The Ethics by Benedictus de Spinoza (free ebook novel .txt) 📕

hand, we are affected more intensely, than if we conceive that

its time for existence is separated from the present by a longer

interval ; so too by the remembrance of what we conceive to have

not long passed away we are affected more intensely, than if we

conceive that it has long passed away.

Proof.-In so far as we conceive a thing as close at hand, or

not long passed away, we conceive that which excludes the

presence of the object less, than if its period of future

existence were more distant from the present, or if it had long

passed away (this is obvious) therefore (by the foregoing Prop.)

we are, so far, more intensely affected towards it. Q.E.D.

Corollary.-From the remarks made in Def. vi. of this part it

follows that, if objects are separated from the present by a

longer period than we can define in conception, though their

dates of occurrence be widely separated one from the other, they

all affect us equally faintly.

PROP. XI. An emotion towards that which we conceive as necessary

is, when other conditions are equal, more intense than an emotion

towards that which possible, or contingent, or non-necessary.

Proof.-In so far as we conceive a thing to be necessary, we,

to that extent, affirm its existence ; on the other hand we deny

a thing’s existence, in so far as we conceive it not to be

necessary I. xxxiii. note. i.) ; wherefore (IV. ix.) an emotion

towards that which is necessary is, other conditions being equal,

more intense than an emotion that which is non-necessary. Q.E.D.

PROP. XII. An emotion towards a thing, which we know not to

exist at the present time, and which we conceive as possible, is

more intense, other conditions being equal, than an emotion

towards a thing contingent.

Proof.-In so far as we conceive a thing as contingent, we are

affected by the conception of some further thing, which would

assert the existence of the former (IV. Def. iii.) ; but, on the

other hand, we (by hypothesis) conceive certain things, which

exclude its present existence. But, in so far as we conceive a

thing to be possible in the future, we there by conceive things

which assert its existence (IV. iv.), that is (III. xviii.),

things which promote hope or fear : wherefore an emotion towards

something possible is more vehement. Q.E.D.

Corollary.-An emotion towards a thing, which we know not to

exist in the present, and which we conceive as contingent, is far

fainter, than if we conceive the thing to be present with us.

Proof.-Emotion towards a thing, which we conceive to exist,

is more intense than it would be, if we conceived the thing as

future (IV. ix. Coroll.), and is much more vehement, than if the

future time be conceived as far distant from the present (IV.

x.). Therefore an emotion towards a thing, whose period of

existence we conceive to be far distant from the present, is far

fainter, than if we conceive the thing as present ; it is,

nevertheless, more intense, than if we conceived the thing as

contingent, wherefore an emotion towards a thing, which we regard

as contingent, will be far fainter, than if we conceived the

thing to be present with us. Q.E.D.

PROP. XIII. Emotion towards a thing contingent, which we know

not to exist in the present, is, other conditions being equal,

fainter than an emotion towards a thing past.

Proof.-In so far as we conceive a thing as contingent, we are

not affected by the image of any other thing, which asserts the

existence of the said thing (IV. Def. iii.), but, on the other

hand (by hypothesis), we conceive certain things excluding its

present existence. But, in so far as we conceive it in relation

to time past, we are assumed to conceive something, which recalls

the thing to memory, or excites the image thereof (II. xviii. and

note), which is so far the same as regarding it as present (II.

xvii. Coroll.). Therefore (IV. ix.) an emotion towards a thing

contingent, which we know does not exist in the present, is

fainter, other conditions being equal, than an emotion towards a

thing past. Q.E.D.

PROP. XIV. A true knowledge of good and evil cannot check any

emotion by virtue of being true, but only in so far as it is

considered as an emotion.

Proof.-An emotion is an idea, whereby the mind affirms of its

body a greater or less force of existing than before (by the

general Definition of the Emotions) ; therefore it has no

positive quality, which can be destroyed by the presence of what

is true ; consequently the knowledge of good and evil cannot, by

virtue of being true, restrain any emotion. But, in so far as

such knowledge is an emotion (IV. viii.) if it have more strength

for restraining emotion, it will to that extent be able to

restrain the given emotion. Q.E.D.

PROP. XV. Desire arising from the knowledge of good and bad can

be quenched or checked by many of the other desires arising from

the emotions whereby we are assailed.

Proof.-From the true knowledge of good and evil, in so far as

it is an emotion, necessarily arises desire (Def. of the

Emotions, i.), the strength of which is proportioned to the

strength of the emotion wherefrom it arises (III. xxxvii.). But,

inasmuch as this desire arises (by hypothesis) from the fact of

our truly understanding anything, it follows that it is also

present with us, in so far as we are active (III. i.), and must

therefore be understood through our essence only (III. Def. ii.)

; consequently (III. vii.) its force and increase can be defined

solely by human power. Again, the desires arising from the

emotions whereby we are assailed are stronger, in proportion as

the said emotions are more vehement ; wherefore their force and

increase must be defined solely by the power of external causes,

which, when compared with our own power, indefinitely surpass it

(IV. iii.) ; hence the desires arising from like emotions may be

more vehement, than the desire which arises from a true knowledge

of good and evil, and may, consequently, control or quench it.

Q.E.D.

PROP. XVI. Desire arising from the knowledge of good and evil,

in so far as such knowledge regards what is future, may be more

easily controlled or quenched, than the desire for what is

agreeable at the present moment.

Proof.-Emotion towards a thing, which we conceive as future,

is fainter than emotion towards a thing that is present (IV. ix.

Coroll.). But desire, which arises from the true knowledge of

good and evil, though it be concerned with things which are good

at the moment, can be quenched or controlled by any headstrong

desire (by the last Prop., the proof whereof is of universal

application). Wherefore desire arising from such knowledge, when

concerned with the future, can be more easily controlled or

quenched, &c. Q.E.D.

PROP. XVII. Desire arising from the true knowledge of good and

evil, in so far as such knowledge is concerned with what is

contingent, can be controlled far more easily still, than desire

for things that are present.

Proof.-This Prop. is proved in the same way as the last Prop.

from IV. xii. Coroll.

Note.-I think I have now shown the reason, why men are moved

by opinion more readily than by true reason, why it is that the

true knowledge of good and evil stirs up conflicts in the soul,

and often yields to every kind of passion. This state of things

gave rise to the exclamation of the poet :12-

“The better path I gaze at and approve,

The worse-I follow.”

Ecclesiastes seems to have had the same thought in his mind,

when he says, “He who increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow.” I

have not written the above with the object of drawing the

conclusion, that ignorance is more excellent than knowledge, or

that a wise man is on a par with a fool in controlling his

emotions, but because it is necessary to know the power and the

infirmity of our nature, before we can determine what reason can

do in restraining the emotions, and what is beyond her power. I

have said, that in the present part I shall merely treat of human

infirmity. The power of reason over the emotions I have settled

to treat separately.

PROP. XVIII. Desire arising from pleasure is, other conditions

being equal, stronger than desire arising from pain.

Proof.-Desire is the essence of a man (Def. of the Emotions,

i.), that is, the endeavour whereby a man endeavours to persist

in his own being. Wherefore desire arising from pleasure is, by

the fact of pleasure being felt, increased or helped ; on the

contrary, desire arising from pain is, by the fact of pain being

felt, diminished or hindered ; hence the force of desire arising

from pleasure must be defined by human power together with the

power of an external cause, whereas desire arising from pain must

be defined by human power only. Thus the former is the stronger

of the two. Q.E.D.

Note.-In these few remarks I have explained the causes of

human infirmity and inconstancy, and shown why men do not abide

by the precepts of reason. It now remains for me to show what

course is marked out for us by reason, which of the emotions are

in harmony with the rules of human reason, and which of them are

contrary thereto. But, before I begin to prove my Propositions

in detailed geometrical fashion, it is advisable to sketch them

briefly in advance, so that everyone may more readily grasp my

meaning.

As reason makes no demands contrary to nature, it demands,

that every man should love himself, should seek that which is

useful to him-I mean, that which is really useful to him, should

desire everything which really brings man to greater perfection,

and should, each for himself, endeavour as far as he can to

preserve his own being. This is as necessarily true, as that a

whole is greater than its part. (Cf. III. iv.)

Again, as virtue is nothing else but action in accordance

with the laws of one’s own nature (IV. Def. viii.), and as no one

endeavours to preserve his own being, except in accordance with

the laws of his own nature, it follows, first, that the

foundation of virtue is the endeavour to preserve one’s own

being, and that happiness consists in man’s power of preserving

his own being ; secondly, that virtue is to be desired for its

own sake, and that there is nothing more excellent or more useful

to us, for the sake of which we should desire it ; thirdly and

lastly, that suicides are weak-minded, and are overcome by

external causes repugnant to their nature. Further, it follows

from Postulate iv., Part II., that we can never arrive at doing

without all external things for the preservation of our being or

living, so as to have no relations with things which are outside

ourselves. Again, if we consider our mind, we see that our

intellect would be more imperfect, if mind were alone, and could

understand nothing besides itself. There are, then, many things

outside ourselves, which are useful to us, and are, therefore, to

be desired. Of such none can be discerned more excellent, than

those which are in entire agreement with our nature. For if, for

example, two individuals of entirely the same nature are united,

they form a combination twice as powerful as either of them

singly.

Therefore, to man there is nothing more useful than

man-nothing, I repeat, more excellent for preserving their being

can be wished for by men, than that all should so in all points

agree, that the minds and bodies