The Ethics by Benedictus de Spinoza (free ebook novel .txt) 📕

PROP. XXXVIII. If a man has begun to hate an object of his love,

so that love is thoroughly destroyed, he will, causes being

equal, regard it with more hatred than if he had never loved it,

and his hatred will be in proportion to the strength of his

former love.

Proof.-If a man begins to hate that which he had loved, more

of his appetites are put under restraint than if he had never

loved it. For love is a pleasure (III. xiii. note) which a man

endeavours as far as he can to render permanent (III. xxviii.) ;

he does so by regarding the object of his love as present, and by

affecting it as far as he can pleasurably ; this endeavour is

greater in proportion as the love is greater, and so also is the

endeavour to bring about that the beloved should return his

affection (III. xxxiii.). Now these endeavours are constrained

by hatred towards the object of love (III. xiii. Coroll. and III.

xxiii.) ; wherefore the lover (III. xi. note) will for this cause

also be affected with pain, the more so in proportion as his love

has been greater ; that is, in addition to the pain caused by

hatred, there is a pain caused by the fact that he has loved the

object ; wherefore the lover will regard the beloved with greater

pain, or in other words, will hate it more than if he had never

loved it, and with the more intensity in proportion as his former

love was greater. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXIX. He who hates anyone will endeavour to do him an

injury, unless he fears that a greater injury will thereby accrue

to himself ; on the other hand, he who loves anyone will, by the

same law, seek to benefit him.

Proof.-To hate a man is (III. xiii. note) to conceive him as

a cause of pain ; therefore he who hates a man will endeavour to

remove or destroy him. But if anything more painful, or, in

other words, a greater evil, should accrue to the hater

thereby-and if the hater thinks he can avoid such evil by not

carrying out the injury, which he planned against the object of

his hate-he will desire to abstain from inflicting that injury

(III. xxviii.), and the strength of his endeavour (III. xxxvii.)

will be greater than his former endeavour to do injury, and will

therefore prevail over it, as we asserted. The second part of

this proof proceeds in the same manner. Wherefore he who hates

another, etc. Q.E.D.

Note.-By good I here mean every kind of pleasure, and all

that conduces thereto, especially that which satisfies our

longings, whatsoever they may be. By evil, I mean every kind of

pain, especially that which frustrates our longings. For I have

shown (III. ix. note) that we in no case desire a thing because

we deem it good, but, contrariwise, we deem a thing good because

we desire it : consequently we deem evil that which we shrink

from ; everyone, therefore, according to his particular emotions,

judges or estimates what is good, what is bad, what is better,

what is worse, lastly, what is best, and what is worst. Thus a

miser thinks that abundance of money is the best, and want of

money the worst ; an ambitious man desires nothing so much as

glory, and fears nothing so much as shame. To an envious man

nothing is more delightful than another’s misfortune, and nothing

more painful than another’s success. So every man, according to

his emotions, judges a thing to be good or bad, useful or

useless. The emotion, which induces a man to turn from that

which he wishes, or to wish for that which he turns from, is

called timidity, which may accordingly be defined as the fear

whereby a man is induced to avoid an evil which he regards as

future by encountering a lesser evil (III. xxviii.). But if the

evil which he fears be shame, timidity becomes bashfulness.

Lastly, if the desire to avoid a future evil be checked by the

fear of another evil, so that the man knows not which to choose,

fear becomes consternation, especially if both the evils feared

be very great.

PROP. XL. He, who conceives himself to be hated by another, and

believes that he has given him no cause for hatred, will hate

that other in return.

Proof.-He who conceives another as affected with hatred, will

thereupon be affected himself with hatred (III. xxvii.), that is,

with pain, accompanied by the idea of an external cause. But, by

the hypothesis, he conceives no cause for this pain except him

who is his enemy ; therefore, from conceiving that he is hated by

some one, he will be affected with pain, accompanied by the idea

of his enemy ; in other words, he will hate his enemy in return.

Q.E.D.

Note.-He who thinks that he has given just cause for hatred

will (III. xxx. and note) be affected with shame ; but this case

(III. xxv.) rarely happens. This reciprocation of hatred may

also arise from the hatred, which follows an endeavour to injure

the object of our hate (III. xxxix.). He therefore who conceives

that he is hated by another will conceive his enemy as the cause

of some evil or pain ; thus he will be affected with pain or

fear, accompanied by the idea of his enemy as cause ; in other

words, he will be affected with hatred towards his enemy, as I

said above.

Corollary I.-He who conceives, that one whom he loves hates

him, will be a prey to conflicting hatred and love. For, in so

far as he conceives that he is an object of hatred, he is

determined to hate his enemy in return. But, by the hypothesis,

he nevertheless loves him : wherefore he will be a prey to

conflicting hatred and love.

Corollary II.-If a man conceives that one, whom he has

hitherto regarded without emotion, has done him any injury from

motives of hatred, he will forthwith seek to repay the injury in

kind.

Proof.-He who conceives, that another hates him, will (by the

last proposition) hate his enemy in return, and (III. xxvi.) will

endeavour to recall everything which can affect him painfully ;

he will moreover endeavour to do him an injury (III. xxxix.).

Now the first thing of this sort which he conceives is the injury

done to himself ; he will, therefore, forthwith endeavour to

repay it in kind. Q.E.D.

Note.-The endeavour to injure one whom we hate is called

Anger ; the endeavour to repay in kind injury done to ourselves

is called Revenge.

PROP. XLI. If anyone conceives that he is loved by another, and

believes that he has given no cause for such love, he will love

that other in return. (Cf. III. xv. Coroll., and III. xvi.)

Proof.-This proposition is proved in the same way as the

preceding one. See also the note appended thereto.

Note.-If he believes that he has given just cause for the

love, he will take pride therein (III. xxx. and note) ; this is

what most often happens (III. xxv.), and we said that its

contrary took place whenever a man conceives himself to be hated

by another. (See note to preceding proposition.) This

reciprocal love, and consequently the desire of benefiting him

who loves us (III. xxxix.), and who endeavours to benefit us, is

called gratitude or thankfulness. It thus appears that men are

much more prone to take vengeance than to return benefits.

Corollary.-He who imagines that he is loved by one whom he

hates, will be a prey to conflicting hatred and love. This is

proved in the same way as the first corollary of the preceding

proposition.

Note.-If hatred be the prevailing emotion, he will endeavour

to injure him who loves him ; this emotion is called cruelty,

especially if the victim be believed to have given no ordinary

cause for hatred.

PROP. XLII. He who has conferred a benefit on anyone from

motives of love or honour will feel pain, if he sees that the

benefit is received without gratitude.

Proof.-When a man loves something similar to himself, he

endeavours, as far as he can, to bring it about that he should be

loved thereby in return (III. xxxiii.). Therefore he who has

conferred a benefit confers it in obedience to the desire, which

he feels of being loved in return ; that is (III. xxxiv.) from

the hope of honour or (III. xxx. note) pleasure ; hence he will

endeavour, as far as he can, to conceive this cause of honour, or

to regard it as actually existing. But, by the hypothesis, he

conceives something else, which excludes the existence of the

said cause of honour : wherefore he will thereat feel pain (III.

xix.). Q.E.D.

PROP. XLIII. Hatred is increased by being reciprocated, and can

on the other hand be destroyed by love.

Proof.-He who conceives, that an object of his hatred hates

him in return, will thereupon feel a new hatred, while the former

hatred (by hypothesis) still remains (III. xl.). But if, on the

other hand, he conceives that the object of hate loves him, he

will to this extent (III. xxxviii.) regard himself with pleasure,

and (III. xxix.) will endeavour to please the cause of his

emotion. In other words, he will endeavour not to hate him (III.

xli.), and not to affect him painfully ; this endeavour (III.

xxxvii.) will be greater or less in proportion to the emotion

from which it arises. Therefore, if it be greater than that

which arises from hatred, and through which the man endeavours to

affect painfully the thing which he hates, it will get the better

of it and banish the hatred from his mind. Q.E.D.

PROP. XLIV. Hatred which is completely vanquished by love passes

into love : and love is thereupon greater than if hatred had not

preceded it.

Proof.-The proof proceeds in the same way as Prop. xxxviii.

of this Part : for he who begins to love a thing, which he was

wont to hate or regard with pain, from the very fact of loving

feels pleasure. To this pleasure involved in love is added the

pleasure arising from aid given to the endeavour to remove the

pain involved in hatred (III. xxxvii.), accompanied by the idea

of the former object of hatred as cause.

Note.-Though this be so, no one will endeavour to hate

anything, or to be affected with pain, for the sake of enjoying

this greater pleasure ; that is, no one will desire that he

should be injured, in the hope of recovering from the injury, nor

long to be ill for the sake of getting well. For everyone will

always endeavour to persist in his being, and to ward off pain as

far as he can. If the contrary is conceivable, namely, that a

man should desire to hate someone, in order that he might love

him the more thereafter, he will always desire to hate him. For

the strength of love is in proportion to the strength of the

hatred, wherefore the man would desire, that the hatred be

continually increased more and more, and, for a similar reason,

he would desire to become more and more ill, in order that he

might take a greater pleasure in being restored to health : in

such a case he would always endeavour to be ill, which (III. vi.)

is absurd.

PROP. XLV. If a man conceives, that anyone similar to himself

hates anything also similar to himself, which he loves, he will

hate that person.

Proof.-The beloved object feels reciprocal hatred towards him

who hates it (III. xl.) ; therefore the lover, in conceiving that

anyone hates the