William Pitt and the Great War by John Holland Rose (book club reads txt) 📕

 

 

[476] Pitt MSS., 108. See "Pitt and Napoleon Miscellanies," for a fuller

investigation of the Fitzwilliam affair in the light of new evidence.

 

[477] Lecky, vii, 41-4.

 

[478] "Dropmore P.," iii, 35-8.

 

[479] Pitt MSS., 331.

 

[480] Quoted by Froude, "The English in Ireland," iii, 158-61.

 

[481] "Autobiography of Wolfe Tone," ii, chs. iv-vi; Guillon, "La France

et l'Irlande."

 

[482] "Mems. of Ld. E. Fitzgerald," ch. xx.

 

[483] Tone, "Autob.," ii, 99.

 

[484] "Report of the Comm. of Secrecy" (1799), 22, 25; W. J.

Fitzpatrick, "Secret Service under Pitt," ch. x; C. L. Falkiner,

"Studies in Irish History," ch. iv; "Castlereagh Corresp.," i, 270-88.

 

[485] "Lord Colchester's Diary," i, 103.

 

[486] B.M. Add. MSS., 34454.

 

[487] Pitt MSS., 326. Quoted with other extracts from Camden's letters,

in "Pitt and Napoleon Miscellanies."

 

[488] Tone, "Autob.," ii, 272.

 

[489] "Castlereagh Corresp.," i, 165-8.

 

[490] B.M. Add. MSS., 27808; "Report of the Comm. of Secrecy" (1799),

App. x; "Nap. Corresp.," iii, 486-92. For Place see _ante_, ch. vii.

 

[491] W. J. Fitzpatrick, "Secret Service under Pitt," ch. iii; "Report

of the Comm. of Secrecy" (1799), App. xxvi. For Despard, the plotter of

1802, see "Castlereagh Corresp.," i, 306, 326; ii, 4.

 

[492] "Auckland Journals," iv, 52. I have published the statements of

O'Connor, etc., and the news sent by a British agent at Hamburg, in the

"Eng. Hist. Rev." for October 1910.

 

[493] Pitt MSS., 324; B.M. Add. MSS., 27808; "Dropmore P.," iv, 167. On

24th May 1798 Thelwall wrote to Thos. Hardy from Llyswen, near

Brecknock, describing his rustic retreat, and requesting a new pair of

farmer's boots for "Stella." He hopes that O'Connor has returned in

triumph to his friends. Tierney's vote in favour of suspending the

Habeas Corpus Act does not surprise him, for he is vulgar and a

sycophant. Hardy is too angry with Sheridan, whose chief offence is in

going at all to the House of Commons. Sheridan surely does well in

encouraging the people to resist an invasion. "I remain steady to my

point--'no nation can be free but by its own efforts.' As for the French

Directory and its faction, nothing appears to me to be further from

their design than to leave one atom of liberty either to their own or to

any nation. If, however, Mr. Sheridan supposes that all his talents can

produce even a temporary unanimity while the present crew are in power,

even for repelling the most inveterate enemy, he will find himself

miserably mistaken. No such unanimity ever can exist: I am convinced,

nay, the Ministers themselves seem determined, that it _shall_ not. The

only way to produce the unanimity desired is to stand aloof, and let

these ruffians go blundering on till our most blessed and gracious

sovereign shall see that either Pitt and Co. must bow down to the will

of the people or his British crown bow down to five French shillings....

But what have we to do with Directories or politics? Peaceful shades of

Llyswen! shelter me beneath your luxuriant foliage: lull me to

forgetfulness, ye murmuring waters of the Wye. Let me be part farmer and

fisherman. But no more politics--no more politics in this bad world!"

(From Mr. A. M. Broadley's MSS.)

 

[494] Pretyman MSS. See, too, "Diary of Sir J. Moore," i, ch. xi.

 

[495] "Castlereagh Corresp.," i, 458-67; "Life and Letters of Lady Sarah

Lennox," ii, 299-302; "Mems. of Lord E. Fitzgerald," chs. 27-30.

 

[496] B.M. Add. MSS., 34454.

 

[497] "Dropmore P.," iv, 230, 239.

 

[498] B.M. Add. MSS., 34454. News received through Sir F. d'Ivernois.

 

[499] Pretyman MSS. The King also stated that Pitt had "saved Ireland"

by persuading Pelham to return and act as Chief Secretary. Pelham was a

clever man, but often disabled by ill health.

 

[500] J. Alexander, "... Rebellion in Wexford" (Dublin, 1800).

 

[501] "Cornwallis Corresp.," ii, 395-404. For the panic in Dublin see

"Dropmore P.," iv, 289 _et seq._ Cooke wrote to Castlereagh on 28th

September that the Bishop of Killala and his family were saved from

slaughter by a few French officers, "who execrate our savages more than

they whom they have plundered." He adds that though the United Irishmen

began the plot the Catholics are turning it solely to their own

interests (Pitt MSS., 327). See, too, H. F. B. Wheeler and A. M.

Broadley, "The War in Wexford" (1910).

 

CHAPTER XVII (THE SECOND COALITION)

 

    To reduce France within her ancient limits is an object of

    evident and pressing interest to the future tranquillity and

    independence of Europe.--_Foreign Office Despatch of 16th

    November 1798_.

 

 

It is difficult to realize that the independence of Europe was

endangered by the French Republic. We associate the ascendancy of France

in Spain, Italy, Germany, Switzerland, and Holland with the personality

of Napoleon; and by contrasting him with the pygmies who strutted on the

stage after the death of Pitt we find the collapse of Europe

intelligible. But a backward glance of one decade more shows France

dominating the Continent. True, it was Bonaparte's genius which brought

Austria to the humiliating Peace of Campo Formio (October 1797); but his

triumphs in Italy merely crowned the efforts of France in 1793-5. After

the close of his Italian campaigns a touch of her little finger unseated

the Pope. At the Congress of Rastatt her envoys disposed of German

duchies and bishoprics in the lordliest way. Switzerland she overran,

plundered, and unified. Ferdinand IV of Naples and his consort, Maria

Carolina, quaked and fumed at her threats. Prussia was her henchman. And

in the first months of his reign Paul I of Russia courted her favour.

French policy controlled Europe from the Niemen to the Tagus, from the

Zuyder Zee to the Campagna.

 

Yet this supremacy was in reality unsound. So fitful a ruler as the Czar

Paul was certain to weary of his peaceful mood. He had good ground for

intervention. By the Treaty of Teschen (1779) Russia became one of the

guarantors of the Germanic System which the French now set at naught.

Moreover his chivalrous instincts, inherited from his mother, Catharine,

were chafed by the news of French depredations in Rome and Switzerland.

The growth of indignation at St. Petersburg begot new hopes at Vienna.

In truth Francis II, despite his timidity, could not acquiesce in French

ascendancy. How could his motley States cohere, if from Swabia,

Switzerland, and Italy there dropped on them the corrosive acid of

democracy? The appeals from his father-in-law, Ferdinand of Naples, also

had some weight. In fine the Court of Vienna decided to make overtures

to London. On 17th March 1798 the Chancellor, Thugut, urged his

ambassador, Stahremberg, to find out whether England would help Austria

against "a fierce nation irrevocably determined on the total subversion

of Europe, and rapidly marching to that end"; also whether Pitt would

send a fleet to the Mediterranean, and, if necessary, prolong the

struggle into the year 1799.[502] The entreaties from Naples were still

more urgent.

 

Pitt resolved to stretch out a helping hand. Early in April he sought to

induce Earl Spencer, First Lord of the Admiralty, to send to that sea a

strong squadron detached from Earl St. Vincent's force blockading Cadiz.

His letter asking for information on several topics is missing; but

Spencer's letter to Grenville throws so much light on the situation that

I quote parts of it, summarizing the remainder:[503]

 

                                      Admiralty, _April 6, 1798_.

 

    "I send you by Mr. Pitt's desire a sketch I have made out of

    answers to the queries he put down upon paper yesterday in

    Downing Street. The result is to my mind a decision which I fear

    will not tally very well with our wishes and the views you have

    formed as the groundwork of the communication at present

    proposed with Vienna." He then states that, even if a Russian

    squadron appears in the North Sea, yet we cannot keep a

    permanent squadron in the Mediterranean. "For that purpose we

    should at least have 70 sail, as the Channel cannot be trusted

    with safety with less than 35, including the coast of Ireland,

    and the remaining 35 would be but barely enough to watch Cadiz

    and command the Mediterranean. Our best plan appears to me to be

    to maintain as long as we can a position between Lisbon and

    Cadiz, and when we are excluded (which I conclude we soon shall

be) from the Tagus, to send Lord St. Vincent with the fleet he

    now has to take a sweep round the Mediterranean and do all the

    mischief he can to the French navy." If, he adds, the Spaniards

    come northward, our home fleet can deal with them: if they go to

    the Mediterranean and join the French there will not be much

    danger from so ill-combined a force when opposed to St.

    Vincent's fleet, "which I consider as being the best formed to

    act together that perhaps ever existed." If Austria would be

    satisfied with our sweeping round the Mediterranean, Spencer

    advocates that plan, but not that of keeping a fleet there,

    "because, exclusive of the great expense, it would leave the

    Spaniards too much at liberty."

 

    In answer to Pitt's questions Spencer states the force

    disposable for the Channel and the coast of Ireland as 34, for

    the Mediterranean 24; 3 more were fitting for sea, and 8 others

    were nearing completion; but the chief deficiency was in men,

    8,000 more being needed. He adds that the Neapolitans have 4

    sail-of-the-line and 7 frigates: the French have 6 sail at

    Corfu; but he thinks not more than 10 sail can be equipped at

    Toulon. He regards the Venetian fleet as valueless.

 

Clearly Spencer underrated the force at Toulon and in the ports of North

Italy. But, even so, the position was critical. To send an undermanned

fleet into the Mediterranean, while France was preparing a blow at

Ireland, seemed almost foolhardy. Nevertheless, Pitt resolved to do so.

For, as he stated to Grenville on 7th April, they must encourage Austria

to play a decisive part in resisting French aggression; and, in view of

the revival of the old English spirit, he was prepared to brave the

risks of invasion, deeming even that event preferable to a lingering and

indecisive war. As usual, Pitt's view prevailed; and a few days later

orders went forth to St. Vincent to despatch a squadron under Nelson to

the Mediterranean, Austria being also apprised of this decision, in

terms which implied the formation of a league against France. While

Russia and, if possible, Prussia defended Germany, Austria was to expel

the French from Italy.[504] Here again Pitt's hopeful nature led him to

antedate the course of events. The new Coalition came about very slowly.

England and Austria were held apart by disputes respecting the repayment

of the last loan, on which Pitt and Grenville insisted, perhaps with

undue rigour. Distrust of Prussia paralysed the Court of Vienna, and

some time elapsed before it came to terms with Russia. But in the midst

of the haggling came news which brought new vigour to the old

monarchies.

 

On 1st August 1798 Nelson destroyed the French fleet in Aboukir Bay;

and thus, at one blow, naval supremacy in the Mediterranean passed from

the tricolour to the Union Jack. This momentous change resulted

primarily from the bold resolve of Pitt to encounter even a French

descent on our coasts, provided that he could strike at France in the

Mediterranean. Thus he exchanged the defensive for the offensive in a

way no less bewildering to the French than reassuring to friendly

Powers; and it is noteworthy that he adopted the same course in 1805, in

sending Craig's expedition into that sea, thereby replacing Addington's

tame acceptance of events by a vigorous policy which heartened Austria

and Naples for the struggle against Napoleon. On both occasions he ran

great risks, but his audacity proved to be the highest prudence. The

results of the Battle of the Nile were immeasurably great. Bonaparte and

his 30,000 veterans were cooped up in Egypt. The Maltese rose against

the French garrison of Valetta two days