Books author - "Immanuel Kant"
* The less a man can be physically forced, and the more he can be morally forced (by the mere idea of duty), so much the freer he is. The man, for example, who is of sufficiently firm resolution and strong mind not to give up an enjoyment which he has resolved on, however much loss is shown as resulting therefrom, and who yet desists from his purpose unhesitatingly, though very reluctantly, when he finds that it would cause him to neglect an official duty or a sick father; this man proves his
nd albeit they all leade us with a common accord to despise povertie, and other accidental! crosses, to whichOmnes eodem cogimur, omnium Versatur urna, serius, ocius Sors exitura, et nos in aeternum Exilium impositura cymbae, [Footnote: Hor. I. iii. Od. iii. 25.] All to one place are driv'n, of all Shak't is the lot-pot, where-hence shall Sooner or later drawne lots fall, And to deaths boat for aye enthrall. And by consequence, if she makes us affeard, it is a continual subject of torment, and
tospecial disfavour of fortune, or the niggardly provision of astep-motherly nature, this will should wholly lack power to accomplishits purpose, if with its greatest efforts it should yet achievenothing, and there should remain only the good will (not, to besure, a mere wish, but the summoning of all means in our power), then,like a jewel, it would still shine by its own light, as a thingwhich has its whole value in itself. Its usefulness or fruitfulnesscan neither add nor take away anything
to laws of the faculty of desire. The faculty of DESIRE is the being's faculty of becoming by means of its ideas the cause of the actual existence of the objects of these ideas. PLEASURE is the idea of the agreement of the object, or the action with the subjective conditions of life, i.e., with the faculty of causality of an idea in respect of the actuality of its object (or with the determination of the forces of the subject to action which produces it). I have no further need for the purposes
fully exhausted in the Critique, it is necessary that, in the proposed work, the same should be the case with their analysis. But this will be rather an amusement than a labour.[*Footnote: In contradistinction to the Metaphysic of Ethics. This work was never published.] PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION, 1787 Whether the treatment of that portion of our knowledge which lies within the province of pure reason advances with that undeviating certainty which characterizes the progress of science, we
* The less a man can be physically forced, and the more he can be morally forced (by the mere idea of duty), so much the freer he is. The man, for example, who is of sufficiently firm resolution and strong mind not to give up an enjoyment which he has resolved on, however much loss is shown as resulting therefrom, and who yet desists from his purpose unhesitatingly, though very reluctantly, when he finds that it would cause him to neglect an official duty or a sick father; this man proves his
nd albeit they all leade us with a common accord to despise povertie, and other accidental! crosses, to whichOmnes eodem cogimur, omnium Versatur urna, serius, ocius Sors exitura, et nos in aeternum Exilium impositura cymbae, [Footnote: Hor. I. iii. Od. iii. 25.] All to one place are driv'n, of all Shak't is the lot-pot, where-hence shall Sooner or later drawne lots fall, And to deaths boat for aye enthrall. And by consequence, if she makes us affeard, it is a continual subject of torment, and
tospecial disfavour of fortune, or the niggardly provision of astep-motherly nature, this will should wholly lack power to accomplishits purpose, if with its greatest efforts it should yet achievenothing, and there should remain only the good will (not, to besure, a mere wish, but the summoning of all means in our power), then,like a jewel, it would still shine by its own light, as a thingwhich has its whole value in itself. Its usefulness or fruitfulnesscan neither add nor take away anything
to laws of the faculty of desire. The faculty of DESIRE is the being's faculty of becoming by means of its ideas the cause of the actual existence of the objects of these ideas. PLEASURE is the idea of the agreement of the object, or the action with the subjective conditions of life, i.e., with the faculty of causality of an idea in respect of the actuality of its object (or with the determination of the forces of the subject to action which produces it). I have no further need for the purposes
fully exhausted in the Critique, it is necessary that, in the proposed work, the same should be the case with their analysis. But this will be rather an amusement than a labour.[*Footnote: In contradistinction to the Metaphysic of Ethics. This work was never published.] PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION, 1787 Whether the treatment of that portion of our knowledge which lies within the province of pure reason advances with that undeviating certainty which characterizes the progress of science, we