An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding by David Hume (a book to read .txt) 📕

has immediately fallen under our observation. Greater good produced by

this Being must still prove a greater degree of goodness: a more

impartial distribution of rewards and punishments must proceed from a

greater regard to justice and equity. Every supposed addition to the

works of nature makes an addition to the attributes of the Author of

nature; and consequently, being entirely unsupported by any reason or

argument, can never be admitted but as mere conjecture and

hypothesis[30].

[30] In general, it may, I think, be established as a maxim,

that where any cause is known only by its particular effects,

it must be impossible to infer any new effects from that cause;

since the qualities, which are requisite to produce these new

effects along with the former, must either be different, or

superior, or of more extensive operation, than those which

simply produced the effect, whence alone the cause is supposed

to be known to us. We can never, therefore, have any reason to

suppose the existence of these qualities. To say, that the new

effects proceed only from a continuation of the same energy,

which is already known from the first effects, will not remove

the difficulty. For even granting this to be the case (which

can seldom be supposed), the very continuation and exertion of

a like energy (for it is impossible it can be absolutely the

same), I say, this exertion of a like energy, in a different

period of space and time, is a very arbitrary supposition, and

what there cannot possibly be any traces of in the effects,

from which all our knowledge of the cause is originally

derived. Let the inferred cause be exactly proportioned (as

it should be) to the known effect; and it is impossible that

it can possess any qualities, from which new or different

effects can be inferred.

The great source of our mistake in this subject, and of the unbounded

licence of conjecture, which we indulge, is, that we tacitly consider

ourselves, as in the place of the Supreme Being, and conclude, that he

will, on every occasion, observe the same conduct, which we ourselves,

in his situation, would have embraced as reasonable and eligible. But,

besides that the ordinary course of nature may convince us, that almost

everything is regulated by principles and maxims very different from

ours; besides this, I say, it must evidently appear contrary to all

rules of analogy to reason, from the intentions and projects of men, to

those of a Being so different, and so much superior. In human nature,

there is a certain experienced coherence of designs and inclinations; so

that when, from any fact, we have discovered one intention of any man,

it may often be reasonable, from experience, to infer another, and draw

a long chain of conclusions concerning his past or future conduct. But

this method of reasoning can never have place with regard to a Being, so

remote and incomprehensible, who bears much less analogy to any other

being in the universe than the sun to a waxen taper, and who discovers

himself only by some faint traces or outlines, beyond which we have no

authority to ascribe to him any attribute or perfection. What we imagine

to be a superior perfection, may really be a defect. Or were it ever so

much a perfection, the ascribing of it to the Supreme Being, where it

appears not to have been really exerted, to the full, in his works,

savours more of flattery and panegyric, than of just reasoning and sound

philosophy. All the philosophy, therefore, in the world, and all the

religion, which is nothing but a species of philosophy, will never be

able to carry us beyond the usual course of experience, or give us

measures of conduct and behaviour different from those which are

furnished by reflections on common life. No new fact can ever be

inferred from the religious hypothesis; no event foreseen or foretold;

no reward or punishment expected or dreaded, beyond what is already

known by practice and observation. So that my apology for Epicurus will

still appear solid and satisfactory; nor have the political interests

of society any connexion with the philosophical disputes concerning

metaphysics and religion.

114. There is still one circumstance, replied I, which you seem to have

overlooked. Though I should allow your premises, I must deny your

conclusion. You conclude, that religious doctrines and reasonings can

have no influence on life, because they ought to have no influence;

never considering, that men reason not in the same manner you do, but

draw many consequences from the belief of a divine Existence, and

suppose that the Deity will inflict punishments on vice, and bestow

rewards on virtue, beyond what appear in the ordinary course of nature.

Whether this reasoning of theirs be just or not, is no matter. Its

influence on their life and conduct must still be the same. And, those,

who attempt to disabuse them of such prejudices, may, for aught I know,

be good reasoners, but I cannot allow them to be good citizens and

politicians; since they free men from one restraint upon their passions,

and make the infringement of the laws of society, in one respect, more

easy and secure.

After all, I may, perhaps, agree to your general conclusion in favour of

liberty, though upon different premises from those, on which you

endeavour to found it. I think, that the state ought to tolerate every

principle of philosophy; nor is there an instance, that any government

has suffered in its political interests by such indulgence. There is no

enthusiasm among philosophers; their doctrines are not very alluring to

the people; and no restraint can be put upon their reasonings, but what

must be of dangerous consequence to the sciences, and even to the state,

by paving the way for persecution and oppression in points, where the

generality of mankind are more deeply interested and concerned.

115. But there occurs to me (continued I) with regard to your main

topic, a difficulty, which I shall just propose to you without insisting

on it; lest it lead into reasonings of too nice and delicate a nature.

In a word, I much doubt whether it be possible for a cause to be known

only by its effect (as you have all along supposed) or to be of so

singular and particular a nature as to have no parallel and no

similarity with any other cause or object, that has ever fallen under

our observation. It is only when two species of objects are found to

be constantly conjoined, that we can infer the one from the other; and

were an effect presented, which was entirely singular, and could not be

comprehended under any known species, I do not see, that we could form

any conjecture or inference at all concerning its cause. If experience

and observation and analogy be, indeed, the only guides which we can

reasonably follow in inferences of this nature; both the effect and

cause must bear a similarity and resemblance to other effects and

causes, which we know, and which we have found, in many instances, to be

conjoined with each other. I leave it to your own reflection to pursue

the consequences of this principle. I shall just observe, that, as the

antagonists of Epicurus always suppose the universe, an effect quite

singular and unparalleled, to be the proof of a Deity, a cause no less

singular and unparalleled; your reasonings, upon that supposition, seem,

at least, to merit our attention. There is, I own, some difficulty, how

we can ever return from the cause to the effect, and, reasoning from our

ideas of the former, infer any alteration on the latter, or any

addition to it.

SECTION XII.

OF THE ACADEMICAL OR SCEPTICAL PHILOSOPHY.

PART I.

116. There is not a greater number of philosophical reasonings,

displayed upon any subject, than those, which prove the existence of a

Deity, and refute the fallacies of Atheists; and yet the most

religious philosophers still dispute whether any man can be so blinded

as to be a speculative atheist. How shall we reconcile these

contradictions? The knights-errant, who wandered about to clear the

world of dragons and giants, never entertained the least doubt with

regard to the existence of these monsters.

The Sceptic is another enemy of religion, who naturally provokes the

indignation of all divines and graver philosophers; though it is

certain, that no man ever met with any such absurd creature, or

conversed with a man, who had no opinion or principle concerning any

subject, either of action or speculation. This begets a very natural

question; What is meant by a sceptic? And how far it is possible to push

these philosophical principles of doubt and uncertainty?

There is a species of scepticism, antecedent to all study and

philosophy, which is much inculcated by Des Cartes and others, as a

sovereign preservative against error and precipitate judgement. It

recommends an universal doubt, not only of all our former opinions and

principles, but also of our very faculties; of whose veracity, say they,

we must assure ourselves, by a chain of reasoning, deduced from some

original principle, which cannot possibly be fallacious or deceitful.

But neither is there any such original principle, which has a

prerogative above others, that are self-evident and convincing: or if

there were, could we advance a step beyond it, but by the use of those

very faculties, of which we are supposed to be already diffident. The

Cartesian doubt, therefore, were it ever possible to be attained by any

human creature (as it plainly is not) would be entirely incurable; and

no reasoning could ever bring us to a state of assurance and conviction

upon any subject.

It must, however, be confessed, that this species of scepticism, when

more moderate, may be understood in a very reasonable sense, and is a

necessary preparative to the study of philosophy, by preserving a proper

impartiality in our judgements, and weaning our mind from all those

prejudices, which we may have imbibed from education or rash opinion. To

begin with clear and self-evident principles, to advance by timorous and

sure steps, to review frequently our conclusions, and examine accurately

all their consequences; though by these means we shall make both a slow

and a short progress in our systems; are the only methods, by which we

can ever hope to reach truth, and attain a proper stability and

certainty in our determinations.

117. There is another species of scepticism, consequent to science and

enquiry, when men are supposed to have discovered, either the absolute

fallaciousness of their mental faculties, or their unfitness to reach

any fixed determination in all those curious subjects of speculation,

about which they are commonly employed. Even our very senses are brought

into dispute, by a certain species of philosophers; and the maxims of

common life are subjected to the same doubt as the most profound

principles or conclusions of metaphysics and theology. As these

paradoxical tenets (if they may be called tenets) are to be met with in

some philosophers, and the refutation of them in several, they naturally

excite our curiosity, and make us enquire into the arguments, on which

they may be founded.

I need not insist upon the more trite topics, employed by the sceptics

in all ages, against the evidence of sense; such as those which are

derived from the imperfection and fallaciousness of our organs, on

numberless occasions; the crooked appearance of an oar in water; the

various aspects of objects, according to their different distances; the

double images which arise from the pressing one eye; with many other

appearances of a like nature. These sceptical topics, indeed, are only

sufficient to