William Pitt and the Great War by John Holland Rose (book club reads txt) 📕

of Venice and the Sultan's

dominions, and deprecated a compact with "this last adventurer in the

lottery of Revolutions.... As a sincere lover of peace," he added, "I

will not sacrifice it by grasping at the shadow, when the reality is not

substantially within my reach. _Cur igitur pacem nolo? Quia infida est,

quia periculosa, quia esse non potest._"[526] In reply to a verbal

challenge from Tierney a fortnight later, he fired off an harangue which

ranks among the ablest and most fervid of improvisations. The Whig

leader having defied him to state in one sentence without _ifs_ and

_buts_ the object of the war, Pitt flung back the retort:

 

    ... I know not whether I can do it in one sentence, but in one

    word I can tell him that it is security; security against a

    danger the greatest that ever threatened the world; ... against

    a danger which has been resisted by all the nations of Europe,

    and resisted by none with so much success as by this nation,

    because by none has it been resisted so uniformly and with so

    much energy.... How or where did the honourable gentleman

    discover that the Jacobinism of Robespierre, of Barère, of the

    Triumvirate, of the Five Directors, which he acknowledged to be

    real, has vanished and disappeared because it has all been

    centred and condensed into one man, who was reared and nursed in

    its bosom, whose celebrity was gained under its auspices, who

    was at once the child and champion of all its atrocities and

    horrors? Our security in negotiation is to be this Buonaparte,

    who is now the sole organ of all that was formerly dangerous and

    pestiferous in the Revolution.... _If_ peace afford no prospect

    of security; _if_ it threaten all the evils which we have been

    struggling to avert; _if_ the prosecution of the war afford the

    prospect of attaining complete security; and _if_ it may be

    prosecuted with increasing commerce, with increasing means, and

    with increasing prosperity, except what may result from the

    visitations of the seasons; then I say it is prudent in us not

    to negotiate at the present moment. These are my _buts_ and my

    _ifs_. This is my plea, and on no other do I wish to be tried by

    God and my country.

 

One who heard that spirited retort left on record the profound

impression which it produced on the House.[527]

 

Seeing that Bonaparte was then known merely as an able _condottiere_,

not as the re-organizer of French society, Pitt's haughty attitude,

though deplorable, is intelligible. The prospects of the war were not

unfavourable. He hoped that Austria, now about to invade Nice and Savoy,

would be able by her own efforts to reduce France within her old limits,

England's duty being to offer help on the Riviera, to make a dash at

Brest, and to seize Belleisle as a base of supplies for the Breton

royalists, now once more in revolt. It is significant that Dundas wrote

to Pitt on 4th January expressing his belief that Bonaparte must be

serious in his desire for peace because he had no other game to

play.[528]

 

Many influences conspired to mar these hopes. The enterprises against

Brest and Belleisle proved to be impracticable, and a landing at

Quiberon failed because the Breton rising occurred too soon. The

royalists of Provence did not rise at all. An attempt by Sir James

Pulteney and a small force upon Ferrol was an utter failure. All the

operations were paralysed by uncertainty as to the future conduct of

Russia. The indignation of the Czar against Austria extended to England

after the failure of the joint expedition to Holland; and his testiness

increased owing to maritime disputes and the friction caused by the

outrages of his troops in the Channel Islands. In the Riviera the

Austrians continued their successes, and finally shut up Masséna in

Genoa, where the British fleet rendered valuable service. But it is not

surprising to find Grenville writing on 10th April to Dundas: "For God's

sake, for your own honour, and for the cause in which we are engaged, do

not let us, after having by immense exertions collected a fine army,

leave it unemployed, gaping after messengers from Genoa, Augsburg, and

Vienna till the moment for acting is irrecoverably passed by."

 

This, however, was the outcome of events. The French, acting on interior

lines, and propelled by the will of Bonaparte, utterly crushed these

sporadic efforts. The Royalists were quelled or pacified, the coasts

were well guarded, while the First Consul, crossing the Great St.

Bernard, overthrew the Austrians at Marengo (14th June). Before long

Naples made peace with the conqueror. Meanwhile the Sea Power, operating

on diverse coasts, delayed, but did not reverse, the progress of the

French arms. British forces for a time defended Portugal and held

Minorca and the citadel of Messina, but without any appreciable effect

on Spain or Italy. The fleet played an important part in starving out

the French garrisons of Genoa and Valetta. But elsewhere the action, or

inaction, of the British forces was discreditable. True, the conditions

were adverse, but an army numbering more than 80,000 men, and costing

nearly £10,000,000 sterling, should have accomplished something in

Europe.

 

Only at one point did the British arms win a decisive success. The

French occupation of Egypt had aroused the apprehensions of Dundas for

India; and throughout the year 1800 he continued to urge an expedition

to Egypt, though other Ministers inclined to put it off. Finally, when

Bonaparte's triumph at Marengo shattered all hopes of an Austrian

invasion of Provence, and the surrender of Valetta, early in September,

set free the British squadron long blockading that port, Dundas pressed

the Egyptian project in a letter to Pitt, dated Wimbledon, 19th

September 1800. The gist of it is as follows:[529]

 

    On reconsidering the discussion on Egypt at the Cabinet meeting

    of yesterday, I am impressed by the danger of delaying action.

    The importance of expelling the French from Egypt is obvious;

    for it is clear that Bonaparte will subordinate every object to

    the retention of that colony. The danger to India may not be

    immediate, but it must be faced. Besides, our sacrifice of

    Turkish interests to those of Austria [that is, by refusing to

    ratify the Franco-Turkish Convention of El Arish] may induce the

    Sultan to bargain with France on terms very unfavourable to us.

    Or, again, France and Russia may plan a partition of the Ottoman

    Empire. The objections, that we are pledged to do what we can

    for Portugal and Austria, are not vital. For Portugal is safe

    while the Viennese Court opposes France; and by our subsidies

    and naval help we have borne our fair share in the Coalition.

    Further efforts in that direction will be fruitless. We must now

    see to our own interests. By occupying all the posts of Egypt,

    we can coop up the French and force them to capitulate. Action

    must not be postponed for any consideration whatever.

 

The opinion of Dundas soon prevailed; for, on 6th October, Grenville

wrote that the Egyptian Expedition was decided on. As is well known, the

joint efforts of forces from England, India, and the Cape of Good Hope

brought about the surrender of the French garrisons, and the acquisition

for the British Museum of the treasures designed for the Louvre. This

brilliant result was in the last instance due to Abercromby, Hutchinson,

Popham, and their coadjutors. But the enterprise resulted from the

untiring championship of the interests of India by Dundas. Long

afterwards at Perthshire dinner-tables he used to tell with pride how

George III once proposed a toast to the Minister who planned the

expedition to Egypt and in doing so had the courage to oppose not only

his colleagues but his King.

 

As the year 1800 drew to its close, the opposition of the Baltic Powers

to the British maritime code became most threatening. The questions at

issue are too technical to be discussed here. Pitt and his colleagues

believed the maintenance of the rights of search and of the seizure of

an enemy's goods on neutral ships to be essential to the existence of

England. For this view of the case much was to be said. In every war

France used neutral ships in order to get supplies; and the neutrals

themselves sought to filch trade from British merchants. Now, to hinder

or destroy the commerce of the enemy, and to prevent neutrals from

bringing naval stores to his ports, were the only means of bringing

pressure from the sea upon the dominant Land Power. In a strife for life

or death Pitt and his colleagues perforce made use of every weapon, even

to the detriment of non-combatants. This stiff attitude, however,

contrasted with that of Bonaparte, who, in July 1800 flattered the Czar

by sending back Russian prisoners and by offering to cede Malta to him.

Paul, not knowing that the fall of Valetta was imminent, was duped by

this device; and, a few weeks later, occurred the rupture between Russia

and England.

 

Thus, within a year, the Second Coalition against France went to pieces,

and was succeeded by a league against England. Thanks to the victory of

Nelson at Copenhagen and the murder of the Czar Paul in the spring of

1801, that unnatural alliance speedily collapsed. These events, however,

belong to a time subsequent to Pitt's resignation of office, after the

completion of the union with Ireland, to which we must now return.

Enough has been said to show the statesmanlike nature of his plans for

the vindication of European independence. The intrigues of Thugut, the

selfish isolation of Prussia, and the mad oscillations of Paul marred

those plans and left the Continent a prey to the unbridled ambition of

Bonaparte, from which it was to be saved only after a decade of

exhausting wars.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

[502] "F. O.," Austria, 51; "Dropmore P.," iv, 170. The French took

nearly 33,000,000 francs from the Swiss cantonal treasuries.

 

[503] Pitt MSS., 108.

 

[504] "Dropmore P.," iv, 166, 172; "F. O.," Austria, 51. Grenville to

Eden, 20th April.

 

[505] The Earl of Crawford's MSS.

 

[506] "F. O.," Russia, 40. Whitworth to Grenville, 6th August 1798.

 

[507] See my Introduction to "The History of Malta, 1798-1815," by the

late W. Hardman.

 

[508] "Dropmore P.," iv, 344, 355.

 

[509] See Rose, "Napoleonic Studies," 54-8, for this despatch of 16th

November 1798.

 

[510] For a fuller account see "Camb. Mod. Hist.," viii, ch. xxi, by the

present writer.

 

[511] "F. O.," Russia, 42. Despatches of 2nd, 8th and 25th January 1799.

 

[512] Huffer, "Quellen," i, 23-9.

 

[513] "Dropmore P.," iv, 297, 338, 505; "F. O.," Russia, 42.

 

[514] "F. O.," Russia, 42. Whitworth to Grenville, 29th March.

 

[515] "F. O.," Russia, 43. Grenville to Whitworth, 23rd June.

 

[516] G. Caudrillier, "L'Association royaliste ... et la Conspiration

anglaise en France" (Paris, 1908); Wickham, "Corresp.," ii, _passim_.

 

[517] B.M. Add. MSS., 37844.

 

[518] "Dropmore P.," v, 400. I propose to examine this campaign in "Pitt

and Napoleon Miscellanies."

 

[519] "F. O.," Russia, 43. Whitworth to Grenville, 23rd June 1799;

"Dropmore P.," v, 133, 259; Windham, "Diary," 411. On 22nd July Windham

urged Pitt to send a force to help the Bretons rather than to Holland.

"If we succeed in France, Holland falls of course, but not _vice versa_"

(Pitt MSS., 190).

 

[520] Pretyman MSS.

 

[521] That of Bruix, which after entering the Mediterranean, returned to

Brest on 13th August along with the Spanish fleet.

 

[522] The Earl of Crawford's MSS.

 

[523] Fortescue, iv, 662, 673-6; Bunbury, "Narrative of the War

(1799-1810)," 50. Hermann wrote to the Emperor blaming the British for

not supporting his advance ("Dropmore P.," v, 425); but on 10th October

Paul dismissed him from the Russian service ("F. O.," Russia, 44).

 

[524] "Dropmore P.," v, 446.

 

[525] See Rose, "Napoleon I," 240-2.

 

[526] Cicero, Seventh Philippic, ch. iii.

 

[527] The father of the present Master of Trinity College, Cambridge.

See his work, "Ten Great and Good Men," 49.

 

[528] Pretyman MSS.

 

[529] Pretyman MSS.