On the Improvement of the Understanding by Benedict de Spinoza (sci fi books to read .txt) 📕

[108] (1) The properties of the understanding which I have chiefly remarked, and which I clearly understand, are the following:- I. (2) It involves certainty - in other words, it knows that a thing

exists in reality as it is reflected subjectively. II. (108:3) That it perceives certain things, or forms some ideas

absolutely, some ideas from others. (4) Thus it forms the

idea of quantity absolutely, without reference to any other

thoughts; but ideas of motion it only forms after taking into

consideration the idea of quantity. III. (108:5) Those ideas which the understanding forms absolutely

express infinity; determinate ideas are derived from other

ideas. (6) Thus in the idea of quantity, perceived by means

of a cause, the quantity is determined, as when a body is

perceived to be formed by the motion of a plane, a plane by

the motion of a line, or, again, a line by the motion of a

point. (7) All these are perceptions which do not serve

towards understanding quantity, but only towards determining

it. (108:8) This is proved by the fact that we conceive them

as formed as it were by motion, yet this motion is not perceived

unless the quantity be perceived also; we can even prolong the

motion to form an infinite line, which we certainly could not do

unless we had an idea of infinite quantity. IV. (9) The understanding forms positive ideas before forming

negative ideas. V. (108:10) It perceives things not so much under the condition

of duration as under a certain form of eternity, and in an

infinite number; or rather in perceiving things it does not

consider either their number or duration, whereas, in imagining

them, it perceives them in a determinate number, duration, and

quantity. VI. (108:11) The ideas which we form as clear and distinct, seem

to follow from the sole necessity of our nature, that they

appear to depend absolutely on our sole power; with confused

ideas the contrary is the case. (12) They are often formed

against our will. VII. (108:13) The mind can determine in many ways the ideas of things, which the understanding forms from other ideas: thus, for instance, in order to define the plane of an ellipse, it supposes a point adhering to a cord to be moved around two centers, or, again, it conceives an infinity of points, always in the same fixed relation to a given straight line, angle of the vertex of the cone, or in an infinity of other ways. VIII. (108:14) The more ideas express perfection of any object, the more perfect are they themselves; for we do not admire the architect who has planned a chapel so much as the architect who has planned a splendid temple.

[109] (1) I do not stop to consider the rest of what is referred to thought, such as love, joy, &c. (2) They are nothing to our present purpose, and cannot even be conceived unless the understanding be perceived previously. (3) When perception is removed, all these go with it.

[110] (1) False and fictitious ideas have nothing positive about them (as we have abundantly shown), which causes them to be called false or fictitious; they are only considered as such through the defectiveness of knowledge. (2) Therefore, false and fictitious ideas as such can teach us nothing concerning the essence of thought; this must be sought from the positive properties just enumerated; in other words, we must lay down some common basis from which these properties necessarily follow, so that when this is given, the properties are necessarily given also, and when it is removed, they too vanish with it.

The rest of the treatise is wanting.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––-

Spinoza’s Endnotes: Marks as per Curley, see Note 5 above. [a] (1) This might be explained more at large and more clearly:

I mean by distinguishing riches according as they are pursued for

their own sake, in or furtherance of fame, or sensual pleasure,

or the advancement of science and art. (2) But this subject is

reserved to its own place, for it is not here proper to

investigate the matter more accurately. [b] These considerations should be set forth more precisely. [c] These matters are explained more at length elsewhere. [d] N.B. I do no more here than enumerate the sciences necessary

for our purpose; I lay no stress on their order. [e] There is for the sciences but one end, to which they should

all be directed. [f] (1) In this case we do not understand anything of the cause

from the consideration of it in the effect. (2) This is

sufficiently evident from the fact that the cause is only

spoken of in very general terms, such as - there exists then

something; there exists then some power, &c.; or from the

that we only express it in a negative manner - it is not

or that, &c. (3) In the second case something is ascribed

to the cause because of the effect, as we shall show in an

example, but only a property, never an essence. [g] (1) From this example may be clearly seen what I have just

drawn attention to. (2) For through this union we understand

nothing beyond the sensation, the effect, to wit, from which

we inferred the cause of which we understand nothing. [h] (1) A conclusion of this sort, though it be certain, is yet

not to be relied on without great caution; for unless we are

exceedingly careful we shall forthwith fall into error.

(2) When things are conceived thus abstractedly, and not

through their true essence, they are apt to be confused by the

imagination. (3) For that which is in itself one, men imagine

to be multiplex. (4) To those things which are conceived

abstractedly, apart, and confusedly, terms are applied which are

apt to become wrested from their strict meaning, and bestowed on

things more familiar; whence it results that these latter are

imagined in the same way as the former to which the terms were

originally given. [i] I shall here treat a little more in detail of experience,

and shall examine the method adopted by the Empirics,

and by recent philosophers. [k] By native strength, I mean that not bestowed on us by external

causes, as I shall afterwards explain in my philosophy. [l] Here I term them operations: I shall explain their nature

in my philosophy. [m] I shall take care not only to demonstrate what I have just

advanced, but also that we have hitherto proceeded rightly,

and other things needful to be known. [33note1] (1) In modern language, “the idea may become the

subject of another presentation.” (2) Objectivus generally

corresponds to the modern “subjective,” formalis to the

modern “objective.” [Trans.- Note 1] [n] (1) Observe that we are not here inquiring how the first

subjective essence is innate in us. (2) This belongs to an

investigation into nature, where all these matters are amply

explained, and it is shown that without ideas neither

affirmation, nor negation, nor volition are possible. [o] The nature of mental search is explained in my philosophy. [p] To be connected with other things is to be produced by them,

or to produce them. [q] In the same way as we have here no doubt of the truth of

our knowledge. [r] See below the note on hypotheses, whereof we have a clear

understanding; the fiction consists in saying that such

hypotheses exist in heavenly bodies. [s] (1) As a thing, when once it is understood, manifests itself,

we have need only of an example without further proof.

(2) In the same way the contrary has only to be presented to

our minds to be recognized as false, as will forthwith appear

when we come to discuss fiction concerning essences. [t] Observe, that although many assert that they doubt whether God

exists, they have nought but his name in their minds, or else

some fiction which they call God: this fiction is not in

harmony with God’s real nature, as we will duly show. [u] (1) I shall presently show that no fiction can concern eternal

truths. By an eternal truth, I mean that which being positive

could never become negative. (2) Thus it is a primary and

eternal truth that God exists, but it is not an eternal truth

that Adam thinks. (3) That the Chimaera does not exist is an

eternal truth, that Adam does not think is not so. [x] (1) Afterwards, when we come to speak of fiction that is

concerned with essences, it will be evident that fiction never

creates or furnishes the mind with anything new; only such things

as are already in the brain or imagination are recalled to the

memory, when the attention is directed to them confusedly and all

at once. (2) For instance, we have remembrance of spoken words

and of a tree; when the mind directs itself to them confusedly,

it forms the notion of a tree speaking. (3) The same may be said

of existence, especially when it is conceived quite generally as

an entity; it is then readily applied to all things together in

the memory. (4) This is specially worthy of remark. [y] We must understand as much in the case of hypotheses put forward

to explain certain movements accompanying celestial phenomena;

but from these, when applied to the celestial motions, we any

draw conclusions as to the nature of the heavens, whereas this

last may be quite different, especially as many other causes are

conceivable which would account for such motions. [z] (1) It often happens that a man recalls to mind this word soul,

and forms at the same time some corporeal image: as the two

representations are simultaneous, he easily thinks that he

imagines and feigns a corporeal soul: thus confusing the name

with the thing itself. (2) I here beg that my readers will not

be in a hurry to refute this proposition; they will, I hope,

have no mind to do so, if they pay close attention to the

examples given and to what follows. [61a] (1) Though I seem to deduce this from experience, some

may deny its cogency because I have given no formal proof.

(2) I therefore append the following for those who may

desire it. (3) As there can be nothing in nature contrary

to nature’s laws, since all things come to pass by fixed

laws, so that each thing must irrefragably produce its own

proper effect, it follows that the soul, as soon as it

possesses the true conception of a thing, proceeds to

reproduce in thought that thing’s effects. (4) See below,

where I speak of the false idea. [64b] (1) Observe that fiction regarded in itself, only differs

from dreams in that in the latter we do not perceive the

external causes which we perceive through the senses while

awake. (2) It has hence been inferred that representations

occurring in sleep have no connection with objects external

to us. (3) We shall presently see that error is the dreaming

of a waking man: if it reaches a certain pitch it becomes delirium. [76z] These are not attributes of God displaying His essence,

as I will show in my philosophy. [76a] (1) This has been shown already. (2) For if such a being

did not exist it would never be produced; therefore the mind

would be able to understand more than nature could furnish;

and this has been shown above to be false. [78a] (1) That is, it is known that the senses sometimes deceive us.

(2) But it is only known confusedly, for it is not known how

they deceive us. [83d] (1) If the duration be indefinite, the recollection is

imperfect; this everyone seems to have learnt from nature.

(2) For we often ask, to strengthen our belief in something

we hear of, when and where it happened; though ideas

themselves have their own duration in the