Thoughts Of Marcus Aurelius Antoninus by Marcus Aurelius Antoninus (best self help books to read .txt) 📕

Instead Of Resentment; And So It Comes To The Same As St. Paul's Advice

To Be Angry And Sin Not; Which,  As Butler Well Explains It,  Is Not A

Recommendation To Be Angry,  Which Nobody Needs,  For Anger Is A Natural

Passion,  But It Is A Warning Against Allowing Anger To Lead Us Into Sin.

In Short The Emperor's Doctrine About Wrongful Acts Is This: Wrong-Doers

Do Not Know What Good And Bad Are: They Offend Out Of Ignorance,  And In

The Sense Of The Stoics This Is True. Though This Kind Of Ignorance Will

Never Be Admitted As A Legal Excuse,  And Ought Not To Be Admitted As A

Full Excuse In Any Way By Society,  There May Be Grievous Injuries,  Such

As It Is In A Man's Power To Forgive Without Harm To Society; And If He

Forgives Because He Sees That His Enemies Know Not What They Do,  He Is

Acting In The Spirit Of The Sublime Prayer,  "Father,  Forgive Them,  For

They Know Not What They Do."

The Emperor's Moral Philosophy Was Not A Feeble,  Narrow System,  Which

Teaches A Man To Look Directly To His Own Happiness,  Though A Man's

Happiness Or Tranquillity Is Indirectly Promoted By Living As He Ought

To Do. A Man Must Live Conformably To The Universal Nature,  Which Means,

As The Emperor Explains It In Many Passages,  That A Man's Actions Must

Be Conformable To His True Relations To All Other Human Beings,  Both As

A Citizen Of A Political Community And As A Member Of The Whole Human

Family. This Implies,  And He Often Expresses It In The Most Forcible

Language,  That A Man's Words And Actions,  So Far As They Affect Others,

Must Be Measured By A Fixed Rule,  Which Is Their Consistency With The

Conservation And The Interests Of The Particular Society Of Which He Is

A Member,  And Of The Whole Human Race. To Live Conformably To Such A

Rule,  A Man Must Use His Rational Faculties In Order To Discern Clearly

The Consequences And Full Effect Of All His Actions And Of The Actions

Of Others: He Must Not Live A Life Of Contemplation And Reflection Only,

Though He Must Often Retire Within Himself To Calm And Purify His Soul

By Thought,[A] But He Must Mingle In The Work Of Man And Be A Fellow

Laborer For The General Good.

    [A] Ut Nemo In Sese Tentat Descendere,  Nemo.--_Persius_,  Iv.

    21.

A Man Should Have An Object Or Purpose In Life,  That He May Direct All

His Energies To It; Of Course A Good Object (Ii. 7). He Who Has Not One

Object Or Purpose Of Life,  Cannot Be One And The Same All Through His

Life (Xi. 21). Bacon Has A Remark To The Same Effect,  On The Best Means

Of "Reducing Of The Mind Unto Virtue And Good Estate; Which Is,  The

Electing And Propounding Unto A Man's Self Good And Virtuous Ends Of His

Life,  Such As May Be In A Reasonable Sort Within His Compass To Attain."

He Is A Happy Man Who Has Been Wise Enough To Do This When He Was Young

And Has Had The Opportunities; But The Emperor Seeing Well That A Man

Cannot Always Be So Wise In His Youth,  Encourages Himself To Do It When

He Can,  And Not To Let Life Slip Away Before He Has Begun. He Who Can

Propose To Himself Good And Virtuous Ends Of Life,  And Be True To Them,

Cannot Fail To Live Conformably To His Own Interest And The Universal

Interest,  For In The Nature Of Things They Are One. If A Thing Is Not

Good For The Hive,  It Is Not Good For The Bee (Vi. 54).

One Passage May End This Matter. "If The Gods Have Determined About Me

And About The Things Which Must Happen To Me,  They Have Determined Well,

For It Is Not Easy Even To Imagine A Deity Without Forethought; And As

To Doing Me Harm,  Why Should They Have Any Desire Towards That? For What

Advantage Would Result To Them From This Or To The Whole,  Which Is The

Special Object Of Their Providence? But If They Have Not Determined

About Me Individually,  They Have Certainly Determined About The Whole At

Least; And The Things Which Happen By Way Of Sequence In This General

Arrangement I Ought To Accept With Pleasure And To Be Content With Them.

But If They Determine About Nothing--Which It Is Wicked To Believe,  Or

If We Do Believe It,  Let Us Neither Sacrifice Nor Pray Nor Swear By

Them,  Nor Do Anything Else Which We Do As If The Gods Were Present And

Lived With Us; But If However The Gods Determine About None Of The

Things Which Concern Us,  I Am Able To Determine About Myself,  And I Can

Inquire About That Which Is Useful: And That Is Useful To Every Man

Which Is Conformable To His Own Constitution ([Greek: Kataskeuê]) And

Nature. But My Nature Is Rational And Social; And My City And Country,

So Far As I Am Antoninus,  Is Rome; But So Far As I Am A Man,  It Is The

World. The Things Then Which Are Useful To These Cities Are Alone Useful

To Me" (Vi. 44).

It Would Be Tedious,  And It Is Not Necessary,  To State The Emperor's

Opinions On All The Ways In Which A Man May Profitably Use His

Understanding Towards Perfecting Himself In Practical Virtue. The

Passages To This Purpose Are In All Parts Of His Book,  But As They Are

In No Order Or Connection,  A Man Must Use The Book A Long Time Before He

Will Find Out All That Is In It. A Few Words May Be Added Here. If We

Analyze All Other Things,  We Find How Insufficient They Are For Human

Life,  And How Truly Worthless Many Of Them Are. Virtue Alone Is

Indivisible,  One,  And Perfectly Satisfying. The Notion Of Virtue Cannot

Be Considered Vague Or Unsettled,  Because A Man May Find It Difficult To

Explain The Notion Fully To Himself,  Or To Expound It To Others In Such

A Way As To Prevent Cavilling. Virtue Is A Whole,  And No More Consists

Of Parts Than Man's Intelligence Does; And Yet We Speak Of Various

Intellectual Faculties As A Convenient Way Of Expressing The Various

Powers Which Man's Intellect Shows By His Works. In The Same Way We May

Speak Of Various Virtues Or Parts Of Virtue,  In A Practical Sense,  For

The Purpose Of Showing What Particular Virtues We Ought To Practice In

Order To The Exercise Of The Whole Of Virtue,  That Is,  As Man's Nature

Is Capable Of.

The Prime Principle In Man's Constitution Is Social. The Next In Order

Is Not To Yield To The Persuasions Of The Body,  When They Are Not

Conformable To The Rational Principle,  Which Must Govern. The Third Is

Freedom From Error And From Deception. "Let Then The Ruling Principle

Holding Fast To These Things Go Straight On,  And It Has What Is Its Own"

(Vii. 55). The Emperor Selects Justice As The Virtue Which Is The Basis

Of All The Rest (X. 11),  And This Had Been Said Long Before His Time.

It Is True That All People Have Some Notion Of What Is Meant By Justice

As A Disposition Of The Mind,  And Some Notion About Acting In Conformity

To This Disposition; But Experience Shows That Men's Notions About

Justice Are As Confused As Their Actions Are Inconsistent With The True

Notion Of Justice. The Emperor's Notion Of Justice Is Clear Enough,  But

Not Practical Enough For All Mankind. "Let There Be Freedom From

Perturbations With Respect To The Things Which Come From The External

Cause; And Let There Be Justice In The Things Done By Virtue Of The

Internal Cause,  That Is,  Let There Be Movement And Action Terminating In

This,  In Social Acts,  For This Is According To Thy Nature" (Ix. 31). In

Another Place (Ix. 1) He Says That "He Who Acts Unjustly Acts

Impiously," Which Follows Of Course From All That He Says In Various

Places. He Insists On The Practice Of Truth As A Virtue And As A Means

To Virtue,  Which No Doubt It Is: For Lying Even In Indifferent Things

Weakens The Understanding; And Lying Maliciously Is As Great A Moral

Offense As A Man Can Be Guilty Of,  Viewed Both As Showing An Habitual

Disposition,  And Viewed With Respect To Consequences. He Couples The

Notion Of Justice With Action. A Man Must Not Pride Himself On Having

Some Fine Notion Of Justice In His Head,  But He Must Exhibit His Justice

In Act,  Like St. James' Notion Of Faith. But This Is Enough.

The Stoics,  And Antoninus Among Them,  Call Some Things Beautiful

([Greek: Kala]) And Some Ugly ([Greek: Aischra]),  And As They Are Beautiful

So They Are Good,  And As They Are Ugly So They Are Evil,  Or Bad (Ii. 1).

All These Things,  Good And Evil,  Are In Our Power,  Absolutely,  Some Of

The Stricter Stoics Would Say; In A Manner Only,  As Those Who Would Not

Depart Altogether From Common Sense Would Say; Practically They Are To A

Great Degree In The Power Of Some Persons And In Some Circumstances,  But

In A Small Degree Only In Other Persons And In Other Circumstances. The

Stoics Maintain Man's Free Will As To The Things Which Are In His Power;

For As To The Things Which Are Out Of His Power,  Free Will Terminating

In Action Is Of Course Excluded By The Very Terms Of The Expression. I

Hardly Know If We Can Discover Exactly Antoninus' Notion Of The Free

Will Of Man,  Nor Is The Question Worth The Inquiry. What He Does Mean

And Does Say Is Intelligible. All The Things Which Are Not In Our Power

([Greek: Aproaireta]) Are Indifferent: They Are Neither Good Nor Bad,

Morally. Such Are Life,  Health,  Wealth,  Power,  Disease,  Poverty,  And

Death. Life And Death Are All Men's Portion. Health,  Wealth,  Power,

Disease,  And Poverty Happen To Men,  Indifferently To The Good And To The

Bad; To Those Who Live According To Nature And To Those Who Do Not.[A]

"Life," Says The Emperor,  "Is A Warfare And A Stranger's Sojourn,  And

After Fame Is Oblivion" (Ii. 17). After Speaking Of Those Men Who Have

Disturbed The World And Then Died,  And Of The Death Of Philosophers Such

As Heraclitus And Democritus,  Who Was Destroyed By Lice,  And Of Socrates

Whom Other Lice (His Enemies) Destroyed,  He Says: "What Means All This?

Thou Hast Embarked,  Thou Hast Made The Voyage,  Thou Art Come To Shore;

Get Out. If Indeed To Another Life,  There Is No Want Of Gods,  Not Even

There. But If To A State Without Sensation,  Thou Wilt Cease To Be Held

By Pains And Pleasures,  And To Be A Slave To The Vessel Which Is As Much

Inferior As That Which Serves It Is Superior: For The One Is

Intelligence And Deity; The Other Is Earth And Corruption" (Iii. 3). It

Is Not Death That A Man Should Fear,  But He Should Fear Never Beginning

To Live According To Nature (Xii. 1). Every Man Should Live