

quality which it has in common