Elements of Military Art and Science by Henry Wager Halleck (books you have to read txt) 📕

Perkins says two killed and six wounded. Holmes says six wounded, but makes no mention of any killed.

The fleet sent to the attack of Baltimore, in 1814, consisted of forty sail, the largest of which were ships of the line, carrying an army of over six thousand combatants. The troops were landed at North Point, while sixteen of the bomb-vessels and frigates approached within reach of Fort McHenry, and commenced a bombardment which lasted twenty-five hours. During this attack, the enemy threw "fifteen hundred shells, four hundred of which exploded within the walls of the fort, but without making any impression on either the strength of the work or the garrison," and the British were compelled to retire with much loss.

In 1815, a squadron of British ships, stationed off the mouths of the Mississippi, for the purpose of a blockade, ascended the river as high as Fort St. Philip, which is a small work capable of an armament of only twenty guns in all. A heavy fire of shot and shells was continued with but few and short pauses for nine days and nights, but making no impression either on the fort or garrison, they retreated to their former position at the mouth of the river.

There is but a single instance in the war of 1812, where the enemy's vessels succeeded in reducing a fort; and this has sometimes been alluded to, by persons ignorant of the real facts of the case, as a proof against the ability of our fortifications to resist naval attacks. Even if it were a case of decided failure, would this single exception be sufficient to overthrow the weight of evidence on the other side? We allude to the reduction of the so-called Fort Washington by the British fleet that ascended the Potomac in 1814, to assist in the disgraceful and barbarous operation of burning the capitol and destroying the archives of the nation. Fort Washington was a very small and inefficient work, incorrectly planned by an incompetent French engineer; only a small part of the fort was then built, and it has not yet been completed. The portion constructed was never, until very recently, properly prepared for receiving its armament, and at the time of attack could not possibly have held out a long time. But no defence whatever was made. Capt. Gordon, with a squadron of eight sail, carrying one hundred and seventy-three guns, under orders "to ascend the river as high as Fort Washington, and try upon it the experiment of a bombardment," approached that fort, and, upon firing a single shell, which did no injury to either the fort or the garrison, the latter deserted the works, and rapidly retreated. The commanding officer was immediately dismissed for his cowardice. An English naval officer, who was one of the expedition, in speaking of the retreat of the garrison, says: "We were at loss to account for such an extraordinary step. The position was good and the capture would have cost us at least fifty men, and more, had it been properly defended; besides, an unfavorable wind and many other chances were in their favor," &c. The fleet ascended the river to Alexandria, but learning soon afterwards that batteries were preparing at White House and Indian Head to cut off its retreat, it retired, in much haste, but not without injury.

Some have also pretended to find in modern European history a few examples contradictory of the relative power which we have here assigned to ships and forts. Overlooking the numerous and well-authenticated examples, where forts of small dimensions and of small armament have repelled large fleets, they would draw their conclusions from the four or five instances where fleets have gained (as was at first supposed) a somewhat doubtful victory over forts. But a careful and critical examination of the facts in these cases, will show that even these are no exceptions to the general rule of the superiority of guns ashore over guns afloat.

The only instances where it has ever been pretended by writers of any note, that ships have gained advantage, are those of the attack on Copenhagen in 1801; the passage of the Dardanelles, in 1807; the attack on Algiers, in 1816; the attack on San Juan d'Ulloa, in 1838; and the attack on St. Jean d'Acre, in 1840.

Let us examine these examples a little in detail:—

Copenhagen.—The British fleet sent to attack Copenhagen, in 1801, consisted of fifty-two sail, eighteen of them being line-of-battle ships, four frigates, &c. They sailed from Yarmouth roads on the 12th of March, passed the Sound on the 30th, and attacked and defeated the Danish line on the 2d of April.

The Sound between Cronenberg and the Swedish coast is about two and a half miles wide, (vide Fig. 34.) The batteries of Cronenberg and Elsinore were lined with one hundred pieces of cannon and mortars; but the Swedish battery had been much neglected, and then mounted only six guns. Nevertheless, the British admiral, to avoid the damage his squadron would have to sustain in the passage of this wide channel, defended by a force scarcely superior to a single one of his ships, preferred to attempt the difficult passage of the Belt; but after a few of his light vessels, acting as scouts, had run on rocks, he returned to the Sound.

He then tried to negotiate a peaceful passage, threatening, however, a declaration of war if his vessels should be fired upon. It must be remembered that at this time England was at peace with both Denmark and Sweden, and that no just cause of war existed. Hence, the admiral inferred that the commanders of these batteries would be loath to involve their countries in a war with so formidable a power as England, by commencing hostilities, when only a free passage was asked. The Danish commander replied, that he should not permit a fleet to pass his post, whose object and destination were unknown to him. He fired upon them, as he was bound to do by long-existing commercial regulations, and not as an act of hostility against the English. The Swedes, on the contrary, remained neutral, and allowed the British vessels to lie near by for several days without firing upon them. Seeing this friendly disposition of the Swedes, the fleet neared their coast, and passed out of the reach of the Danish batteries, which opened a fire of balls and shells; but all of them fell more than two hundred yards short of the fleet, which escaped without the loss of a single man.

The Swedes excused their treachery by the plea that it would have been impossible to construct batteries at that season, and that, even had it been possible, Denmark would not have consented to their doing so, for fear that Sweden would renew her old claim to one half of the rich duties levied by Denmark on all ships passing the strait. There may have been some grounds for the last excuse; but the true reason for their conduct was the fear of getting involved in a war with England. Napoleon says that, even at that season, a few days would have been sufficient for placing a hundred guns in battery, and that Sweden had much more time than was requisite. And with a hundred guns on each side of the channel, served with skill and energy, the fleet must necessarily have sustained so much damage as to render it unfit to attack Copenhagen.

On this passage, we remark:—

1st. The whole number of guns and mortars in the forts of the Sound amounted to only one hundred and six, while the fleet carried over seventeen hundred guns; and yet, with this immense superiority of more than sixteen to one, the British admiral preferred the dangerous passage of the Belt to encountering the fire of these land-batteries.

2d. By negotiations, and threatening the vengeance of England, he persuaded the small Swedish battery to remain silent and allow the fleet to pass near that shore, out of reach of Cronenberg and Elsinore.

3d. It is the opinion of Napoleon and the best English writers, that if the Swedish battery had been put in order, and acted in concert