Elements of Military Art and Science by Henry Wager Halleck (books you have to read txt) 📕

Before recurring to these, it might be useful to give one example, as it is often referred to, in the campaign of 1702. It was deemed important for the success of the campaign to attack the Prince of Baden in his camp at Friedlingen. Accordingly, a bridge was thrown across the Rhine at Huningen, the passage effected, and the victory gained. But Villars was several times on the point of losing all for want of a sufficient ponton equipage. Having but a single bridge, the passage was necessarily slow; the artillery and stores were frequently interrupted by the infantry hurrying to the field of battle; disorder ensued, and the whole movement was retarded; Villars could bring only a small part of his artillery into action, and towards the close of the battle the infantry were in want of ammunition: moreover, the whole operation had nearly failed from the attempt of the enemy to destroy this bridge, but the skill of the French pontoniers saved it. We here remark, 1st, the passage secured to Villars an important victory; 2d, from having an inefficient bridge-equipage his whole army was placed in great peril, and the operation had nearly failed; 3d, if the Prince of Baden had possessed a skilful corps to oppose that of Villars, this single bridge would have been destroyed, and the army cut to pieces; 4th, the skill of the little corps of French pontoniers saved the bridge, and of consequence, the army.

In 1794 so great was the disorder in the direction of affairs, that the boats of the bridges across the Wahal and the Rhine were disposed of for commercial purposes; and in the beginning of 1795, says Jomini, "the conquerors of Belgium and Holland had not even a bridge equipage, at a time too when the success of the campaign depended solely on the means of crossing a river." A few boats were procured from the Wahal and the Meuse, and others manufactured in the forests of the Moselle; but "these operations consumed precious time, and four months thus passed away in preparations." Even after other things were all ready, the army was obliged to wait thirty days for the arrival of boats for ponton bridges; during this delay the Austrians strengthened their position, and with very little exertion they might easily have prevented the passage.

In 1796, profiting by the errors of the former campaigns, the French collected more suitable bridge equipages, and the two armies passed the Rhine at Neuweid and Kehl without loss or delay. The latter of these passages has often been referred to as a model for such operations, and certainly does credit to the general who directed it. But Moreau's bridge equipage having been destroyed during this disastrous campaign, his operations the following year were considerably delayed in preparing a new one, and even then he was under the necessity of seizing all private boats that could be found within reach; but the difficulty of collecting and using boats of all sizes and descriptions was so great as entirely to defeat his plan of surprising the enemy on the opposite bank of the river. The necessity of co-operating with Hoche admitted of no further delay, and he was now obliged to force his passage in the open day, and in face of the enemy. Undertaken under such circumstances, "the enterprise was extremely sanguinary, and at one time very doubtful;" and had it failed, "Moreau's army would have been ruined for the campaign."

Napoleon's celebrated passage of the Po, at Placentia, shows plainly how important it is for a general to possess the means of crossing rivers. "I felt the importance of hastening the enterprise in order not to allow the enemy time to prevent it. But the Po, which is a river as wide and deep as the Rhine, is a barrier difficult to be overcome. We had no means of constructing a bridge, and were obliged to content ourselves with the means of embarkation found at Placentia and its environs. Lannes, chief of brigade, crossed in the first boats, with the advanced guard. The Austrians had only ten squadrons on the other side, and these were easily overcome. The passage was now continued without interruption, but very slowly. If I had had a good ponton-equipage, the fate of the enemy's army had been sealed; but the necessity of passing the river by successive embarkations saved it."

In the campaign of 1799, the Archduke attempted to pass the Aar, and attacked the French on the opposite side, but for want of suitable equipage his operation was delayed till the enemy had collected sufficient forces to intercept the passage; he was now obliged to enter into a stipulation for a suspension of hostilities, and to withdraw his bridges.

The operations of the French in the campaign of 1800, led to the most glorious results, but their execution was attended with the greatest difficulties. The passage of the Alps was greatly facilitated by the ability of the chief engineer, Marescot, and the skill of the troops under his command; and the facility of passing rivers afforded Napoleon by his pontoniers, had an important influence upon the success of the campaign. "The army of the reserve had many companies of pontoniers and sappers; the pontons of course could not be taken across the St. Bernard, but the pontoniers soon found materials on the Po and Tesin for constructing bridge equipages." Moreau's army in the same year profited well by his pontoniers, in the passages of the Inn, the Salza, the Traun, the Alza, &c., and in the pursuit of the Austrian army—a pursuit that has but a single parallel example in modern history.

The facility with which Napoleon crossed rivers, made forced marches, constructed redoubts, fortified dépôts, and grasped the great strategic points of the enemy in the campaign of 1805, resulted from the skilful organization of his army, and the efficiency given to the forces employed in these important operations. The engineer staff of the French army at this period, consisted of four hundred and forty-nine officers, and there were four battalions of sappers, of one hundred and twenty officers and seven thousand and ninety-two men; six companies of miners, of twenty-four officers and five hundred and seventy-six men; and two regiments of pontoniers, of thirty-eight officers and nine hundred and sixty men. On the contrary, the enemy's neglect of these things is one of the most striking of the many faults of the war, and his ill-directed efforts to destroy the great wooden bridge across the Danube, and the successful operations of the French sappers in securing it, formed one of the principal turning points in the campaign.

The same organization enabled the French to perform their wonderfully rapid and decisive movements in the Prussian campaign of 1806, and the northern operations of 1807.

In 1809, Napoleon's army crossed, with the most wonderful rapidity, the Inn, the Salza, the Traun, and other rivers emptying into the Danube, and reached Vienna before the wonder-stricken Austrians could prepare for its defence. It was then necessary for the French to effect a passage of the Danube, which was much swollen by recent rains and the melting snow of the mountains. Considering the depth and width of the river, the positions of the enemy, and his preparations to oppose a passage, with the disastrous consequences that would result to the French from any failure in its execution; taking all these things into consideration, Jomini pronounced it "one of the most hazardous and difficult of all the operations of War." Here the fate of the army depended, apparently, upon the skill and efficiency of the engineers and pontoniers, and nobly did they discharge the trust reposed in them. When the pontons failed, tressel-bridges were substituted, and even fifty-four enormous boats were put in requisition. So skilfully were these operations conducted, that Napoleon's immense army crossed over in safety, directly in the face of a superior enemy, and the same day fought the memorable battle of Esling. Forced to retire before numbers vastly superior to his own, Napoleon concentrated his forces on the island of Lobau, and intrenched his position. Surrounded by the broad and deep channel of the Danube, and watched by numerous and skilful enemies, it required the most constant activity and the greatest good fortune to effect a passage. Here the skill and efficiency of the engineers shone conspicuously; a number of bridges were thrown across the river in the face of the Austrians, and against obstacles almost insurmountable; the whole French army passed in safety, and soon put the finishing stroke to that brilliant campaign. So high an estimate did Napoleon attach to the construction of these bridges, that, when the passage was completed, he offered to place Bertrand, the constructing engineer, though of comparatively low rank, at the head of the French corps du genie.

On many occasions during the retreat in 1812-13, from the Beresina to the left of the Rhine, across the Niemen, the Vistula, the Oder, the Elbe, and the numerous other rivers which divide that immense country, the French derived vast advantages from the experience and skill of their engineers and pontoniers, several times whole corps escaping through their means from the grasp of their pursuers. When, however, the disasters of this retreat had absorbed most of the material of the army, and had sadly thinned the ranks of men of skill and experience, they sustained many severe, and, in other circumstances, unnecessary losses. Of this character we may mention the passage of the Elster by the bridge of Lindnau, where, through the ignorance and carelessness of those charged with the mines, and through the want of suitable bridge arrangements, thousands of brave men were buried in the muddy waters of this small river. So sensibly did Napoleon feel this want of bridge equipages, in the winter of 1813-14, that he addressed to his minister of war, on this subject, the following remarkable words: "If I had had pontons, I should have already annihilated the army of Schwartzenberg, and closed the war; I should have taken from him eight or ten thousand wagons, and his entire army in detail; but for want of the proper means I could not pass the Seine." Again, on the 2d of March he wrote: "If I had had a bridge equipage this morning, Blücher's army had been lost." Whoever will examine the details of the operations of this campaign, will be convinced of the full force of these remarks.

In Spain in 1808, Sir John Moore, in order to assist the native forces, had penetrated so near the army of Napoleon, that retreat became exceedingly difficult, and he was several times on the point of being lost. The English army was at this time very deficient in engineer troops, and Moore suffered much for want of miners to destroy bridges, and pontoniers to construct new ones. In order to cover his retreat and impede the advance of the French, the commander-in-chief, says Napier, "directed several bridges to be destroyed, but the engineers [for want of miners and miner's tools] failed of success in every attempt."

In Soult's retreat, in 1809, he crossed the Duero at Oporto, and destroyed the bridges so as to cut off the pursuit of Wellington. But while Soult, deceived by treachery in his own corps, neglected to guard the river with proper vigilance, Wellington collected boats at different points, crossed over his