The Moral Instruction of Children by Felix Adler (read after txt) 📕

Applications of the Principle of Justice.—

1. Do not kill. By taking away the life of a human being we should of course cut off all chance of that person's further development. This requires no comment. But certain casuistical questions arise in connection with this command. Is it right to kill another in self-defense? The difficulty involved might be put in this way: A burglar breaks into your house by night and threatens to kill you. You have a weapon at hand and can save yourself by killing him. Now it is evident that one of two lives must be taken. But would it not be more moral on your part to say: I, at least, will not break the commandment. I would rather be killed than kill? This question serves to show to what absurdities a purely formal principle in ethics can lead, as we have already seen in the discussion of truthfulness. The problem of the duel and that of the taking of the life of others in war also belong under this head, but will be reserved for the advanced course.

2. Respect the personal liberty of others. Slavery, under whatever form, is an outrage on justice. The slave is degraded to be the mere instrument of his master's profit or pleasure. Let the teacher point out in what particulars the slave is wronged, and show the evil effects of the institution of slavery on the character of the master as well as of the slave. Question—Is it right to speak of wage-slavery, for instance, in cases where the hours of labor are so prolonged as to leave no time for higher interests, or where the relations of the laborer to his employer are such as to impair his moral independence?

3. Respect the property of others. Unless we are careful we may at this point commit a grave wrong. Upon what moral considerations shall the right of property be based? The school, especially the moral lessons which are imparted in it, should certainly not be placed in the service of vested interests. On the other hand, the school should not fill the pupils' minds with economic theories, which they are incapable of understanding, and of which the truth, the justice, the feasibility are still hotly disputed. We are therefore taking a very responsible step in introducing the idea of property at all into our moral lessons. And yet it is too great and important to be ignored. Some writers have advanced the theory that the right in question rests on labor, and they regard it as a self-evident proposition, one which, therefore, might safely be taught to the young, that every person is entitled to the products of his labor. Jules Simon says (see Paul Janet, Elements of Morals, English translation, p. 66): "This earth was worth nothing and produced nothing. I dug the soil, I brought from a distance fertilizing earth; it is now fertile. This fertility is my work; by fertilizing it, I made it mine." American writers have eloquent passages to the same effect. But this proposition certainly does not appear to me self-evident, nor even true. Chiefly for the reason that "my labor" and "my skill" are not original, but derivative factors in production. They are very largely the result of the labor and the skill of generations that have preceded me, that have built up in me this brain, this skill, this power of application. The products of my labor would indeed belong to me if my labor were really mine, if it were not to an incalculable extent the consequent of social antecedents, in regard to which I can not claim the least merit. The attempt to found the rewards of labor upon the merit of the laborer seems to me a perfectly hopeless one.

Let me add that it is one thing to say that he who will not work shall not eat, and a very different thing to say that he who works shall enjoy what he has produced. The former statement merely signifies that he who will not contribute his share toward sustaining and improving human society is not entitled to any part in the advantages of the social order, though the charity of his fellow-men may grant him, under certain conditions and in the hope of changing his disposition, what he is not entitled to as of right. But the question what the share of the laborer ought to be is one that can not be settled in the rough-and-ready manner above suggested, and the considerations involved are, in truth, far too numerous and complex to be introduced at this stage. The whole question will be reopened later on. For the present it must suffice to state certain purely moral considerations on which the right of property may be made to rest. The following are the ideas which I should seek to develop: Property is justified by its uses. Its uses are to support the existence and promote the mental and moral growth of man. The physical life itself depends on property. Even in a communistic state the food any one eats must be his property in the sense that every one else is debarred from using it. The moral life of men depends on property. The moral life is rooted in the institution of the family, and the family could not exist without a separate domicile of its own and the means of providing for its dependent members. The independence and the growth of the intellect depend on property. In short, property is an indispensable adjunct of personality. This I take to be its moral basis. What I here indicate, however, is an ideal right which the existing state of society by no means reflects. By what methods we may best approach this ideal, whether by maintaining and improving the system of private property in land or by state ownership, whether by capitalistic or socialistic production, etc., are questions of means, not of ends, and raise problems in social science with which here we have not to deal.

Question—If the present social arrangements are not morally satisfactory, if e. g., certain persons possess property to which on moral grounds they are not entitled, should not the commandment against stealing be suspended so far as they are concerned? The present system of rights, imperfect as it is, is the result of social evolution, and denotes the high-water mark of the average ethical consciousness of the world up to date. Respect for the existing system of rights, however, imperfect as it is, is the prime condition of obtaining a better system.

4. Respect the mental liberty of others. Upon this rule of justice is founded the right to freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and what is called the freedom of conscience. Point out the limitations of these various rights which follow from the fact of their universality.

5. Respect the reputation of your fellow-men. Refrain from backbiting and slander. Bridle your tongue. This undoubtedly is a rule of justice. "Who steals my purse steals trash," etc. The respect of our fellow-men is in itself a source of happiness and a moral prop, and, besides, the greatest help in achieving the legitimate purposes of life. He who has the confidence of others has wings to bear him along. He who is suspected for any reason, true or false, strikes against invisible barriers at every step. Nothing is so sensitive as character—a mere breath may tarnish it. It is therefore the gravest kind of injury to our neighbors to disseminate damaging rumors, to throw out dark hints and suggestions with respect to them, to impugn their motives. But is it not a duty to denounce evil and evil-doers and to put the innocent on their guard against wolves in sheep's clothing? Yes, if we are sure that our own motives are perfectly disinterested, that we are not in the least prompted by personal spite or prejudice. For if we dislike a person, as every one knows, we can not judge him fairly, we are prone to attribute to him all manner of evil qualities and evil intents which exist only in our own jaundiced imagination. Very often a person against whom we had at first conceived a distinct dislike proves on nearer acquaintance to be one whom we can esteem and even love. We should be warned by such experiences to hold our judgments in suspense, and not to allow injurious words to pass the lips. The vast moral importance of being able to hold one's tongue, the golden resources of silence, should be emphasized by the teacher.

A series of lessons on good manners may be introduced at this point. The ceremonies of social intercourse, the various forms in which refined people show their deference for each other, the rule not to obtrude self in conversation, and the like, are so many illustrations of the respect which we owe to the personality of our fellow-men. Good manners are the æsthetic counterpart of good morals, and the connection between the two can easily be made plain.

6. Speak the truth. Inward truthfulness is a self-regarding duty; social truthfulness is a form of justice. Words represent facts. The words we speak to our neighbor are used by him as building-stones in the architecture of his daily conduct. We have no right to defeat the purposes of his life, to weaken the dwelling he is erecting, by supplying him with worthless building material.

Upon exactly the same ground is based the duty of keeping one's promises, viz., that our fellow-men build on our promises. Promises made in a legal form are called contracts and can be enforced. Promises not made in legal form are equally binding from a moral point of view. It should be borne in mind, however, that conditional promises are canceled when the stipulated conditions do not occur, and, furthermore, that there are certain tacit conditions implied in all promises whatsoever. A person who has promised to visit a friend on a certain day and dies in the interval is not supposed to have broken his promise; nor if any one makes a similar promise and a heavy snowstorm should block the roads or if he should be confined to his bed by sickness is he likely to be accused of breaking his promise. The physical possibility of fulfilling them is a tacit condition in all promises. It is also a tacit condition in all promises that it shall be morally possible or consistent with morality to keep them. A young man who has promised to join a gang of burglars in an attack on a bank and who repents at the last moment is morally justified in refusing to keep his pledge. His crime consisted in having made the promise in the first place, not in refusing to fulfill it at the last moment. A person, however, who promises to pay usurious interest on a loan of money and who then takes advantage of the laws against usury to escape payment is a double-dyed rogue, for his intention is to cheat, and he uses the cloak of virtue as a screen in order to cheat with impunity. Let the teacher discuss the casuistical question whether it is right to keep a promise made to robbers—e. g., if we should fall into the hands of brigands, and they should make it a condition of our release that we shall not betray their hiding-place.

Justice is based on positive respect for the individuality of others, but its commands may all be expressed in the negative form: Do not kill, do not infringe the liberty, the property of others, do not slander, do not lie, etc. It is often held, however, that there is a positive as well as a negative