An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding by David Hume (a book to read .txt) 📕

prove the reality of the foregoing principle.

42. We may add force to these experiments by others of a different kind,

in considering the effects of contiguity as well as of resemblance.

It is certain that distance diminishes the force of every idea, and

that, upon our approach to any object; though it does not discover

itself to our senses; it operates upon the mind with an influence, which

imitates an immediate impression. The thinking on any object readily

transports the mind to what is contiguous; but it is only the actual

presence of an object, that transports it with a superior vivacity. When

I am a few miles from home, whatever relates to it touches me more

nearly than when I am two hundred leagues distant; though even at that

distance the reflecting on any thing in the neighbourhood of my friends

or family naturally produces an idea of them. But as in this latter

case, both the objects of the mind are ideas; notwithstanding there is

an easy transition between them; that transition alone is not able to

give a superior vivacity to any of the ideas, for want of some immediate

impression[8].

[8] ‘Naturane nobis, inquit, datum dicam, an errore quodam, ut,

cum ea loca videamus, in quibus memoria dignos viros

acceperimus multum esse versatos, magis moveamur, quam siquando

eorum ipsorum aut facta audiamus aut scriptum aliquod legamus?

Velut ego nunc moveor. Venit enim mihi Plato in mentem, quera

accepimus primum hic disputare solitum: cuius etiam illi

hortuli propinqui non memoriam solum mihi afferunt, sed ipsum

videntur in conspectu meo hic ponere. Hic Speusippus, hic

Xenocrates, hic eius auditor Polemo; cuius ipsa illa sessio

fuit, quam videmus. Equidem etiam curiam nostram, Hostiliam

dico, non hanc novam, quae mihi minor esse videtur postquam est

maior, solebam intuens, Scipionem, Catonem, Laelium, nostrum

vero in primis avum cogitare. Tanta vis admonitionis est in

locis; ut non sine causa ex his memoriae deducta sit

disciplina.’

Cicero de Finibus. Lib. v.

43. No one can doubt but causation has the same influence as the other

two relations of resemblance and contiguity. Superstitious people are

fond of the reliques of saints and holy men, for the same reason, that

they seek after types or images, in order to enliven their devotion, and

give them a more intimate and strong conception of those exemplary

lives, which they desire to imitate. Now it is evident, that one of the

best reliques, which a devotee could procure, would be the handywork of

a saint; and if his cloaths and furniture are ever to be considered in

this light, it is because they were once at his disposal, and were moved

and affected by him; in which respect they are to be considered as

imperfect effects, and as connected with him by a shorter chain of

consequences than any of those, by which we learn the reality of his

existence.

Suppose, that the son of a friend, who had been long dead or absent,

were presented to us; it is evident, that this object would instantly

revive its correlative idea, and recal to our thoughts all past

intimacies and familiarities, in more lively colours than they would

otherwise have appeared to us. This is another phaenomenon, which seems

to prove the principle above mentioned.

44. We may observe, that, in these phaenomena, the belief of the

correlative object is always presupposed; without which the relation

could have no effect. The influence of the picture supposes, that we

believe our friend to have once existed. Contiguity to home can never

excite our ideas of home, unless we believe that it really exists. Now

I assert, that this belief, where it reaches beyond the memory or

senses, is of a similar nature, and arises from similar causes, with the

transition of thought and vivacity of conception here explained. When I

throw a piece of dry wood into a fire, my mind is immediately carried to

conceive, that it augments, not extinguishes the flame. This transition

of thought from the cause to the effect proceeds not from reason. It

derives its origin altogether from custom and experience. And as it

first begins from an object, present to the senses, it renders the idea

or conception of flame more strong and lively than any loose, floating

reverie of the imagination. That idea arises immediately. The thought

moves instantly towards it, and conveys to it all that force of

conception, which is derived from the impression present to the senses.

When a sword is levelled at my breast, does not the idea of wound and

pain strike me more strongly, than when a glass of wine is presented to

me, even though by accident this idea should occur after the appearance

of the latter object? But what is there in this whole matter to cause

such a strong conception, except only a present object and a customary

transition to the idea of another object, which we have been accustomed

to conjoin with the former? This is the whole operation of the mind, in

all our conclusions concerning matter of fact and existence; and it is a

satisfaction to find some analogies, by which it may be explained. The

transition from a present object does in all cases give strength and

solidity to the related idea.

Here, then, is a kind of pre-established harmony between the course of

nature and the succession of our ideas; and though the powers and

forces, by which the former is governed, be wholly unknown to us; yet

our thoughts and conceptions have still, we find, gone on in the same

train with the other works of nature. Custom is that principle, by which

this correspondence has been effected; so necessary to the subsistence

of our species, and the regulation of our conduct, in every circumstance

and occurrence of human life. Had not the presence of an object,

instantly excited the idea of those objects, commonly conjoined with it,

all our knowledge must have been limited to the narrow sphere of our

memory and senses; and we should never have been able to adjust means to

ends, or employ our natural powers, either to the producing of good, or

avoiding of evil. Those, who delight in the discovery and contemplation

of final causes, have here ample subject to employ their wonder and

admiration.

45. I shall add, for a further confirmation of the foregoing theory,

that, as this operation of the mind, by which we infer like effects from

like causes, and vice versa, is so essential to the subsistence of all

human creatures, it is not probable, that it could be trusted to the

fallacious deductions of our reason, which is slow in its operations;

appears not, in any degree, during the first years of infancy; and at

best is, in every age and period of human life, extremely liable to

error and mistake. It is more conformable to the ordinary wisdom of

nature to secure so necessary an act of the mind, by some instinct or

mechanical tendency, which may be infallible in its operations, may

discover itself at the first appearance of life and thought, and may be

independent of all the laboured deductions of the understanding. As

nature has taught us the use of our limbs, without giving us the

knowledge of the muscles and nerves, by which they are actuated; so has

she implanted in us an instinct, which carries forward the thought in a

correspondent course to that which she has established among external

objects; though we are ignorant of those powers and forces, on which

this regular course and succession of objects totally depends.

SECTION VI.

OF PROBABILITY[9].

[9] Mr. Locke divides all arguments into demonstrative and

probable. In this view, we must say, that it is only probable

all men must die, or that the sun will rise to-morrow. But to

conform our language more to common use, we ought to divide

arguments into demonstrations, proofs, and probabilities.

By proofs meaning such arguments from experience as leave no

room for doubt or opposition.

46. Though there be no such thing as Chance in the world; our

ignorance of the real cause of any event has the same influence on the

understanding, and begets a like species of belief or opinion.

There is certainly a probability, which arises from a superiority of

chances on any side; and according as this superiority encreases, and

surpasses the opposite chances, the probability receives a

proportionable encrease, and begets still a higher degree of belief or

assent to that side, in which we discover the superiority. If a dye were

marked with one figure or number of spots on four sides, and with

another figure or number of spots on the two remaining sides, it would

be more probable, that the former would turn up than the latter; though,

if it had a thousand sides marked in the same manner, and only one side

different, the probability would be much higher, and our belief or

expectation of the event more steady and secure. This process of the

thought or reasoning may seem trivial and obvious; but to those who

consider it more narrowly, it may, perhaps, afford matter for curious

speculation.

It seems evident, that, when the mind looks forward to discover the

event, which may result from the throw of such a dye, it considers the

turning up of each particular side as alike probable; and this is the

very nature of chance, to render all the particular events, comprehended

in it, entirely equal. But finding a greater number of sides concur in

the one event than in the other, the mind is carried more frequently to

that event, and meets it oftener, in revolving the various possibilities

or chances, on which the ultimate result depends. This concurrence of

several views in one particular event begets immediately, by an

inexplicable contrivance of nature, the sentiment of belief, and gives

that event the advantage over its antagonist, which is supported by a

smaller number of views, and recurs less frequently to the mind. If we

allow, that belief is nothing but a firmer and stronger conception of an

object than what attends the mere fictions of the imagination, this

operation may, perhaps, in some measure, be accounted for. The

concurrence of these several views or glimpses imprints the idea more

strongly on the imagination; gives it superior force and vigour; renders

its influence on the passions and affections more sensible: and in a

word, begets that reliance or security, which constitutes the nature of

belief and opinion.

47. The case is the same with the probability of causes, as with that of

chance. There are some causes, which are entirely uniform and constant

in producing a particular effect; and no instance has ever yet been

found of any failure or irregularity in their operation. Fire has always

burned, and water suffocated every human creature: The production of

motion by impulse and gravity is an universal law, which has hitherto

admitted of no exception. But there are other causes, which have been

found more irregular and uncertain; nor has rhubarb always proved a

purge, or opium a soporific to every one, who has taken these medicines.

It is true, when any cause fails of producing its usual effect,

philosophers ascribe not this to any irregularity in nature; but

suppose, that some secret causes, in the particular structure of parts,

have prevented the operation. Our reasonings, however, and conclusions

concerning the event are the same as if this principle had no place.

Being determined by custom to transfer the past to the future, in all

our inferences; where the past has been entirely regular and uniform, we

expect the event with the greatest assurance, and leave no room for any

contrary supposition. But