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Title: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

Author: David Hume et al

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AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.

BY DAVID HUME

Extracted from:

Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding, and Concerning the

Principles of Morals, By David Hume.

Reprinted from The Posthumous Edition of 1777, and Edited with

Introduction, Comparative Tables of Contents, and Analytical Index

by L.A. Selby-Bigge, M.A., Late Fellow of University College, Oxford.

Second Edition, 1902

CONTENTS

I. Of the different Species of Philosophy

II. Of the Origin of Ideas

III. Of the Association of Ideas

IV. Sceptical Doubts concerning the Operations of the Understanding

V. Sceptical Solution of these Doubts

VI. Of Probability

VII. Of the Idea of necessary Connexion

VIII. Of Liberty and Necessity

IX. Of the Reason of Animals

X. Of Miracles

XI. Of a particular Providence and of a future State

XII. Of the academical or sceptical Philosophy

INDEX

SECTION I.

OF THE DIFFERENT SPECIES OF PHILOSOPHY.

1. Moral philosophy, or the science of human nature, may be treated

after two different manners; each of which has its peculiar merit, and

may contribute to the entertainment, instruction, and reformation of

mankind. The one considers man chiefly as born for action; and as

influenced in his measures by taste and sentiment; pursuing one object,

and avoiding another, according to the value which these objects seem to

possess, and according to the light in which they present themselves. As

virtue, of all objects, is allowed to be the most valuable, this species

of philosophers paint her in the most amiable colours; borrowing all

helps from poetry and eloquence, and treating their subject in an easy

and obvious manner, and such as is best fitted to please the

imagination, and engage the affections. They select the most striking

observations and instances from common life; place opposite characters

in a proper contrast; and alluring us into the paths of virtue by the

views of glory and happiness, direct our steps in these paths by the

soundest precepts and most illustrious examples. They make us feel the

difference between vice and virtue; they excite and regulate our

sentiments; and so they can but bend our hearts to the love of probity

and true honour, they think, that they have fully attained the end of

all their labours.

2. The other species of philosophers consider man in the light of a

reasonable rather than an active being, and endeavour to form his

understanding more than cultivate his manners. They regard human nature

as a subject of speculation; and with a narrow scrutiny examine it, in

order to find those principles, which regulate our understanding, excite

our sentiments, and make us approve or blame any particular object,

action, or behaviour. They think it a reproach to all literature, that

philosophy should not yet have fixed, beyond controversy, the foundation

of morals, reasoning, and criticism; and should for ever talk of truth

and falsehood, vice and virtue, beauty and deformity, without being able

to determine the source of these distinctions. While they attempt this

arduous task, they are deterred by no difficulties; but proceeding from

particular instances to general principles, they still push on their

enquiries to principles more general, and rest not satisfied till they

arrive at those original principles, by which, in every science, all

human curiosity must be bounded. Though their speculations seem

abstract, and even unintelligible to common readers, they aim at the

approbation of the learned and the wise; and think themselves

sufficiently compensated for the labour of their whole lives, if they

can discover some hidden truths, which may contribute to the instruction

of posterity.

3. It is certain that the easy and obvious philosophy will always, with

the generality of mankind, have the preference above the accurate and

abstruse; and by many will be recommended, not only as more agreeable,

but more useful than the other. It enters more into common life; moulds

the heart and affections; and, by touching those principles which

actuate men, reforms their conduct, and brings them nearer to that model

of perfection which it describes. On the contrary, the abstruse

philosophy, being founded on a turn of mind, which cannot enter into

business and action, vanishes when the philosopher leaves the shade, and

comes into open day; nor can its principles easily retain any influence

over our conduct and behaviour. The feelings of our heart, the agitation

of our passions, the vehemence of our affections, dissipate all its

conclusions, and reduce the profound philosopher to a mere plebeian.

4. This also must be confessed, that the most durable, as well as

justest fame, has been acquired by the easy philosophy, and that

abstract reasoners seem hitherto to have enjoyed only a momentary

reputation, from the caprice or ignorance of their own age, but have not

been able to support their renown with more equitable posterity. It is

easy for a profound philosopher to commit a mistake in his subtile

reasonings; and one mistake is the necessary parent of another, while he

pushes on his consequences, and is not deterred from embracing any

conclusion, by its unusual appearance, or its contradiction to popular

opinion. But a philosopher, who purposes only to represent the common

sense of mankind in more beautiful and more engaging colours, if by

accident he falls into error, goes no farther; but renewing his appeal

to common sense, and the natural sentiments of the mind, returns into

the right path, and secures himself from any dangerous illusions. The

fame of Cicero flourishes at present; but that of Aristotle is utterly

decayed. La Bruyere passes the seas, and still maintains his reputation:

But the glory of Malebranche is confined to his own nation, and to his

own age. And Addison, perhaps, will be read with pleasure, when Locke

shall be entirely forgotten.

The mere philosopher is a character, which is commonly but little

acceptable in the world, as being supposed to contribute nothing either

to the advantage or pleasure of society; while he lives remote from

communication with mankind, and is wrapped up in principles and notions

equally remote from their comprehension. On the other hand, the mere

ignorant is still more despised; nor is any thing deemed a surer sign of

an illiberal genius in an age and nation where the sciences flourish,

than to be entirely destitute of all relish for those noble

entertainments. The most perfect character is supposed to lie between

those extremes; retaining an equal ability and taste for books, company,

and business; preserving in conversation that discernment and delicacy

which arise from polite letters; and in business, that probity and

accuracy which are the natural result of a just philosophy. In order to

diffuse and cultivate so accomplished a character, nothing can be more

useful than compositions of the easy style and manner, which draw not

too much from life, require no deep application or retreat to be

comprehended, and send back the student among mankind full of noble

sentiments and wise precepts, applicable to every exigence of human

life. By means of such compositions, virtue becomes amiable, science

agreeable, company instructive, and retirement entertaining.

Man is a reasonable being; and as such, receives from science his proper

food and nourishment: But so narrow are the bounds of human

understanding, that little satisfaction can be hoped for in this

particular, either from the extent of security or his acquisitions. Man

is a sociable, no less than a reasonable being: But neither can he

always enjoy company agreeable and amusing, or preserve the proper

relish for them. Man is also an active being; and from that disposition,

as well as from the various necessities of human life, must submit to

business and occupation: But the mind requires some relaxation, and

cannot always support its bent to care and industry. It seems, then,

that nature has pointed out a mixed kind of life as most suitable to the

human race, and secretly admonished them to allow none of these biasses

to draw too much, so as to incapacitate them for other occupations and

entertainments. Indulge your passion for science, says she, but let your

science be human, and such as may have a direct reference to action and

society. Abstruse thought and profound researches I prohibit, and will

severely punish, by the pensive melancholy which they introduce, by the

endless uncertainty in which they involve you, and by the cold reception

which your pretended discoveries shall meet with, when communicated. Be

a philosopher; but, amidst all your philosophy, be still a man.

5. Were the generality of mankind contented to prefer the easy

philosophy to the abstract and profound, without throwing any blame or

contempt on the latter, it might not be improper, perhaps, to comply

with this general opinion, and allow every man to enjoy, without

opposition, his own taste and sentiment. But as the matter is often

carried farther, even to the absolute rejecting of all profound

reasonings, or what is commonly called metaphysics, we shall now

proceed to consider what can reasonably be pleaded in their behalf.

We may begin with observing, that one considerable advantage, which

results from the accurate and abstract philosophy, is, its subserviency

to the easy and humane; which, without the former, can never attain a

sufficient degree of exactness in its sentiments, precepts, or

reasonings. All polite letters are nothing but pictures of human life in

various attitudes and situations; and inspire us with different

sentiments, of praise or blame, admiration or ridicule, according to the

qualities of the object, which they set before us. An artist must be

better qualified to succeed in this undertaking, who, besides a delicate

taste and a quick apprehension, possesses an accurate knowledge of the

internal fabric, the operations of the understanding, the workings of

the passions, and the various species of sentiment which discriminate

vice and virtue. How painful soever this inward search or enquiry may

appear, it becomes, in some measure, requisite to those, who would

describe with success the obvious and outward appearances of life and

manners. The anatomist presents to the eye the most hideous and

disagreeable objects; but his science is useful to the painter in