A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1 by Surendranath Dasgupta (desktop ebook reader txt) 📕

all its objects in this that it is never dependent on anything else for its manifestation, but manifests all other objects such as the jug, the cloth, etc. If consciousness should require another consciousness to manifest it, then that might again require another, and that another, and so on ad infinitum (anavasthâ). If consciousness did not manifest itself at the time of the object-manifestation, then even on seeing or knowing a thing one might doubt if he had seen or known it. It is thus to be admitted that consciousness (anubhûti) manifests itself and thereby maintains the appearance

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[Footnote 1: Vedanta would have either pratijñâ, hetu and udâharana, or udâhara@na, upanaya and nigamana, and not all the five of Nyâya, viz. pratijña, hetu, udâhara@na, upanaya and nigamana.]

[Footnote 2: Vedântic notions of the pramâna of upamana, arthapatti, s'abda and anupalabdhi, being similar to the mîmâm@sâ view, do not require to be treated here separately.]

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of all our world experience. This goes directly against the jñâtatâ theory of Kumârila that consciousness was not immediate but was only inferable from the manifesting quality (jñâtatâ) of objects when they are known in consciousness.

Now Vedânta says that this self-luminous pure consciousness is the same as the self. For it is only self which is not the object of any knowledge and is yet immediate and ever present in consciousness. No one doubts about his own self, because it is of itself manifested along with all states of knowledge. The self itself is the revealer of all objects of knowledge, but is never itself the object of knowledge, for what appears as the perceiving of self as object of knowledge is but association comprehended under the term aha@mkâra (ego). The real self is identical with the pure manifesting unity of all consciousness. This real self called the âtman is not the same as the jîva or individual soul, which passes through the diverse experiences of worldly life. Îs'vara also must be distinguished from this highest âtman or Brahman. We have already seen that many Vedântists draw a distinction between mâyâ and avidyâ. Mâyâ is that aspect of ajñâna by which only the best attributes are projected, whereas avidyâ is that aspect by which impure qualities are projected. In the former aspect the functions are more of a creative, generative (vik@sepa) type, whereas in the latter veiling (âvara@na) characteristics are most prominent. The relation of the cit or pure intelligence, the highest self, with mâyâ and avidyâ (also called ajñâna) was believed respectively to explain the phenomenal Îs'vara and the phenomenal jîva or individual. This relation is conceived in two ways, namely as upâdhi or pratibimba, and avaccheda. The conception of pratibimba or reflection is like the reflection of the sun in the water where the image, though it has the same brilliance as the sun, yet undergoes the effect of the impurity and movements of the water. The sun remains ever the same in its purity untouched by the impurities from which the image sun suffers. The sun may be the same but it may be reflected in different kinds of water and yield different kinds of images possessing different characteristics and changes which though unreal yet phenomenally have all the appearance of reality. The other conception of the relation is that when we speak of âkâs'a (space) in the jug or of âkâs'a in the room. The âkâs'a in reality does not suffer

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any modification in being within the jug or within the room. In reality it is all-pervasive and is neither limited (avachinna) within the jug or the room, but is yet conceived as being limited by the jug or by the room. So long as the jug remains, the âkâs'a limited within it will remain as separate from the âkâs'a limited within the room.

Of the Vedântists who accept the reflection analogy the followers of N@rsi@mhâs'rama think that when the pure cit is reflected in the mâyâ, Îs'vara is phenomenally produced, and when in the avidyâ the individual or jîva. Sarvajñâtmâ however does not distinguish between the mâyâ and the avidyâ, and thinks that when the cit is reflected in the avidyâ in its total aspect as cause, we get Îs'vara, and when reflected in the anta@hkara@na—a product of the avidyâ—we have jîva or individual soul.

Jîva or individual means the self in association with the ego and other personal experiences, i.e. phenomenal self, which feels, suffers and is affected by world-experiences. In jîva also three stages are distinguished; thus when during deep sleep the anta@hkara@na is submerged, the self perceives merely the ajñâna and the jîva in this state is called prâjña or ânandamaya. In the dream-state the self is in association with a subtle body and is called taijasa. In the awakened state the self as associated with a subtle and gross body is called vis'va. So also the self in its pure state is called Brahman, when associated with mâyâ it is called Îs'vara, when associated with the fine subtle element of matter as controlling them, it is called hira@nyagarbha; when with the gross elements as the ruler or controller of them it is called virâ@t puru@sa.

The jîva in itself as limited by its avidyâ is often spoken of as pâramarthika (real), when manifested through the sense and the ego in the waking states as vyavahârika (phenomenal), and when in the dream states as dream-self, prâtibhâ@sika (illusory).

Prakâs'âtmâ and his followers think that since ajñâna is one there cannot be two separate reflections such as jîva and Îs'vara; but it is better to admit that jîva is the image of Îs'vara in the ajñâna. The totality of Brahma-cit in association with mâyâ is Îs'vara, and this when again reflected through the ajñâna gives us the jîva. The manifestation of the jîva is in the anta@hkara@na as states of knowledge. The jîva thus in reality is Îs'vara and apart from jîva and Îs'vara there is no other separate existence of

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Brahma-caitanya. Jîva being the image of Îs'vara is thus dependent on him, but when the limitations of jîva are removed by right knowledge, the jîva is the same Brahman it always was.

Those who prefer to conceive the relation as being of the avaccheda type hold that reflection (pratibimba) is only possible of things which have colour, and therefore jîva is cit limited (avacchinna) by the anta@hkara@na (mind). Îs'vara is that which is beyond it; the diversity of anta@hkara@nas accounts for the diversity of the jîvas. It is easy however to see that these discussions are not of much fruit from the point of view of philosophy in determining or comprehending the relation of Îs'vara and jîva. In the Vedânta system Îs'vara has but little importance, for he is but a phenomenal being; he may be better, purer, and much more powerful than we, but yet he is as much phenomenal as any of us. The highest truth is the self, the reality, the Brahman, and both jîva and Îs'vara are but illusory impositions on it. Some Vedântists hold that there is but one jîva and one body, and that all the world as well as all the jîvas in it are merely his imaginings. These dream jîvas and the dream world will continue so long as that super-jîva continues to undergo his experiences; the world-appearance and all of us imaginary individuals, run our course and salvation is as much imaginary salvation as our world-experience is an imaginary experience of the imaginary jîvas. The cosmic jîva is alone the awakened jîva and all the rest are but his imaginings. This is known as the doctrine of ekajîva (one-soul).

The opposite of this doctrine is the theory held by some Vedântists that there are many individuals and the world-appearance has no permanent illusion for all people, but each person creates for himself his own illusion, and there is no objective datum which forms the common ground for the illusory perception of all people; just as when ten persons see in the darkness a rope and having the illusion of a snake there, run away, and agree in their individual perceptions that they have all seen the same snake, though each really had his own illusion and there was no snake at all. According to this view the illusory perception of each happens for him subjectively and has no corresponding objective phenomena as its ground. This must be distinguished from the normal Vedânta view which holds that objectively phenomena are also happening, but that these

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are illusory only in the sense that they will not last permanently and have thus only a temporary and relative existence in comparison with the truth or reality which is ever the same constant and unchangeable entity in all our perceptions and in all world-appearance. According to the other view phenomena are not objectively existent but are only subjectively imagined; so that the jug I see had no existence before I happened to have the perception that there was the jug; as soon as the jug illusion occurred to me I said that there was the jug, but it did not exist before. As soon as I had the perception there was the illusion, and there was no other reality apart from the illusion. It is therefore called the theory of d@r@s@tis@r@s@tivâda, i.e. the theory that the subjective perception is the creating of the objects and that there are no other objective phenomena apart from subjective perceptions. In the normal Vedânta view however the objects of the world are existent as phenomena by the sense-contact with which the subjective perceptions are created. The objective phenomena in themselves are of course but modifications of ajñâna, but still these phenomena of the ajñâna are there as the common ground for the experience of all. This therefore has an objective epistemology whereas the d@r@s@tis@r@s@tivâda has no proper epistemology, for the experiences of each person are determined by his own subjective avidyâ and previous impressions as modifications of the avidyâ. The d@r@s@tis@r@s@tivâda theory approaches nearest to the Vijñânavâda Buddhism, only with this difference that while Buddhism does not admit of any permanent being Vedânta admits the Brahman, the permanent unchangeable reality as the only truth, whereas the illusory and momentary perceptions are but impositions on it.

The mental and physical phenomena are alike in this, that both are modifications of ajñâna. It is indeed difficult to comprehend the nature of ajñâna, though its presence in consciousness can be perceived, and though by dialectic criticism all our most well-founded notions seem to vanish away and become self-contradictory and indefinable. Vedânta explains the reason of this difficulty as due to the fact that all these indefinable forms and names can only be experienced as modes of the real, the self-luminous. Our innate error which we continue from beginningless time consists in this, that the real in its full complete light is ever hidden from us, and the glimpse

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that we get of it is always through manifestations of forms and names; these phenomenal forms and names are undefinable, incomprehensible, and unknowable in themselves, but under certain conditions they are manifested by the self-luminous real, and at the time they are so manifested they seem to have a positive being which is undeniable. This positive being is only the highest being, the real which appears as the being of those forms and names. A lump of clay may be moulded into a plate or a cup, but the plate-form or the cup-form has no existence or being apart from the being of the clay; it is the being of the clay that is imposed on the diverse forms which also then seem to have being in themselves. Our illusion thus consists in mutually misattributing the characteristics of the unreal forms—the modes of ajñâna and the real being. As this illusion is the mode of all our experience and its very essence, it is indeed difficult for us to conceive of the Brahman as apart from the modes of ajñâna. Moreover such is the nature of ajñânas that they are knowable only by a false identification of them with the self-luminous Brahman or âtman. Being as such is the highest truth, the Brahman. The ajñâna states are not non-being in the sense of nothing of pure negation (abhâva), but in the sense that they are not being. Being that is the self-luminous illuminates non-being, the ajñâna, and this illumination means nothing more than a false identification of being with non-being. The forms of ajñâna if they are to be known must be associated with pure consciousness, and this association means an illusion, superimposition, and mutual misattribution. But apart from pure consciousness these cannot be manifested or known, for it is pure consciousness alone that is self-luminous. Thus when we try to know the ajñâna states in themselves as apart from the âtman we fail in a dilemma, for knowledge means illusory superimposition or illusion, and when it is not knowledge they evidently cannot be known. Thus apart from its being a factor in our illusory experience no other kind of its existence is known to us. If ajñâna had been a