A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1 by Surendranath Dasgupta (desktop ebook reader txt) 📕
The Vedas and their antiquity.
The sacred books of India, the Vedas, are generally believed to be the earliest literary record of the Indo-European race. It is indeed difficult to say when the earliest portions of these compositions came into existence. Many shrewd guesses have been offered, but none of them can be proved to be incontestably true. Max Müller supposed the date to be 1200 B.C., Haug 2400 B.C. and Bâl [email protected]âdhar Tilak 4000 B.C. The ancient Hindus seldom kept any historical record of their literary, religious or political achievements. The Vedas were handed down from mouth to mouth from a period of unknown antiquity; and the Hindus generally believed that they were never composed by men. It was therefore generally supposed that either they were taught by God to the sages, or that they were of themselves revealed to the sages who were the "seers" ([email protected]@tâ_) of the hymns. Thus we find that when some time had elapsed after the composition of the Vedas, people had come to look upon them not only as very old, but so old that they had, theoretically at least, no beginning in time, though they were believed to have been revealed at some unknown remote period at the beginning of each creation.
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We remember that this is distinctly that which Prabhâkara sought to repudiate. Prabhâkara did not consider the self to be self-luminous, and held that such is the threefold nature of thought (tripu@ti), that it at once reveals the knowledge, the object of knowledge, and the self. He further said, that the analogy of the red-hot iron ball did not hold, for the iron ball and the fire are separately experienced, but the self and the anta@hkara@na are never separately experienced, and we can never say that these two are really different, and only have an illusory appearance of a seeming unity. Perception (anubhava) is like a light which illuminates both the object and the self, and like it does not require the assistance of anything else for the fulfilment of its purpose. But the Vedânta objects to this saying that according to Prabhakara's supposition, it is impossible to discover any relation between the self and the knowledge. If knowledge can be regarded as revealing itself, the self may as well be held to be self-luminous; the self and the knowledge are indeed one and the same. Kumârila thinks this thought (anubhava), to be a movement, Nyâya and Prabhâkara as a quality of the self [Footnote ref 1]. But if it was a movement like other movements, it could not affect itself as illumination. If it were a substance and atomic in size, it would only manifest a small portion of a thing, if all pervasive, then it would illuminate everything, if of medium size, it would depend on its parts for its own
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[Footnote 1: According to Nyâya the âtman is conscious only through association with consciousness, but it is not consciousness(cit). Consciousness is associated with it only as a result of suitable collocations. Thus, Nyâyamañjarî in refuting the doctrine of self-luminosity {svaprakâs'a) says (p.432)
_sacetanas'citâ yogâttadyogena vinâ ja@da@h nârthâvabhâsadanyaddhi caitanya@m nâma manma@he.]
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constitution and not on the self. If it is regarded as a quality of the self as the light is of the lamp, then also it has necessarily to be supposed that it was produced by the self, for from what else could it be produced? Thus it is to be admitted that the self, the âtman, is the self-luminous entity. No one doubts any of his knowledge, whether it is he who sees or anybody else. The self is thus the same as vijñâna, the pure consciousness, which is always of itself self-luminous [Footnote ref 1].
Again, though consciousness is continuous in all stages, waking or sleeping, yet aha@mkâra is absent during deep sleep. It is true that on waking from deep sleep one feels "I slept happily and did not know anything"; yet what happens is this, that during deep sleep the anta@hkara@na and the aha@mkâra are altogether submerged in the ajñâna, and there are only the ajñâna and the self; on waking, this aha@mkâra as a state of anta@hkar@na is again generated, and then it associates the perception of the ajñâna in the sleep and originates the perception "I did not know anything." This aha@mkâra which is a mode (v@rtti) of the anta@hkara@na is thus constituted by avidyâ, and is manifested as jñânas'akti (power of knowledge) and kriyâs'akti (power of work). This kriyâs'akti of the aha@mkâra is illusorily imposed upon the self, and as a result of that the self appears to be an active agent in knowing and willing. The aha@mkâra itself is regarded, as we have already seen, as a mode or v@rtti of the anta@hkara@na, and as such the aha@mkâra of a past period can now be associated; but even then the v@rtti of anta@hkara@na, aha@mkâra, may be regarded as only the active side or aspect of the anta@hkara@na. The same anta@hkara@na is called manas in its capacity as doubt buddhi in its capacity as achieving certainty of knowledge, and citta in its capacity as remembering [Footnote ref 2]. When the pure cit shines forth in association with this anta@hkara@na, it is called a jîva. It is clear from the above account that the ajñâna is not a mere nothing, but is the principle of the phenomena. But it cannot stand alone, without the principle of the real to support it (âs'raya); its own nature as the ajñâna or indefinite is perceived directly by the pure consciousness; its movements as originating the phenomena remain indefinite in themselves, the real as underlying
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[Footnote 1: See Nyâyamakaranda, pp. 130-140, Citshkha and Vivara@naprameyasa@mgraha, pp. 53-58.]
[Footnote 2: See Vedânta-paribhâ@sâ, p. 88, Bombay edition.]
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these phenomenal movements can only manifest itself through these which hide it, when corresponding states arise in the anta@hkara@na, and the light of the real shines forth through these states. The anta@hkara@na of which aha@mkâra is a moment, is itself a beginningless system of ajñâna-phenomena containing within it the associations and impressions of past phenomena as merit, demerit, instincts, etc. from a beginningless time when the jîva or individual soul began his career.
Anirvâcyavâda and the Vedânta Dialectic.
We have already seen that the indefinite ajñâna could be experienced in direct perception and according to Vedânta there are only two categories. The category of the real, the self-luminous Brahman, and the category of the indefinite. The latter has for its ground the world-appearance, and is the principle by which the one unchangeable Brahman is falsely manifested in all the diversity of the manifold world. But this indefinite which is different from the category of the positive and the negative, has only a relative existence and will ultimately vanish, when the true knowledge of the Brahman dawns. Nothing however can be known about the nature of this indefinite except its character as indefinite. That all the phenomena of the world, the fixed order of events, the infinite variety of world-forms and names, all these are originated by this avidyâ, ajñâna or mâyâ is indeed hardly comprehensible. If it is indefinite nescience, how can all these well-defined forms of world-existence come out of it? It is said to exist only relatively, and to have only a temporary existence beside the permanent infinite reality. To take such a principle and to derive from it the mind, matter, and indeed everything else except the pure self-luminous Brahman, would hardly appeal to our reason. If this system of world-order were only seeming appearance, with no other element of truth in it except pure being, then it would be indefensible in the light of reason. It has been proved that whatever notions we have about the objective world are all self-contradictory, and thus groundless and false. If they have all proceeded from the indefinite they must show this character when exposed to discerning criticism. All categories have to be shown to be so hopelessly confused and to be without any conceivable notion that though apparent before us yet they crumble into indefiniteness as soon as they are
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examined, and one cannot make such assertion about them as that they are or that they are not. Such negative criticisms of our fundamental notions about the world-order were undertaken by S'rîhar@sa and his commentator and follower Citsukha. It is impossible within the limits of this chapter, to give a complete account of their criticisms of our various notions of reality. I shall give here, only one example.
Let us take the examination of the notion of difference (bheda)from Kha@n@danakha@n@dakhâdya. Four explanations are possible about the notion of difference: (1) the difference may be perceived as appearing in its own characteristics in our experience (svarûpa-bheda) as Prabhâkara thinks; (2) the difference between two things is nothing but the absence of one in the other (anyonyâbhâva), as some Naiyâyikas and Bhâ@t@tas think; (3) difference means divergence of characteristics (vaidharmya) as the Vais'e@sikas speak of it; (4) difference may be a separate quality in itself like the p@rthaktva quality of Nyâya. Taking the first alternative, we see that it is said that the jug and the cloth represent in themselves, by their very form and existence, their mutual difference from each other. But if by perceiving the cloth we only perceive its difference from the jug as the characteristic of the cloth, then the jug also must have penetrated into the form of the cloth, otherwise how could we perceive in the cloth its characteristics as the difference from the jug? i.e. if difference is a thing which can be directly perceived by the senses, then as difference would naturally mean difference from something else, it is expected that something else such as jug, etc. from which the difference is perceived, must also be perceived directly in the perception of the cloth. But if the perception of "difference" between two things has penetrated together in the same identical perception, then the self-contradiction becomes apparent. Difference as an entity is not what we perceive in the cloth, for difference means difference from something else, and if that thing from which the difference is perceived is not perceived, then how can the difference as an entity be perceived? If it is said that the cloth itself represents its difference from the jug, and that this is indicated by the jug, then we may ask, what is the nature of the jug? If the difference from the cloth is the very nature of the jug, then the cloth itself is also involved in the nature of the jug. If it is said that
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the jug only indicates a term from which difference is intended to be conveyed, then that also becomes impossible, for how can we imagine that there is a term which is independent of any association of its difference from other things, and is yet a term which establishes the notion of difference? If it is a term of difference, it cannot be independent of its relation to other things from which it is differentiated. If its difference from the cloth is a quality of the jug, then also the old difficulty comes in, for its difference from the cloth would involve the cloth also in itself; and if the cloth is involved in the nature of the jug as its quality, then by the same manner the jug would also be the character of the cloth, and hence not difference but identity results. Moreover, if a cloth is perceived as a character of the jug, the two will appear to be hanging one over the other, but this is never so experienced by us. Moreover, it is difficult to ascertain if qualities have any relation with things; if they have not, then absence of relation being the same everywhere, everything might be the quality of everything. If there is a relation between these two, then that relation would require another relation to relate itself with that relation, and that would again require another relation and that another, and so on. Again, it may be said that when the jug, etc. are seen without reference to other things, they appear as jug, etc., but when they are viewed with reference to cloth, etc. they appear as difference. But this cannot be so, for the perception as jug is entirely different from the perception of difference. It should also be noted that the notion of difference is also different from the notions of both the jug and the cloth. It is one thing to say that there are jug and cloth, and quite another thing to say that the jug is different from the cloth. Thus a jug cannot appear as difference, though it may be viewed with reference to cloth. The notion of a jug does not require the notions of other things for its manifestation. Moreover, when I say the jug is different from the cloth, I never mean that difference is an entity which is the same as the jug or the cloth; what I mean is that the difference of the cloth from the jug has its limits in the jug, and not merely that the notion of cloth has a reference to jug. This shows that difference cannot be the characteristic nature of the thing perceived.
Again, in the second alternative where difference of two
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things is defined as the absence of each thing in the other, we find that if difference in jug and cloth means that the jug is not in the cloth or that cloth is not in jug, then also the same difficulty arises; for when I say that the absence or negation of jug in the cloth is its difference from the jug, then also the residence of the absence of jug in the cloth
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