Unconscious Memory(Fiscle Part-3) by Samuel Butler (classic books to read .TXT) 📕

But It Does Not Follow That The Action Of Two People Who Have Had

Tolerably Similar Antecedents And Are Placed In Tolerably Similar

Circumstances Should Be More Unlike Each Other In This Second Case

Than In The First.  On The Contrary,  Nothing Is More Common Than To

Observe The Same Kind Of People Making The Same Kind Of Mistake When

Placed For The First Time In The Same Kind Of New Circumstances.  I

Did Not Say That There Would Be No Sameness Of Action Without Memory

Of A Like Present.  There May Be Sameness Of Action Proceeding From A

Memory,  Conscious Or Unconscious,  Of Like Antecedents,  And A Presence

Only Of Like Presents Without Recollection Of The Same.

The Sameness Of Action Of Like Persons Placed Under Like

Circumstances For The First Time,  Resembles The Sameness Of Action Of

Inorganic Matter Under The Same Combinations.  Let Us For The Moment

Suppose What We Call Non-Living Substances To Be Capable Of

Remembering Their Antecedents,  And That The Changes They Undergo Are

The Expressions Of Their Recollections.  Then I Admit,  Of Course,

That There Is Not Memory In Any Cream,  We Will Say,  That Is About To

Be Churned Of The Cream Of The Preceding Week,  But The Common Absence

Of Such Memory From Each Week's Cream Is An Element Of Sameness

Between The Two.  And Though No Cream Can Remember Having Been

Churned Before,  Yet All Cream In All Time Has Had Nearly Identical

Antecedents,  And Has Therefore Nearly The Same Memories,  And Nearly

The Same Proclivities.  Thus,  In Fact,  The Cream Of One Week Is As

Truly The Same As The Cream Of Another Week From The Same Cow,

Pasture,  &C.,  As Anything Is Ever The Same With Anything; For The

Having Been Subjected To Like Antecedents Engenders The Closest

Similarity That We Can Conceive Of,  If The Substances Were Like To

Start With.

The Manifest Absence Of Any Connecting Memory (Or Memory Of Like

Presents) From Certain Of The Phenomena Of Heredity,  Such As,  For

Example,  The Diseases Of Old Age,  Is Now Seen To Be No Valid Reason

For Saying That Such Other And Far More Numerous And Important

Phenomena As Those Of Embryonic Development Are Not Phenomena Of

Memory.  Growth And The Diseases Of Old Age Do Indeed,  At First

Sight,  Appear To Stand On The Same Footing,  But Reflection Shows Us

That The Question Whether A Certain Result Is Due To Memory Or No

Must Be Settled Not By Showing That Combinations Into Which Memory

Does Not Certainly Enter May Yet Generate Like Results,  And Therefore

Considering The Memory Theory Disposed Of,  But By The Evidence We May

Be Able To Adduce In Support Of The Fact That The Second Agent Has

Actually Remembered The Conduct Of The First,  Inasmuch As He Cannot

Be Supposed Able To Do What It Is Plain He Can Do,  Except Under The

Guidance Of Memory Or Experience,  And Can Also Be Shown To Have Had

Every Opportunity Of Remembering.  When Either Of These Tests Fails,

Similarity Of Action On The Part Of Two Agents Need Not Be Connected

With Memory Of A Like Present As Well As Of Like Antecedents,  But

Must,  Or At Any Rate May,  Be Referred To Memory Of Like Antecedents

Only.

Returning To A Parenthesis A Few Pages Back,  In Which I Said That

Consciousness Of Memory Would Be Less Or Greater According To The

Greater Or Fewer Number Of Times That The Act Had Been Repeated,  It

May Be Observed As A Corollary To This,  That The Less Consciousness

Of Memory The Greater The Uniformity Of Action,  And Vice Versa.  For

The Less Consciousness Involves The Memory's Being More Perfect,

Through A Larger Number (Generally) Of Repetitions Of The Act That Is

Remembered; There Is Therefore A Less Proportionate Difference In

Respect Of The Number Of Recollections Of This Particular Act Between

The Most Recent Actor And The Most Recent But One.  This Is Why Very

Old Civilisations,  As Those Of Many Insects,  And The Greater Number

Of Now Living Organisms,  Appear To The Eye Not To Change At All.

For Example,  If An Action Has Been Performed Only Ten Times,  We Will

Say By A,  B,  C,  &C.,  Who Are Similar In All Respects,  Except That A

Acts Without Recollection,  B With Recollection Of A's Action,  C With

Recollection Of Both B's And A's,  While J Remembers The Course Taken

By A,  B,  C,  D,  E,  F,  G,  H,  And I--The Possession Of A Memory By B

Will Indeed So Change His Action,  As Compared With A's,  That It May

Well Be Hardly Recognisable.  We Saw This In Our Example Of The Clerk

Who Asked The Policeman The Way To The Eating-House On One Day,  But

Did Not Ask Him The Next,  Because He Remembered; But C's Action Will

Not Be So Different From B's As B's From A's,  For Though C Will Act

With A Memory Of Two Occasions On Which The Action Has Been

Performed,  While B Recollects Only The Original Performance By A,  Yet

B And C Both Act With The Guidance Of A Memory And Experience Of Some

Kind,  While A Acted Without Any.  Thus The Clerk Referred To In

Chapter X. Will Act On The Third Day Much As He Acted On The Second--

That Is To Say,  He Will See The Policeman At The Corner Of The

Street,  But Will Not Question Him.

When The Action Is Repeated By J For The Tenth Time,  The Difference

Between J's Repetition Of It And I's Will Be Due Solely To The

Difference Between A Recollection Of Nine Past Performances By J

Against Only Eight By I,  And This Is So Much Proportionately Less

Than The Difference Between A Recollection Of Two Performances And Of

Only One,  That A Less Modification Of Action Should Be Expected.  At

The Same Time Consciousness Concerning An Action Repeated For The

Tenth Time Should Be Less Acute Than On The First Repetition.

Memory,  Therefore,  Though Tending To Disturb Similarity Of Action

Less And Less Continually,  Must Always Cause Some Disturbance.  At

The Same Time The Possession Of A Memory On The Successive

Repetitions Of An Action After The First,  And,  Perhaps,  The First Two

Or Three,  During Which The Recollection May Be Supposed Still

Imperfect,  Will Tend To Ensure Uniformity,  For It Will Be One Of The

Elements Of Sameness In The Agents--They Both Acting By The Light Of

Experience And Memory.

During The Embryonic Stages And In Childhood We Are Almost Entirely

Under The Guidance Of A Practised And Powerful Memory Of

Circumstances Which Have Been Often Repeated,  Not Only In Detail And

Piecemeal,  But As A Whole,  And Under Many Slightly Varying

Conditions; Thus The Performance Has Become Well Averaged And Matured

In Its Arrangements,  So As To Meet All Ordinary Emergencies.  We

Therefore Act With Great Unconsciousness And Vary Our Performances

Little.  Babies Are Much More Alike Than Persons Of Middle Age.

Up To The Average Age At Which Our Ancestors Have Had Children During

Many Generations,  We Are Still Guided In Great Measure By Memory; But

The Variations In External Circumstances Begin To Make Themselves

Perceptible In Our Characters.  In Middle Life We Live More And More

Continually Upon The Piecing Together Of Details Of Memory Drawn From

Our Personal Experience,  That Is To Say,  Upon The Memory Of Our Own

Antecedents; And This Resembles The Kind Of Memory We Hypothetically

Attached To Cream A Little Time Ago.  It Is Not Surprising,  Then,

That A Son Who Has Inherited His Father's Tastes And Constitution,

And Who Lives Much As His Father Had Done,  Should Make The Same

Mistakes As His Father Did When He Reaches His Father's Age--We Will

Say Of Seventy--Though He Cannot Possibly Remember His Father's

Having Made The Mistakes.  It Were To Be Wished We Could,  For Then We

Might Know Better How To Avoid Gout,  Cancer,  Or What Not.  And It Is

To Be Noticed That The Developments Of Old Age Are Generally Things

We Should Be Glad Enough To Avoid If We Knew How To Do So.

If We Observed The Resemblance Between Successive Generations To Be

As Close As That Between Distilled Water And Distilled Water Through

All Time,  And If We Observed That Perfect Unchangeableness In The

Action Of Living Beings Which We See In What We Call Chemical And

Mechanical Combinations,  We Might Indeed Suspect That Memory Had As

Little Place Among The Causes Of Their Action As It Can Have In

Anything,  And That Each Repetition,  Whether Of A Habit Or The

Practice Of Art,  Or Of An Embryonic Process In Successive

Generations,  Was An Original Performance,  For All That Memory Had To

Do With It.  I Submit,  However,  That In The Case Of The Reproductive

Forms Of Life We See Just So Much Variety,  In Spite Of Uniformity,  As

Is Consistent With A Repetition Involving Not Only A Nearly Perfect

Similarity In The Agents And Their Circumstances,  But Also The Little

Departure Therefrom That Is Inevitably Involved In The Supposition

That A Memory Of Like Presents As Well As Of Like Antecedents (As

Distinguished From A Memory Of Like Antecedents Only) Has Played A

Part In Their Development--A Cyclonic Memory,  If The Expression May

Be Pardoned.

There Is Life Infinitely Lower And More Minute Than Any Which Our

Most Powerful Microscopes Reveal To Us,  But Let Us Leave This Upon

One Side And Begin With The Amoeba.  Let Us Suppose That This

Structureless Morsel Of Protoplasm Is,  For All Its Structurelessness,

Composed Of An Infinite Number Of Living Molecules,  Each One Of Them

With Hopes And Fears Of Its Own,  And All Dwelling Together Like Tekke

Turcomans,  Of Whom We Read That