The Ethics by Benedictus de Spinoza (free ebook novel .txt) 📕

I am not aware that any emotions are named after them.

VI. Love is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of an external

cause.

Explanation-This definition explains sufficiently clearly the

essence of love ; the definition given by those authors who say

that love is the lover’s wish to unite himself to the loved

object expresses a property, but not the essence of love ; and,

as such authors have not sufficiently discerned love’s essence,

they have been unable to acquire a true conception of its

properties, accordingly their definition is on all hands admitted

to be very obscure. It must, however, be noted, that when I say

that it is a property of love, that the lover should wish to

unite himself to the beloved object, I do not here mean by wish

consent, or conclusion, or a free decision of the mind (for I

have shown such, in II. xlviii., to be fictitious) ; neither do I

mean a desire of being united to the loved object when it is

absent, or of continuing in its presence when it is at hand ; for

love can be conceived without either of these desires ; but by

wish I mean the contentment, which is in the lover, on account of

the presence of the beloved object, whereby the pleasure of the

lover is strengthened, or at least maintained.

VII. Hatred is pain, accompanied by the idea of an external

cause.

Explanation-These observations are easily grasped after what

has been said in the explanation of the preceding definition (cf.

also III. xiii. note).

VIII. Inclination is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of

something which is accidentally a cause of pleasure.

IX. Aversion is pain, accompanied by the idea of something which

is accidentally the cause of pain (cf. III. xv. note).

X. Devotion is love towards one whom we admire.

Explanation-Wonder (admiratio) arises (as we have shown, III.

lii.) from the novelty of a thing. If, therefore, it happens

that the object of our wonder is often conceived by us, we shall

cease to wonder at it ; thus we see, that the emotion of devotion

readily degenerates into simple love.

XI. Derision is pleasure arising from our conceiving the

presence of a quality, which we despise, in an object which we

hate.

Explanation-In so far as we despise a thing which we hate, we

deny existence thereof (III. lii. note), and to that extent

rejoice (III. xx.). But since we assume that man hates that

which he derides, it follows that the pleasure in question is not

without alloy (cf. III. xlvii. note).

XII. Hope is an inconstant pleasure, arising from the idea of

something past or future, whereof we to a certain extent doubt

the issue.

XIII. Fear is an inconstant pain arising from the idea of

something past or future, whereof we to a certain extent doubt

the issue (cf. III. xviii. note).

Explanation-From these definitions it follows, that there is

no hope unmingled with fear, and no fear unmingled with hope.

For he, who depends on hope and doubts concerning the issue of

anything, is assumed to conceive something, which excludes the

existence of the said thing in the future ; therefore he, to this

extent, feels pain (cf. III. xix.) ; consequently, while

dependent on hope, he fears for the issue. Contrariwise he, who

fears, in other words doubts, concerning the issue of something

which he hates, also conceives something which excludes the

existence of the thing in question ; to this extent he feels

pleasure, and consequently to this extent he hopes that it will

turn out as he desires (III. xx.).

XIV. Confidence is pleasure arising from the idea of something

past or future, wherefrom all cause of doubt has been removed.

XV. Despair is pain arising from the idea of something past or

future, wherefrom all cause of doubt has been removed.

Explanation-Thus confidence springs from hope, and despair

from fear, when all cause for doubt as to the issue of an event

has been removed : this comes to pass, because man conceives

something past or future as present and regards it as such, or

else because he conceives other things, which exclude the

existence of the causes of his doubt. For, although we can never

be absolutely certain of the issue of any particular event (II.

xxxi. Coroll.), it may nevertheless happen that we feel no doubt

concerning it. For we have shown, that to feel no doubt

concerning a thing is not the same as to be quite certain of it

(II. xlix. note). Thus it may happen that we are affected by the

same emotion of pleasure or pain concerning a thing past or

future, as concerning the conception of a thing present ; this I

have already shown in III. xviii., to which, with its note, I

refer the reader.

XVI. Joy is pleasure accompanied by the idea of something past,

which has had an issue beyond our hope.

XVII. Disappointment is pain accompanied by the idea of

something past, which has had an issue contrary to our hope.

XVIII. Pity is pain accompanied by the idea of evil, which has

befallen someone else whom we conceive to be like ourselves (cf.

III. xxii. note, and III. xxvii. note).

Explanation-Between pity and sympathy (misericordia) there

seems to be no difference, unless perhaps that the former term is

used in reference to a particular action, and the latter in

reference to a disposition.

XIX. Approval is love towards one who has done good to another.

XX. Indignation is hatred towards one who has done evil to

another.

Explanation-I am aware that these terms are employed in

senses somewhat different from those usually assigned. But my

purpose is to explain, not the meaning of words, but the nature

of things. I therefore make use of such terms, as may convey my

meaning without any violent departure from their ordinary

signification. One statement of my method will suffice. As for

the cause of the above-named emotions see III. xxvii. Coroll. i.,

and III. xxii. note.

XXI. Partiality is thinking too highly of anyone because of the

love we bear him.

XXII. Disparagement is thinking too meanly of anyone because we

hate him.

Explanation-Thus partiality is an effect of love, and

disparagement an effect of hatred : so that partiality may also

be defined as love, in so far as it induces a man to think too

highly of a beloved object. Contrariwise, disparagement may be

defined as hatred, in so far as it induces a man to think too

meanly of a hated object. Cf. III. xxvi. note.

XXIII. Envy is hatred, in so far as it induces a man to be

pained by another’s good fortune, and to rejoice in another’s

evil fortune.

Explanation-Envy is generally opposed to sympathy, which, by

doing some violence to the meaning of the word, may therefore be

thus defined :

XXIV. Sympathy (misericordia) is love, in so far as it induces a

man to feel pleasure at another’s good fortune, and pain at

another’s evil fortune.

Explanation-Concerning envy see the notes to III. xxiv. and

xxxii. These emotions also arise from pleasure or pain

accompanied by the idea of something external, as cause either in

itself or accidentally. I now pass on to other emotions, which

are accompanied by the idea of something within as a cause.

XXV. Self-approval is pleasure arising from a man’s

contemplation of himself and his own power of action.

XXVI. Humility is pain arising from a man’s contemplation of his

own weakness of body or mind.

Explanation-Self-complacency is opposed to humility, in so

far as we thereby mean pleasure arising from a contemplation of

our own power of action ; but, in so far as we mean thereby

pleasure accompanied by the idea of any action which we believe

we have performed by the free decision of our mind, it is opposed

to repentance, which we may thus define :

XXVII. Repentance is pain accompanied by the idea of some

action, which we believe we have performed by the free decision

of our mind.

Explanation-The causes of these emotions we have set forth in

III. li. note, and in III. liii., liv., lv. and note. Concerning

the free decision of the mind see II. xxxv. note. This is

perhaps the place to call attention to the fact, that it is

nothing wonderful that all those actions, which are commonly

called wrong, are followed by pain, and all those, which are

called right, are followed by pleasure. We can easily gather

from what has been said, that this depends in great measure on

education. Parents, by reprobating the former class of actions,

and by frequently chiding their children because of them, and

also by persuading to and praising the latter class, have brought

it about, that the former should be associated with pain and the

latter with pleasure. This is confirmed by experience. For

custom and religion are not the same among all men, but that

which some consider sacred others consider profane, and what some

consider honourable others consider disgraceful. According as

each man has been educated, he feels repentance for a given

action or glories therein.

XXVIII. Pride is thinking too highly of one’s self from

self-love.

Explanation-Thus pride is different from partiality, for the

latter term is used in reference to an external object, but pride

is used of a man thinking too highly of himself. However, as

partiality is the effect of love, so is pride the effect or

property of self-love, which may therefore be thus defined, love

of self or self-approval, in so far as it leads a man to think

too highly of himself. To this emotion there is no contrary.

For no one thinks too meanly of himself because of self-hatred ;

I say that no one thinks too meanly of himself, in so far as he

conceives that he is incapable of doing this or that. For

whatsoever a man imagines that he is incapable of doing, he

imagines this of necessity, and by that notion he is so disposed,

that he really cannot do that which he conceives that he cannot

do. For, so long as he conceives that he cannot do it, so long

is he not determined to do it, and consequently so long is it

impossible for him to do it. However, if we consider such

matters as only depend on opinion, we shall find it conceivable

that a man may think too meanly of himself ; for it may happen,

that a man, sorrowfully regarding his own weakness, should

imagine that he is despised by all men, while the rest of the

world are thinking of nothing less than of despising him. Again,

a man may think too meanly of himself, if he deny of himself in

the present something in relation to a future time of which he is

uncertain. As, for instance, if he should say that he is unable

to form any clear conceptions, or that he can desire and do

nothing but what is wicked and base, &c. We may also say, that a

man thinks too meanly of himself, when we see him from excessive

fear of shame refusing to do things which others, his equals,

venture. We can, therefore, set down as a contrary to pride an

emotion which I will call self-abasement, for as from

self-complacency springs pride, so from humility springs

self-abasement, which I will accordingly thus define :

XXIX. Self-abasement is thinking too meanly of one’s self by

reason of pain.

Explanation-We are nevertheless generally accustomed to

oppose pride to humility, but in that case we pay more attention

to the effect of either emotion than to its nature. We are wont

to call proud the