An Essay On The Trial By Jury by Lysander Spooner (free ebook reader for android TXT) π
1215 There Has Been No Clearer Principle Of English Or American
Constitutional Law, Than That, In criminal Cases, It Is Not Only The
Right And Duty Of Juries To Judge What Are The Facts, What Is The Law,
And What Was The Moral Intent Of The Accused; But That It Is Also
Their Right, And Their Primary And Paramount Duty, To Judge Of The
Justice Of The Law, And To Hold All Laws Invalid, That Are, In their
Opinion, Unjust Or Oppressive, And All Persons Guiltless In violating,
Or Resisting the Execution Of, Such Laws.
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A Jury. It Is Wholly Improbable That Two Diferent Modes Of Trial, So
Nearly Resembling each Other As This And The Trial By Jury Do, Should
Prevail At The Same Time, And Among A Rude People, Whose Judicial
Proceedings Would Naturally Be Of The Simplest Kind. But If This
Trial Really Were Any Other Than The Trial By Jury, It Must Have Been
Nearly Or Quite Extinct At The Time Of Magna Carta; And There Is No
Probability That It Was Included in "Legem Terrae."
[24] Hallam Says, "It Appears As If The Ordeal Were Permitted to
Persons Already Convicted by The Verdict Of A Jury." 2 Middle
Ages, 446, Note.
[25] Coke Attempts To Show That There Is A Distinction Between
Amercements And Fines Admitting that Amercements Must Be
Fixed by One'S Peers, But, Claiming that, Fines May Be Fixed by The
Government. (2 Inst. 27, 8 Coke'S Reports 38) But There Seems To
Have Been No Ground Whatever For Supposing that Any Such
Distinction Existed at The Time Of Magna Carta. If There Were Any
Such Distinction In the Time Of Coke, It Had Doubtless Grown Up
Within The Four Centuries That Had Elapsed since Magna Carta, And
Is To Be Set Down As One Of The Numberless Inventions Of
Government For Getting rid Of The Restraints Of Magna Carta, And
For Taking men Out Of The Protection Of Their Peers, And Subjecting
Them To Such Punishments As The Government Chooses To Inflict.
The First Statute Of Westminster, Passed sixty Years After Magna
Carta, Treats The Fine And Amercement As Synonymous, As Follows.
"Forasmuch As The Common Fine And Amercement Of The Whole
County In eyre Of The Justices For False Judgments, Or For Other
Trespass, Is Unjustly Assessed by Sheriffs And Baretors In the Shires,
* * It Is Provided, And The King wills, That Frown Henceforth Such
Sums Shall Be Assessed before The Justices In eyre, Afore Their
Chapter 2 (The Trial By Jury, As Defined by Magna Carta) Section 2 (The Language Of Magna Carta) Pg 43Departure, By The Oath Of Knights And Other Honest Men," &C. 3
Edward I., Ch. 18. (1275)
And In many Other Statutes Passed after Magna Carta, The Terms
Fine And Amercement Seem To Be Used indifferently, In prescribing
The Punishments For Offences. As Late As 1461, (246 Years After
Magna Carta,) The Statute 1 Edward Iv., Ch 2, Speaks Of "Fines.,
Ransoms, And Amerciaments" As Being levied upon Criminals, As If
They Were The Common Punishments Of Offences.
St. 2 And 3 Philip And Mary, Ch 8, Uses The Terms, "Fines,
Forfeitures, And Amerciaments" Five Times. (1555)
St. 5 Elizabeth, Ch. 13, Sec. 10, Uses The Terms "Fines, Forfeitures,
And Amerciaments."
That Amercements Were Fines, Or Pecuniary Punishments, Inflicted
For Offences, Is Proved by The Following statutes, (All Supposed to
Have Been Passed within One Hundred and Fifteen Years After
Magna Cart,) Which Speak Of Amercements As A Species Of
"Judgment," Or Punishment, And As Being inflicted for The Same
Offences As Other "Judgments."
Thus One Statute Declares That A Baker, For Default In the Weight Of
His Bread, "Ought To Be Amerced, Or Suffer The Judgment Of The
Pillory; And That A Brewer, For "Selling ale Contrary To The Assize,"
"Ought To Be Amerced, Or Suffer The Judgment Of The Tumbrel," -- 51
Henry Iii., St. 6. (1266)
Among The "Statutes Of Uncertain Date," But Supposed to Be Prior
To Edward Iii., (1326), Are The Following:
Chap. 6 Provides That "If A Brewer Break The Assize, (Fixing the
Price Of Ale,) The First, Second, And Third Time, He Shall Be Amerced;
But The Fourth Time He Shall Suffer Judgment Of The Pillory Without
Redemption."
Chap. 7 Provides That "A Butcher That Selleth Swine'S Flesh
Measeled, Or Flesh Dead Of The Murrain, Or That Buyeth Flesh Of
Jews, And Selleth The Same Unto Christians, After He Shall Be
Convict Thereof, For The First Time He Shall Be Grievously Amerced;
The Second Time He Shall Suffer Judgment Of The Pillory; And The
Third Time He Shall Be Imprisoned and Make Fine; And The Fourth
Time He Shall Forswear The Town."
Chap. 10, A Statute Against Forestalling, Provides That, "He That Is
Convict Thereof, The First Time Shall Be Amerced, And Shall Lose The
Thing so Bought, And That According to The Custom Of The Town; He
That Is Convicted the Second Time Shall Have Judgment Of The
Pillory; At The Third Time He Shall Be Imprisoned and Make Fine; The
Fourth Time He Shall Abjure The Town. And This Judgment Shall Be
Given Upon All Manner Of Forestallers, And Likewise Upon Them That
Have Given Them Counsel, Help, Or Favor." 1 Ruffheads Statutes,
187, 188. 1 Statutes Of The Realm, 203.
Appendix Pg 44[27] Blackstone Says, "Our Ancient Saxon Laws Nominally Punished
Theft With Death, If Above The Value Of Twelve Pence; But The
Criminal Was Permitted to Redeem His Life By A Pecuniary Ransom,
As Among Their Ancestors, The Germans, By A Stated number Of
Cattle. Bit In the Ninth Year Of Henry The First (1109,) This Power Of
Redemption Was Taken Away, And All Persons Guilty Of Larceny
Above The Value Off Twelve Pence Were Directed to Be Hanged,
Which Law Continues In force To This Day." 4 Blackstone, 238
I Give This Statement Of Blackstone, Because The Latter Clause May
Seem To Militate With The Idea, Which The Former Clause
Corroborates, Viz., That At The Time Of Magna Carta, Fines Were The
Usual Punishment Of Offenses. But I Think There Is No Probability
That A Law So Unreasonable In itself, (Unreasonable Even After
Making all Allowance For The Difference In the Value Of Money,)
And So Contrary To Immemorial Custom, Could And Did Obtain Any
General Or Speedy Acquiescence Among A People Who Cared little
For The Authority Of Kings.
Maddox, Writing of The Period From William The Conqueror To
John, Says: "The Amercement In criminal And Common Pleas,
Which Were Wont To Be Imposed during this First Period And
Afterwards, Were Of So Many Several Sorts, That It Is Not Easy To
Place Them Under Distinct Heads. Let Them, For Methods' Sake, Be
Reduced to The Heads Following: Amercements For Or By Reason Of
Murders And Manslaughters, For Misdemeanors, For Disseisins, For
Recreancy, For Breach Of Assize, For Defaults, For Non-Appearance,
For False Judgment, And For Not Making suit, Or Hue And Cry. To
Them May Be Added miscellaneous Amercements, For Trespasses Of
Divers Kinds." 1 Maddox' History Of The Exchequer, 542.
[28] Coke, In his Exposition Of The Words Legem Terrae, Gives Quite
In Detail The Principles Of The Common Law Governing arrests, And
Takes It For Granted that The Words "Nisi Per Legem Terre" Are
Applicable To Arrests, As Well As To The Indictment, &C. 2 Inst., 51,
52.
[29] I Cite The Above Extract From Mr. Hallam Solely For The Sake Of
His Authority For Rendering the Word Vel By And; And Not By Any
Means For The Purpose Of Indorsing the Opinion He Suggests, That
Legem Terrae Authorized "Judgments By Default Or Demurrer,*'
Appendix Pg 45Without The Intervention Of A Jury. He Seems To Imagine That Lex
Terrae, The Common Law, At The Time Of Magna Carta, Included
Everything, Even To The Practice Of Courts, That Is, At This Day, Called
By The Name Of Common Law; Whereas Much Of What Is Now
Called common Law Has Grown Up, By Usurpation, Since The Time
Of Magna Carta, In palpable Violation Of The Authority Of That
Charter. He Says, "Certainly There Are Many Legal Procedures,
Besides Trial By Jury, Through Which A Party'S Goods Or Person May
Be Taken." Of Course There Are Now Many Such Ways, In which A
Party'S Goods Or Person Are Taken, Besides By The Judgment Of A
Jury; But The Question Is, Whether Such Takings Are Not In violation
Of Magna Carta.
He Seems To Think That, In cases Of "Judgment By Default Or
Demurrer," There Is No Need of A Jury, And Thence To Infer That
Legem Terrae May Not Have Required a Jury In those Cases. But This
Opinion Is Founded on The Erroneous Idea That Juries Are Required
Only For Determining contested facts, And Not For Judging of The
Law. In case Of Default, The Plaintif Must Present A Prima Facie Case
Before He Is Entitled to A Judgment; And Magna Carta, (Supposing it
To Require A Jury Trial In civil Cases, As Mr. Hallam Assumes That It
Does,) As Much Requires That This Prima Facie Case, Both Law And
Fact, Be Made Out To The Satisfaction Of A Jury, As It Does That A
Contested case Shall Be.
As For A Demurrer, The Jury Must Try A Demurrer (Having the Advice
And Assistance Of The Court, Of Course) As Much As Any Other Matter
Of Law Arising in a Case.
Mr. Hallam Evidently Thinks There Is No Use For A Jury, Except
Where There Is A "Trial" Meaning thereby A Contest On Matters Of
Fact. His Language Is, That "There Are Many Legal Procedures,
Besides Trial By Jury, Through Which A Party'S Goods Or Person May
Be Taken." Now Magna Carta Says Nothing of Trial By Jury; But Only
Of The Judgment, Or Sentence, Of A Jury. It Is Only By Inference That
We Come To The Conclusion That There Must Be A Trial By Jury. Since
The Jury Alone Can Give The Judgment, Or Sentence, We Infer That
They Must Try The Case; Because Otherwise They Would Be
Incompetent, And Would Have No Moral Right, To Give Judgment.
They Must, Therefore, Examine The Grounds, (Both Of Law And Fact,)
Or Rather Try The Grounds, Of Every Action Whatsoever, Whether It Be
Decided on "Default, Demurrer," Or Otherwise, And Render Their
Judgment, Or Sentence, Thereon, Before Any Judgment Can Be A Legal
One, On Which "To Take A Party'S Goods Or Person." In short, The
Principle Of Magna Carta Is, That No Judgment Can Be Valid Against
A Party'S Goods Or Person, (Not Even A Judgment For Costs,) Except A
Judgment Rendered by A Jury. Of Course A Jury Must Try Every
Question, Both Of Law And Fact, That Is Involved in the Rendering of
That Judgment. They Are To Have The Assistance And Advice Of The
Judges, So Far As They Desire Them; But The Judgment Itself Must Be
Theirs, And Not The Judgment Of The Court.
As To "Process Of Attachment For Contempt," It Is Of Course Lawful
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