Elements of Military Art and Science by Henry Wager Halleck (books you have to read txt) 📕

We must omit for the present giving even an outline of the history of military engineering, and pass to the troops of this arm, as constituting an essential element of an army organization. The subject of fortification, and the history of its various changes, will be examined in the next chapter.

The engineers, in modern army organization, constitute the fourth arm of service, as, compared with artillery, their relative numbers are about as two to three. They are divided in the same manner as the artillery, viz.:—1st, the staff; 2d, guards, or fort-keepers; 3d, artificers; and 4th, the troops.

I. The officers constituting the staff of this corps are charged in time of peace with planning, constructing, and repairing all fortifications and other defensive works; the construction and preparation of all military materials, and stores connected with this arm; and (in our service) with the disbursements of money connected with these operations: in time of war they are charged with the attack and defence of military works, the laying out and construction of field defences, redoubts, intrenchments, roads, &c.; in the attack they form a part of the vanguard, to remove obstructions; and in retreat they form a part of the rear-guard, to erect obstacles, destroy roads, bridges, &c., so as to retard an enemy's pursuit.

From the important character of these duties as connected with the means essential to a national defence, and the vast amount of money expended in these operations, it is evident that a high order of acquirements should be deemed necessary to qualify one to perform the duties of a military engineer. This officer requires a knowledge of chemistry, to guide his choice of materials for mortars, cements, and mastics; of mineralogy and geology, for selecting stone; of botany, for timber and the means of preventing its decay; of mathematics, in laying out his work and calculating the thickness and stability of his walls, embankments, &c.; of mechanical philosophy, in constructing his machinery; of military engineering, in his plans of fortifications; and of all the higher branches of military science, in selecting positions for these works, such that they shall have the proper relations to the means of national defence, and to the grand operations of armies in the field. The avenues to appointment to this corps are guarded, in most European armies, with special care, to prevent the influence of money, politics, or family connections; and in our own army it is now specified by law of Congress, that the vacancies shall be filled only from the most distinguished graduates of the military academy. Formerly our service suffered most severely from the employment of incompetent persons, introduced through political influence from civil life, and foreign charlatans, the refuse of European armies. Many of our earlier military works (as will be mentioned hereafter) were modelled upon systems for a long time discarded by the profession in Europe, and even some of those which have been constructed within the last thirty years are made of such wretched materials and workmanship, that they are already crumbling into ruins. While the existing laws and regulations seem well calculated to prevent the recurrence of similar abuses and errors, it nevertheless can be shown that the organization of this arm of our service requires modifications and extensions to give it the requisite degree of efficiency, and to economize the public expenditures.

The wars of Louis XIV. first led to a regular military organization, and a regular system of defence. In these wars the engineers received great development, and have ever since occupied a prominent position as parts of an army organization. We therefore find in all the great sieges and battles of this era a large and continually increasing number of engineers and engineer troops, this force being gradually augmented as the true principles of war became better understood, and as the wants of the service required. Even in the earliest of these battles we find the engineers taking a prominent and distinguished part. In the war of 1688, twenty-four engineers were killed and wounded at the siege of Philipsbourg, eighteen at Namur, eight at Huy, ten at Charleroi, eight at Ath, thirty at Barcelona, &c. Such losses were good proofs of the usefulness of these officers, and before this war was closed, their number was increased to six hundred; and in 1706 the army contained eight brigades of engineers and four companies of miners.

The engineer corps being partially disbanded in the early part of the French Revolution, great difficulty was experienced in reorganizing it and in finding competent men to supply the places of those who had been driven into exile or sacrificed during the reign of terror. Energy and activity, combined with republican zeal, could supply the place of skill in the other arms, but the science of the engineer could not be acquired in a day.

In 1799, the staff of the engineer corps consisted of four hundred and forty-nine officers, without including the general officers, commanding departments, or those connected with the engineer troops. The same organization was continued in 1804. The engineer staff of the French army now numbers four hundred and thirty-two officers. We have in our service forty-three engineer officers, for staff duty, who are now engaged in the construction and repairs of some sixty or seventy fortifications, and other works of a civil and military character.

II. Engineer Guards, or Fort-Keepers, are a class of men charged with the general care of forts, and all public property deposited in the several engineer dépôts and garrisons, and in the public works during their construction.

There are five hundred and fifty of these "gardes du Genie" in the French army, who rank next the sub-lieutenants of engineers, and are assimilated with the sub-lieutenants of infantry in the hospitals, marches, &c. In our service we have no engineer guards or fort-keepers.

This defect in our organization has been the cause of serious inconvenience, and the consequent waste of public property. The expense of hiring civil agents for this purpose has more than trebled the cost of supporting a suitable number of non-commissioned guards to maintain the good order and efficiency of our forts, in the absence of engineer officers, and to preserve and keep in repair the military implements and stores connected with this department of the army. It has already been shown that we have fifty-eight of these guards for the artillery service, and it really seems somewhat singular that the engineers, with a much greater amount of public property in their charge, are allowed no assistants of this kind.

III. Engineer artificers are a class of men employed in the practical operations of constructing forts and other military defences, and in making and repairing all the implements used by the engineer troops in the operations of sapping and mining, in crossing rivers, in constructing field-defences, and in the attack and defence of field-works.

As very few new fortifications are now required in France, the services of engineer artificers are less necessary and important than in our service, where large sums of money are annually expended upon military defences, There are, however, in the French army a corps of engineer artificers, consisting of eight officers and a cadre of fifty-four non-commissioned officers, with a variable number of privates, organized into two companies. But in our army we have no regular engineer artificers! In our artillery service we have three hundred and thirty enlisted artillery artificers. If these are useful and necessary to the artillery service, which no one doubts, for still stronger reasons would it be advantageous to the public service to employ at least an equal number of enlisted engineer artificers on our fortifications; for the annual expenditure of public money is here much greater than in the corresponding branch of the artillery service.

IV. Engineer troops are divided into three classes—1st, sappers and pioneers; 2d, miners; and 3d, pontoniers.

In the French army of 1799, there were four battalions of sappers, consisting of 120 officers and 7,092 men. In 1804, Napoleon organized five battalions of these troops, consisting of 165 officers and 8,865 men. Even this number was found insufficient in his campaigns in Germany and Spain, and he was obliged to organize an additional number of sappers from the Italian and French auxiliaries. The pioneers were then partly attached to other branches of the service. There is, at present, in the French army a considerable number of sappers or pioneers detached for the service of the infantry regiments, three companies of sapeurs-conducteurs, and forty-two companies of sapeurs. In the French army of 1799, there were six companies of miners, consisting of 24 officers and 576 men. In 1804, Napoleon increased these troops to nine companies, containing 36 officers and 864 men. The present French peace establishment contains six companies of miners, organized much the same as under Napoleon. In the French army of 1799 there were two regiments of pontoniers, of 38 officers and 960 men. But this number was found too small in the remaining campaigns, and the deficiency was temporarily supplied by organizing sailors for these duties. In the present French army organization, there are eleven companies of pontoniers, forming a regiment of sixty-three officers.

We have in our service no sappers, miners, or pontoniers, and, in case of war, would be found without the means of executing any military works, or performing any military operation which would require engineer troops.

In the preliminary stages of army organization under Louis XIV., infantry troops were detailed as sappers, and instructed in these duties by the engineers. This irregularity of service soon caused difficulties and losses, and the evils springing from it were so great, that Vauban urged the propriety of a separate organization. In 1670 he officially recommended to the king to establish a regiment of twelve hundred sappers and ouvriers, and in a subsequent report on the value of these troops, used the following language: "They would be useful in peace as well as in war, and would be the means of saving much in all fortifications where they should be employed. In fact, I have not the least doubt that they would save annually to the king much more than their pay. I assert all I have said on this subject with as much confidence as if I had seen the result; and I can, with the same certainty, add, that this small troop will be the means of saving large numbers of good engineers and brave officers and soldiers, from the stern necessity to which we are reduced of exposing, almost always, the laborers and those who support them; which necessity would not arise had we at command a sufficient number of this kind of workmen well instructed. To such a degree have I felt the necessity of sappers, at every siege at which I have been present, that I have always had reason to repent of not having more urgently solicited the creation of this company."

Such are the views of the greatest of military engineers, a man who fought one hundred and forty battles, conducted fifty-eight sieges, and built or repaired three hundred fortifications. His anticipations of the usefulness of engineer troops were fully realized, and they have ever since received the most careful attention, and now form, as has just been shown, one of the most important and efficient arms in the French service. The fortifications constructed by the engineers, as organized by Vauban, have ever since constituted one of the principal elements of the French military power.

In the wars of Napoleon there are innumerable instances in illustration of the delays and disasters attending the operations of armies not supplied with engineer troops; and, on the other hand, the advantages resulting from their services when properly organized and instructed. We have already pointed out the influence which the fortifications in the hands of the French exerted on the results of these wars, and the fatal consequences to the Allies of neglecting these works of national defence. Every student of military history will immediately call to