The Ethics by Benedictus de Spinoza (free ebook novel .txt) 📕

have added by the presence of which the mind is determined to

think of one thing rather than another, so that, besides the

nature of pleasure and pain, which the first part of the

definition explains, I might also express the nature of desire.

PART IV :

Of Human Bondage, or the Strength of the Emotions

Human infirmity in moderating and checking the emotions I

name bondage : for, when a man is a prey to his emotions, he is

not his own master, but lies at the mercy of fortune : so much

so, that he is often compelled, while seeing that which is better

for him, to follow that which is worse. Why this is so, and what

is good or evil in the emotions, I propose to show in this part

of my treatise. But, before I begin, it would be well to make a

few prefatory observations on perfection and imperfection, good

and evil.

When a man has purposed to make a given thing, and has

brought it to perfection, his work will be pronounced perfect,

not only by himself, but by everyone who rightly knows, or thinks

that he knows, the intention and aim of its author. For

instance, suppose anyone sees a work (which I assume to be not

yet completed), and knows that the aim of the author of that work

is to build a house, he will call the work imperfect ; he will,

on the other hand, call it perfect, as soon as he sees that it is

carried through to the end, which its author had purposed for it.

But if a man sees a work, the like whereof he has never seen

before, and if he knows not the intention of the artificer, he

plainly cannot know, whether that work be perfect or imperfect.

Such seems to be the primary meaning of these terms.

But, after men began to form general ideas, to think out

types of houses, buildings, towers, &c., and to prefer certain

types to others, it came about, that each man called perfect that

which he saw agree with the general idea he had formed of the

thing in question, and called imperfect that which he saw agree

less with his own preconceived type, even though it had evidently

been completed in accordance with the idea of its artificer.

This seems to be the only reason for calling natural phenomena,

which, indeed, are not made with human hands, perfect or

imperfect : for men are wont to form general ideas of things

natural, no less than of things artificial, and such ideas they

hold as types, believing that Nature (who they think does nothing

without an object) has them in view, and has set them as types

before herself. Therefore, when they behold something in Nature,

which does not wholly conform to the preconceived type which they

have formed of the thing in question, they say that Nature has

fallen short or has blundered, and has left her work incomplete.

Thus we see that men are wont to style natural phenomena perfect

or imperfect rather from their own prejudices, than from true

knowledge of what they pronounce upon.

Now we showed in the Appendix to Part I., that Nature does

not work with an end in view. For the eternal and infinite

Being, which we call God or Nature, acts by the same necessity as

that whereby it exists. For we have shown, that by the same

necessity of its nature, whereby it exists, it likewise works (I.

xvi.). The reason or cause why God or Nature exists, and the

reason why he acts, are one and the same. Therefore, as he does

not exist for the sake of an end, so neither does he act for the

sake of an end ; of his existence and of his action there is

neither origin nor end. Wherefore, a cause which is called final

is nothing else but human desire, in so far as it is considered

as the origin or cause of anything. For example, when we say

that to be inhabited is the final cause of this or that house, we

mean nothing more than that a man, conceiving the conveniences of

household life, had a desire to build a house. Wherefore, the

being inhabited, in so far as it is regarded as a final cause, is

nothing else but this particular desire, which is really the

efficient cause ; it is regarded as the primary cause, because

men are generally ignorant of the causes of their desires. They

are, as I have often said already, conscious of their own actions

and appetites, but ignorant of the causes whereby they are

determined to any particular desire. Therefore, the common

saying that Nature sometimes falls short, or blunders, and

produces things which are imperfect, I set down among the glosses

treated of in the Appendix to Part I. Perfection and

imperfection, then, are in reality merely modes of thinking, or

notions which we form from a comparison among one another of

individuals of the same species ; hence I said above (II. Def.

vi.), that by reality and perfection I mean the same thing. For

we are wont to refer all the individual things in nature to one

genus, which is called the highest genus, namely, to the category

of Being, whereto absolutely all individuals in nature belong.

Thus, in so far as we refer the individuals in nature to this

category, and comparing them one with another, find that some

possess more of being or reality than others, we, to this extent,

say that some are more perfect than others. Again, in so far as

we attribute to them anything implying negation-as term, end,

infirmity, etc., we, to this extent, call them imperfect, because

they do not affect our mind so much as the things which we call

perfect, not because they have any intrinsic deficiency, or

because Nature has blundered. For nothing lies within the scope

of a thing’s nature, save that which follows from the necessity

of the nature of its efficient cause, and whatsoever follows from

the necessity of the nature of its efficient cause necessarily

comes to pass.

As for the terms good and bad, they indicate no positive

quality in things regarded in themselves, but are merely modes of

thinking, or notions which we form from the comparison of things

one with another. Thus one and the same thing can be at the same

time good, bad, and indifferent. For instance, music is good for

him that is melancholy, bad for him that mourns ; for him that is

deaf, it is neither good nor bad.

Nevertheless, though this be so, the terms should still be

retained. For, inasmuch as we desire to form an idea of man as a

type of human nature which we may hold in view, it will be useful

for us to retain the terms in question, in the sense I have

indicated.

In what follows, then, I shall mean by, “good” that, which we

certainly know to be a means of approaching more nearly to the

type of human nature, which we have set before ourselves ; by

“bad,” that which we certainly know to be a hindrance to us in

approaching the said type. Again, we shall that men are more

perfect, or more imperfect, in proportion as they approach more

or less nearly to the said type. For it must be specially

remarked that, when I say that a man passes from a lesser to a

greater perfection, or vice vers�, I do not mean that he is

changed from one essence or reality to another ; for instance, a

horse would be as completely destroyed by being changed into a

man, as by being changed into an insect. What I mean is, that we

conceive the thing’s power of action, in so far as this is

understood by its nature, to be increased or diminished. Lastly,

by perfection in general I shall, as I have said, mean reality-in

other words, each thing’s essence, in so far as it exists, and

operates in a particular manner, and without paying any regard to

its duration. For no given thing can be said to be more perfect,

because it has passed a longer time in existence. The duration

of things cannot be determined by their essence, for the essence

of things involves no fixed and definite period of existence ;

but everything, whether it be more perfect or less perfect, will

always be able to persist in existence with the same force

wherewith it began to exist ; wherefore, in this respect, all

things are equal.

DEFINITIONS.

I. By good I mean that which we certainly know to be useful to

us.

II. By evil I mean that which we certainly know to be a

hindrance

to us in the attainment of any good.

(Concerning these terms see the foregoing preface towards the

end.)

III. Particular things I call contingent in so far as, while

regarding their essence only, we find nothing therein, which

necessarily asserts their existence or excludes it.

IV. Particular things I call possible in so far as, while

regarding the causes whereby they must be produced, we know not,

whether such causes be determined for producing them.

(In I. xxxiii. note. i., I drew no distinction between

possible and contingent, because there was in that place no need

to distinguish them accurately.)

V. By conflicting emotions I mean those which draw a man in

different directions, though they are of the same kind, such as

luxury and avarice, which are both species of love, and are

contraries, not by nature, but by accident.

VI. What I mean by emotion felt towards a thing, future,

present, and past, I explained in III. xviii., notes. i. and ii.,

which see.

(But I should here also remark, that we can only distinctly

conceive distance of space or time up to a certain definite limit

; that is, all objects distant from us more than two hundred

feet, or whose distance from the place where we are exceeds that

which we can distinctly conceive, seem to be an equal distance

from us, and all in the same plane ; so also objects, whose time

of existing is conceived as removed from the present by a longer

interval than we can distinctly conceive, seem to be all equally

distant from the present, and are set down, as it were, to the

same moment of time.)

VII. By an end, for the sake of which we do something, I mean a

desire.

VIII. By virtue (virtus) and power I mean the same thing ; that

is (III. vii), virtue, in so far as it is referred to man, is a

man’s nature or essence, in so far as it has the power of

effecting what can only be understood by the laws of that nature.

AXIOM.

There is no individual thing in nature, than which there is

not another more powerful and strong. Whatsoever thing be given,

there is something stronger whereby it can be destroyed.

PROPOSITIONS.

PROP. I. No positive quality possessed by a false idea is

removed by the presence of what is true, in virtue of its being

true.

Proof.-Falsity consists solely in the privation of knowledge

which inadequate ideas involve (II. xxxv.), nor have they any

positive quality on account of which they are called false (II.

xxxiii.) ; contrariwise, in so far as they are referred to God,

they are true (II. xxxii.). Wherefore, if the positive quality

possessed by a false idea were removed by the presence of what is

true, in virtue of its being true, a true idea would then be

removed by itself, which (IV. iii.) is absurd. Therefore, no

positive