Thoughts Of Marcus Aurelius Antoninus by Marcus Aurelius Antoninus (best self help books to read .txt) 📕

    The Common Greek Word Which We Translate "Matter" Is [Greek:

    Hylê]. It Is The Stuff That Things Are Made Of.

Matter Consists Of Elemental Parts ([Greek: Stoicheia]) Of Which All

Material Objects Are Made. But Nothing Is Permanent In Form. The Nature

Of The Universe,  According To Antoninus' Expression (Iv. 36),  "Loves

Nothing So Much As To Change The Things Which Are,  And To Make New

Things Like Them. For Everything That Exists Is In A Manner The Seed Of

That Which Will Be. But Thou Art Thinking Only Of Seeds Which Are Cast

Into The Earth Or Into A Womb: But This Is A Very Vulgar Notion." All

Things Then Are In A Constant Flux And Change; Some Things Are Dissolved

Into The Elements,  Others Come In Their Places; And So The "Whole

Universe Continues Ever Young And Perfect" (Xii. 23).

Antoninus Has Some Obscure Expressions About What He Calls "Seminal

Principles" ([Greek: Spermatikoi Logoi]). He Opposes Them To The

Epicurean Atoms (Vi. 24),  And Consequently His "Seminal Principles" Are

Not Material Atoms Which Wander About At Hazard,  And Combine Nobody

Knows How. In One Passage (Iv. 21) He Speaks Of Living Principles,  Souls

([Greek: Psychahi]) After The Dissolution Of Their Bodies Being

Received Into The "Seminal Principle Of The Universe." Schultz Thinks

That By "Seminal Principles Antoninus Means The Relations Of The Various

Elemental Principles,  Which Relations Are Determined By The Deity And By

Which Alone The Production Of Organized Beings Is Possible." This May Be

The Meaning; But If It Is,  Nothing Of Any Value Can Be Derived From

It.[A] Antoninus Often Uses The Word "Nature" ([Greek: Physis]),  And We

Must Attempt To Fix Its Meaning,  The Simple Etymological Sense Of

[Greek: Physis] Is "Production," The Birth Of What We Call Things. The

Romans Used Natura,  Which Also Means "Birth" Originally. But Neither The

Greeks Nor The Romans Stuck To This Simple Meaning,  Nor Do We. Antoninus

Says (X. 6): "Whether The Universe Is [A Concourse Of] Atoms Or Nature

[Is A System],  Let This First Be Established,  That I Am A Part Of The

Whole Which Is Governed By Nature." Here It Might Seem As If Nature Were

Personified And Viewed As An Active,  Efficient Power; As Something

Which,  It Not Independent Of The Deity,  Acts By A Power Which Is Given

To It By The Deity. Such,  If I Understand The Expression Right,  Is The

Way In Which The Word Nature Is Often Used Now,  Though It Is Plain That

Many Writers Use The Word Without Fixing Any Exact Meaning To It. It Is

The Same With The Expression Laws Of Nature,  Which Some Writers May Use

In An Intelligible Sense,  But Others As Clearly Use In No Definite Sense

At All. There Is No Meaning In This Word Nature,  Except That Which

Bishop Butler Assigns To It,  When He Says,  "The Only Distinct Meaning Of

That Word Natural Is Stated,  Fixed,  Or Settled; Since What Is Natural As

Much Requires And Presupposes An Intelligent Agent To Render It So,

_I.E._,  To Effect It Continually Or At Stated Times,  As What Is

Supernatural Or Miraculous Does To Effect It At Once." This Is Plato's

Meaning (De Leg.,  Iv. 715) When He Says That God Holds The Beginning And

End And Middle Of All That Exists,  And Proceeds Straight On His Course,

Making His Circuit According To Nature (That Is By A Fixed Order); And

He Is Continually Accompanied By Justice,  Who Punishes Those Who Deviate

From The Divine Law,  That Is,  From The Order Or Course Which God

Observes.

    [A] Justin (Apol. Ii. 8) Has The Words [Greek: Kata

    Spermatikou Logou Meros],  Where He Is Speaking Of The Stoics

    But He Uses This Expression In A Peculiar Sense (Note Ii). The

    Early Christian Writers Were Familiar With The Stoic Terms,  And

    Their Writings Show That The Contest Was Begun Between The

    Christian Expositors And The Greek Philosophy. Even In The

    Second Epistle Of St. Peter (Ii. I,  V. 4) We Find A Stoic

    Expression,  [Greek: Ina Dia Toutôn Genêsthe Theias Koinônoi

    Physeôs.]

When We Look At The Motions Of The Planets,  The Action Of What We Call

Gravitation,  The Elemental Combination Of Unorganized Bodies And Their

Resolution,  The Production Of Plants And Of Living Bodies,  Their

Generation,  Growth,  And Their Dissolution,  Which We Call Their Death,  We

Observe A Regular Sequence Of Phenomena,  Which Within The Limits Of

Experience Present And Past,  So Far As We Know The Past,  Is Fixed And

Invariable. But If This Is Not So,  If The Order And Sequence Of

Phenomena,  As Known To Us,  Are Subject To Change In The Course Of An

Infinite Progression,--And Such Change Is Conceivable,--We Have Not

Discovered,  Nor Shall We Ever Discover,  The Whole Of The Order And

Sequence Of Phenomena,  In Which Sequence There May Be Involved According

To Its Very Nature,  That Is,  According To Its Fixed Order,  Some

Variation Of What We Now Call The Order Or Nature Of Things. It Is Also

Conceivable That Such Changes Have Taken Place,--Changes In The Order Of

Things,  As We Are Compelled By The Imperfection Of Language To Call

Them,  But Which Are No Changes; And Further It Is Certain That Our

Knowledge Of The True Sequence Of All Actual Phenomena,  As For Instance

The Phenomena Of Generation,  Growth,  And Dissolution,  Is And Ever Must

Be Imperfect.

We Do Not Fare Much Better When We Speak Of Causes And Effects Than When

We Speak Of Nature. For The Practical Purposes Of Life We May Use The

Terms Cause And Effect Conveniently,  And We May Fix A Distinct Meaning

To Them,  Distinct Enough At Least To Prevent All Misunderstanding. But

The Case Is Different When We Speak Of Causes And Effects As Of Things.

All That We Know Is Phenomena,  As The Greeks Called Them,  Or Appearances

Which Follow One Another In A Regular Order,  As We Conceive It,  So That

If Some One Phenomenon Should Fail In The Series,  We Conceive That There

Must Either Be An Interruption Of The Series,  Or That Something Else

Will Appear After The Phenomenon Which Has Failed To Appear,  And Will

Occupy The Vacant Place; And So The Series In Its Progression May Be

Modified Or Totally Changed. Cause And Effect Then Mean Nothing In The

Sequence Of Natural Phenomena Beyond What I Have Said; And The Real

Cause,  Or The Transcendent Cause,  As Some Would Call It,  Of Each

Successive Phenomenon Is In That Which Is The Cause Of All Things Which

Are,  Which Have Been,  And Which Will Be Forever. Thus The Word Creation

May Have A Real Sense If We Consider It As The First,  If We Can Conceive

A First,  In The Present Order Of Natural Phenomena; But In The Vulgar

Sense A Creation Of All Things At A Certain Time,  Followed By A

Quiescence Of The First Cause And An Abandonment Of All Sequences Of

Phenomena To The Laws Of Nature,  Or To The Other Words That People May

Use,  Is Absolutely Absurd.[A]

    [A] Time And Space Are The Conditions Of Our Thought; But Time

    Infinite And Space Infinite Cannot Be Objects Of Thought,

    Except In A Very Imperfect Way. Time And Space Must Not In Any

    Way Be Thought Of When We Think Of The Deity. Swedenborg Says,

    "The Natural Man May Believe That He Would Have No Thought,  If

    The Ideas Of Time,  Of Space,  And Of Things Material Were Taken

    Away; For Upon Those Is Founded All The Thought That Man Has.

    But Let Him Know That The Thoughts Are Limited And Confined In

    Proportion As They Partake Of Time,  Of Space,  And Of What Is

    Material; And That They Are Not Limited And Are Extended,  In

    Proportion As They Do Not Partake Of Those Things; Since The

    Mind Is So Far Elevated Above The Things Corporeal And Worldly"

    (Concerning Heaven And Hell,  169).

[Illustration: The Temple Of Pallas]

Now,  Though There Is Great Difficulty In Understanding All The

Passages Of Antoninus,  In Which He Speaks Of Nature,  Of The Changes Of

Things And Of The Economy Of The Universe,  I Am Convinced That His Sense

Of Nature And Natural Is The Same As That Which I Have Stated; And As He

Was A Man Who Knew How To Use Words In A Clear Way And With Strict

Consistency,  We Ought To Assume,  Even If His Meaning In Some Passages Is

Doubtful,  That His View Of Nature Was In Harmony With His Fixed Belief

In The All-Pervading,  Ever Present,  And Ever Active Energy Of God. (Ii.

4; Iv. 40; X. 1; Vi. 40; And Other Passages. Compare Seneca,  De Benef.,

Iv. 7. Swedenborg,  Angelic Wisdom,  349-357.)

There Is Much In Antoninus That Is Hard To Understand,  And It Might Be

Said That He Did Not Fully Comprehend All That He Wrote; Which Would

However Be In No Way Remarkable,  For It Happens Now That A Man May Write

What Neither He Nor Anybody Can Understand. Antoninus Tells Us (Xii. 10)

To Look At Things And See What They Are,  Resolving Them Into The

Material [Greek: Hylê],  The Casual [Greek: Aition],  And The Relation

[Greek: Anaphora],  Or The Purpose,  By Which He Seems To Mean Something

In The Nature Of What We Call Effect,  Or End. The Word Caus ([Greek:

Aitia]) Is The Difficulty. There Is The Same Word In The Sanscrit

(Hétu); And The Subtle Philosophers Of India And Of Greece,  And

The Less Subtle Philosophers Of Modern Times,  Have All Used This Word,

Or An Equivalent Word,  In A Vague Way. Yet The Confusion Sometimes May

Be In The Inevitable Ambiguity Of Language Rather Than In The Mind Of

The Writer,  For I Cannot Think That Some Of The Wisest Of Men Did Not

Know What They Intended To Say. When Antoninus Says (Iv. 36),  "That

Everything That Exists Is In A Manner The Seed Of That Which Will Be,"

He Might Be Supposed To Say What Some Of The Indian Philosophers Have

Said,  And Thus A Profound Truth Might Be Converted Into A Gross

Absurdity. But He Says,  "In A Manner," And In A Manner He Said True; And

In Another Manner,  If You Mistake His Meaning,  He Said False. When Plato

Said,  "Nothing Ever Is,  But Is Always Becoming" ([Greek: Aei

Gignetai]),  He Delivered A Text,  Out Of Which We May Derive Something;

For He Destroys By It Not All Practical,  But All Speculative Notions Of

Cause And Effect. The Whole Series Of Things,  As They Appear To Us,  Must

Be Contemplated In Time,  That Is In Succession,  And We Conceive Or

Suppose Intervals Between One State Of Things And Another State Of

Things,  So That There Is Priority And Sequence,  And Interval,  And Being,

And A Ceasing To Be,  And Beginning And Ending. But There Is Nothing Of

The Kind In The Nature Of Things. It Is An Everlasting Continuity (Iv.

45; Vii. 75). When Antoninus Speaks Of